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The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, is one of forty-
one districts in the Corps’ organization. As the northernmost district 
in the Mississippi Valley Division, it centers on the headwaters of the 
Mississippi River and the uppermost section of the river’s nine-foot 
navigation channel. The St. Paul District oversees civil works projects 
and conducts disaster relief within the geographic boundaries of the 
district, implements the Corps’ regulatory program in the states of Minnesota and 
Wisconsin and assists with other Corps’ missions wherever needed. The following 
history updates the book Creativity, Confl ict & Controversy: A History of the St. Paul 
District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, published in 1979.1 This book describes how 
the St. Paul District responded to enormous changes in the Corps’ missions and 
organization in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
The St. Paul District in the Environmental Era
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been the federal government’s leading civil 
works agency for more than two centuries. It built its reputation largely on river and 
harbor improvements, such as the nine-foot navigation channel in the Mississippi 
River and dikes and dams for fl ood control and hydroelectric power. In the 1960s and 
1970s, the environmental movement fundamentally altered the public outlook on the 
Corps’ works. Many people recognized rivers and lakes and wetlands to be some of 
the most vulnerable elements of the natural environment. Dams, some argued, were 
perhaps the most egregious example of heavy-handed transformations of the landscape. 
Engineering projects that were unquestioningly termed “improvements” in the past 
were condemned by environmentalists as misguided and destructive. Moreover, the 
public developed a more skeptical attitude toward government and technocracy and 
demanded greater participation in public land management decisions. In response, the 
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Corps reinvented its public image, evolving from the nation’s leading dam builder to 
its principal steward of water resources. Seeking to win public confi dence, it navigated 
through a changed political landscape of environmental impact studies and public 
review. More than a few social scientists and environmentalists marveled at the Corps’ 
success, though many still contended that the Corps wrought environmental damage 
wherever it worked. 
The St. Paul District has played a signifi cant role in the “greening” of the Corps. 
It embraced the Corps’ new mission of environmental management on the Upper 
Mississippi River – a project that Congress has continually funded since 1986. When 
the Corps performed maintenance on the nine-foot channel, it placed dredged material 
so as to create islands and back channels that would provide new wildlife habitat. The 
Corps came to occupy a key role in interagency administration of the river, mediating 
between environmentalists and recreational-use interests on the one hand and fl ood-
prone communities and commercial-navigation interests on the other.
The St. Paul District similarly embraced the Corps’ expanded mission in regulatory 
matters, particularly its role in protecting wetlands. The district took initiative in 
redrawing regulatory boundaries to conform to state lines so that it could work more 
effectively with state regulatory programs in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Since these 
states had two of the most aggressive wetlands protection programs in the nation, the 
St. Paul District forged ahead of many other districts in proving the Corps’ commitment 
to the protection of this resource.
The St. Paul District demonstrated environmental sensitivity in other areas, from new 
project designs such as the $115-million Rochester, Minnesota, Flood Control Project 
to restoration efforts such as the Weaver Bottoms Rehabilitation, both of which were 
recognized with the Chief of Engineers Award of Excellence – the most prestigious 
award given to civil works projects. Since 1975, the St. Paul District has received four 
Awards of Excellence, an outstanding record. The professionalism the district has 
cultivated in the course of improving its environmental standing extends to other 
programs, including innovations in the development of recreational facilities and the 
making of one of the Corps’ strongest district history programs.
Unlike most districts, the St. Paul District does not participate in military programs, 
but rather focuses exclusively on civil works. This is one factor that encourages the 
district to excel in its areas of specialization. Moreover, it is said that the individuals 
who comprise the St. Paul District tend to be less mobile within the organization, less 
inclined to seek or accept a reassignment, more loyal to their sense of place than is 
characteristic of most district staff. Longevity has both advantages and disadvantages 
for the organization, but one of its advantages is producing people with a greater 
commitment to quality of living. Many people in the St. Paul District are reluctant to 
transfer elsewhere because they like St. Paul and the region – they have a personal stake 
in the environment. Yet, the human resource may be less signifi cant than the geographic 
and political setting in explaining the St. Paul District’s orientation.
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Most of this region is fl at. The major exception is the “Driftless Area” of southwest 
Wisconsin, so-named because it escaped glaciation during the Ice Ages and is lacking 
glacial “drift” or deposit, therefore exhibiting a much older geologic imprint of 
uplift and dissection by water erosion. Other hills include the Mesabi Range and 
the Vermillion Range in northeast Minnesota, which form the divide with the Great 
Lakes Basin. Generally, the topography of the St. Paul District shows the marks of past 
continental glaciers, which left behind thousands of natural lakes and prairie potholes, 
as well as low, rounded hills, kettle moraines, ancient fl ood plains, and dry river 
channels.3 The Red River Valley, the fl attest area in a region known for its fl atness, is the 
bed of the gigantic glacial Lake Agassiz. Its rich, black soil is extraordinarily fertile. 
Indeed, most of the area within the St. Paul District features soil that is highly 
productive for agriculture – another consequence of past glaciation. The continental 
glaciers not only covered the original land surface with a deep, fl at layer of glacial 
till, they also imported and deposited limestone and other minerals that made good 
soil-building material. Deposits of loess in some areas and lacustrine materials of old 
lakebeds in others formed additional mantles of good 
soil. Most of the St. Paul District, from North Dakota’s 
Red River Valley in the west to Wisconsin’s central 
counties in the east, has yielded rich farm crops for 
more than a century.4 
The climate of this region is continental, marked by 
temperature extremes from winter to summer, as well 
as by dramatic temperature shifts within each season. 
For its mid-continent location it is also relatively 
humid, with 30 to 40 inches of annual precipitation. 
Rainfall is generally highest in the summer, with 
much of it occurring in torrential thunderstorms. 
These climatic conditions, added to the fl at 
topography and the abundance of water, make large 
areas of the St. Paul District particularly fl ood prone. 
Because the region is mid-continent and devoid of 
mountain barriers, the rivers and lakes have provided 
pathways of commerce for centuries. Since the 
nineteenth century, the Mississippi River has served 
as the main artery of commerce with the outside 
world. The Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, 
formed at the river’s farthest point of navigation 
at St. Anthony Falls, became the region’s largest 
metropolitan area very early. The U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers opened an offi ce in St. Paul in 1866 for 
the purpose of surveying the Upper Mississippi and 
its tributaries – a permanent presence that eventually 
became the St. Paul District.
Upper and Lower Locks at St. 
Anthony Falls, Minneapolis:  
The falls were the highest 
point of navigation on the 
Mississippi River when the 
Corps of Engineers opened 
an offi ce in St. Paul in 1866. 
(Photo courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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Throughout its history, the St. Paul District has made the Mississippi River its central 
focus. In the 1930s, it oversaw dredging of a nine-foot channel for navigation as far 
upriver as St. Anthony Falls. This project assisted farmers and industry by facilitating 
the transportation of grain downstream and coal upstream. The project had unintended 
environmental consequences, however, as the dumping of dredge material in 
backwaters along the edges of the river harmed vegetation and wildlife habitat in these 
sensitive wetland areas.
By the 1960s and 1970s, public concern for the ecological and recreational values of 
the Mississippi River vied with more traditional considerations of its navigability 
and susceptibility to fl ooding. In the last quarter of the century, the Corps devoted 
increasing attention to reclamation and preservation of the river’s natural features.5 
In addition to lakes and rivers, the region contains a vast amount of wetlands. 
Outside of Alaska, the St. Paul District encompasses more wetlands than any other 
Corps’ district in the nation – much of it in the form of prairie potholes and inland 
fresh marshes that interface 
with agricultural lands. Long 
maligned by the general public 
as worthless, these areas were 
once converted to farmland as 
fast as they could be ditched 
and drained. In the last quarter 
century, however, the public 
value of wetlands has changed 
radically. The Corps of Engineers 
now plays an important role in 
preserving the nation’s wetlands, 
and the St. Paul District occupies 
a strategic place in this effort. 
Political Setting of the St. Paul District 
The St. Paul District overlaps portions of fi ve farm 
states. Agriculture built these state economies and 
continues to have a strong infl uence on state politics. 
In North Dakota, South Dakota and Iowa, farmers and 
farming-based communities are a dominating factor in 
most local governments. In Minnesota and Wisconsin, 
agricultural interests similarly control most county 
governments. However, in Minnesota and Wisconsin, 
there are large cities, as well as numerous small cities, 
and the state economies are more diversifi ed, meaning 
that urban and nonagricultural interests have a greater 
infl uence at the state level.
St. Paul District boundary:  
The current boundaries, 
after the realignment in 
1979, of the St. Paul District 
include portions of fi ve 
states. (Map courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
Introd
uction
1
9
Wisconsin in the last quarter of the twentieth century has remained less urban than the 
nation as a whole. Though highly industrialized, comparatively few of its people live in 
large cities. The majority of Wisconsin residents live in cities of less than 50 thousand, or 
towns, or in the country; about twenty percent live on farms. Minnesota, with slightly 
fewer people than Wisconsin, has the larger metropolitan area of the two states: the 
Twin Cities. Minnesota’s next largest cities, Duluth and Rochester, each have fewer 
than 100 thousand inhabitants. Yet even Duluth and Rochester are larger than North 
Dakota’s largest city of Fargo, which contains a population of 75 thousand.
Wisconsin, Minnesota and North Dakota received large numbers of German and 
Scandinavian immigrants in the nineteenth century. All three states developed political 
traditions of agrarian dissent and populism. In Wisconsin, the Republican Party 
embraced a persistent progressive wing. In Minnesota, the state Democratic Party 
fused with the leftist Farmer-Laborites in 1944 to form the Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
party, which occupies the left of the political spectrum to this day. In North Dakota, 
leftist farmers formed the Nonpartisan League, which gained control of the state 
government for a few years in the early twentieth century. The Nonpartisan League 
eventually vanished into the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party prevails in the 
state today. In each of these states, liberal and conservative divisions do not run along 
predictable fault lines, and the Corps encounters politically active citizens both in rural 
and urban contexts. 
This district history is organized into ten chapters (including an introduction and a 
conclusion). Six central chapters focus on a Corps’ mission or program: navigation, 
fl ood control, wetlands protection, recreation, cultural resources management and 
disaster relief. The two remaining chapters address organizational change: the fi rst 
concentrating on internal reform and the second discussing external relationships. Since 
the main theme of this history is how the St. Paul District participated in the Corps’ 
efforts to reinvent itself in the environmental era, we begin with the chapter on internal 
reform of the organization.
Chapter 1 Endnotes
1 Raymond H. Merritt, The Corps, the Environment, and the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Offi ce of Administrative Services, Offi ce of the 
Chief of Engineers, 1984).
2 William E. Lass, Minnesota: A Bicentennial History (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1977), 3.
3 Richard Nelson, Current, Wisconsin: A Bicentennial History (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., Inc., 1977), 12-13.
4 John H. Garland, ed., The North American Midwest: A Regional Geography (New York:  
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955), 6.
5 Lass, Minnesota, 4-5.
Site survey:  Mike Dahlquist (left) and Jim Sentz 
look at survey information for the St. Cloud, 
Minnesota, erosion control project. (Photo by 
Shannon Bauer, courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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During the past thirty years, the Army Corps of Engineers has proven 
adept at embracing new missions to meet the changing needs of the 
nation. In particular, the Corps has responded to environmentalism. 
As early as the 1970s, the Corps’ adaptability became the subject of an 
in-depth study by the Brookings Institution, Can Organizations Change? 
Environmental Protection, Citizen Participation, and the Corps of Engineers. 
The authors of the study were cautiously optimistic that the Corps could assimilate new 
environmental values into its varied missions and that its environmental mission could 
be translated into new programs.1 In the following decades, the Corps moved toward 
more environmentally-sensitive approaches in its traditional workload involving river 
and harbor dredging and fl ood control projects; and, at the same time, the Corps came 
to occupy a central role in the growing federal commitment to protection of wetlands. 
These impressive changes notwithstanding, the Corps faced additional challenges 
in demonstrating it could improve its effi ciency. Efforts to downsize the federal 
bureaucracy and to trim the Department of Defense after the end of the Cold War fell 
heavily on the Army Corps of Engineers, especially in the 1990s. The Corps responded 
with successive plans and initiatives to streamline its decentralized administrative 
organization of divisions and districts, to revamp the way it conducted business and to 
stretch federal dollars by means of cost-sharing agreements with local sponsors.
The St. Paul District faced in microcosm the challenges that beset the whole Corps. 
Most of the pressure for organizational change came from Congress and from 
within the executive branch of the federal government; therefore, most of the 
direction to change sprang from the Corps’ Headquarters Division, or HQUSACE, 
and emanated outward through the fi eld divisions to the districts in the Corps’ 
organization. However, the districts continued to serve as primary points of contact 
for members of Congress, so political pressures at the district level shaped the 
process of organizational change as well. In general, the St. Paul District underwent a 
2Reinventing the St. Paul District
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transformation during the past thirty years in step with other Corps’ districts and in 
response to national trends and developments.
Organizational change in the St. Paul District may be divided into two principal 
areas: realignment of the district’s geographical boundaries (and, later, its transfer 
from one division to another) and modifi cations in the district’s internal organization. 
This chapter examines organizational change in these two contexts. A third area of 
organizational change, which involves how the district and the Corps interact with 
other agencies, governments and nongovernment organizations, is addressed in 
Chapter Nine.
Realignment: The St. Paul District and the Corps
The Corps is a decentralized organization with offi ces and key personnel distributed 
widely throughout the United States so as to be near the resource and available to 
local and state offi cials and members of Congress in their respective districts. In the 
nineteenth century, offi cers were stationed in various cities, and the projects in their 
charge defi ned the geographic range of their respective offi ces. The Corps began to refer 
to projects as “districts” in the 1890s and gave names to the districts in 1908. It described 
the geographic boundaries of each district for the fi rst time in 1913. The districts took 
shape within a divisional organizational structure, each district offi cer reporting to 
a division commander. There were fi ve divisions in 1889, nine in 1908 and eleven by 
the end of World War II, while the number of districts fl uctuated. After World War II, 
Congress reduced the number of districts.2
The St. Paul District dates to 1866, when Major Gouverneur Kemble Warren opened an 
engineer’s offi ce in St. Paul and initiated a survey of the Upper Mississippi River and 
its tributaries. The earliest description of the St. Paul District’s boundaries included 
the Mississippi River drainage from the river’s headwaters to the lower end of Lock 1 
between St. Paul and Minneapolis, together with the Red River of the North drainage 
as far as the international boundary with Canada, and the Rainy River drainage in 
northern Minnesota, which encompasses the boundary waters area. The district was 
enlarged in 1919 by the addition of the Mississippi River from Lock 1 downstream to 
the mouth of the Wisconsin River. It was enlarged again in 1930 by the addition of the 
whole Wisconsin River drainage. The boundaries were extended further in 1940 to 
include more of the Mississippi River down to Lock and Dam 10 at Guttenberg, Iowa. 
A portion of the Upper Peninsula of Michigan draining into Lake Superior and Isle 
Royale were added to the district in 1941. The St. Paul District was originally part of the 
Northwest Division. It was transferred to the Upper Mississippi Valley Division and 
then to the North Central Division – where it remained when discussion about another 
reorganization of the Corps ensued in 1978.3
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Realignment of District Boundaries
When the Corps examined 
alternatives for a realignment of 
districts and divisions in 1978, it 
was the largest such reorganization 
effort since World War II. The 
underlying reason for reorganization 
was recognition of the fact that the 
Corps had a declining workload. 
The era of large-scale water 
resource development projects had 
passed. Changing environmental 
considerations, coupled with rising 
construction costs, led to a steady 
winnowing and down-scaling of 
project proposals. Soon after taking offi ce in 1977, President 
Jimmy Carter identifi ed water resource development projects 
as some of the most egregious examples of the pork-barrel 
politics that he had promised to fi ght in his presidential 
campaign. Carter prevailed on Congress – particularly on the 
Democratic leadership – to cut many projects from the annual 
appropriation bill in 1977, and he vetoed the bill altogether in 
1978. This political fi ght “left deep scars” and was one of the 
primary sources of Carter’s troubled relations with Congress, 
according to Carter’s memoir.4 But it established a precedent 
that subsequent presidents would follow – of challenging the 
close relationship that Congress had long enjoyed with the 
Army Corps of Engineers.5 Thus, the Corps had to adjust to 
an uncertain future in which new projects would be smaller 
and more varied and appropriation bills would be sorely 
contested by Congress and the Administration.
Another reason for reorganization was to bring the districts 
into better alignment with major river basins. Increasingly, 
river basins drew attention as rational geographic units 
for interagency planning, and river basin commissions 
were formed to guide such efforts. The Upper Mississippi 
River Basin Commission, established in 1972 by President 
Richard Nixon at the request of seven state governors, was 
one such body. The commission sought to improve public 
decision-making by bringing together ten different federal 
agencies that oversaw land and water resource programs in 
the river basin and by encouraging maximum participation 
by the public.6 The growing emphasis on interagency 
regional planning caused the Corps to reexamine its district 
boundaries with the intent of making the Corps a more 
effective team player.
Baldhill Dam, 
Sheyenne River, N.D.:  
The district operates 
and maintains 
approximately 
sixteen multi-purpose 
reservoirs, mainly for 
fl ood control, and 
another thirteen 
locks and dams for 
navigation. (Photo by 
Ken Horner, courtesy of 
St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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These two factors – declining workload and watershed management – led the Corps 
to study various alternatives for a nationwide reorganization of divisions and districts. 
Looking at the Upper Midwest, the Corps considered eliminating both the Rock Island 
and Chicago districts by dividing the Rock Island District between the St. Paul and 
St. Louis districts, and splitting the Chicago District between the St. Paul and Detroit 
districts. Either scenario would have added responsibilities and personnel to the St. 
Paul District and enlarged its profi le on the Upper Mississippi River. Both scenarios 
encountered resistance by Illinois’ congressmen, who did not want a closure of either 
Illinois offi ce.7 
Instead, a plan emerged in which the St. Paul District would be divided. On May 25, 
1979, Major General Richard Harris, North Central Division commander, announced 
the reorganization plan for the Upper Midwest. He recommended transferring the area 
of the St. Paul District that drained into Lake Superior – parts of Minnesota, Wisconsin 
and the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, as well as Isle Royale – to the Detroit District. In 
addition, he proposed eliminating Chicago District, transferring the area that borders 
Lake Michigan to the Detroit District and transferring the area comprising the Illinois 
River drainage to the Rock Island District. In concept, this proposal sought to allow 
the St. Paul District to focus on the Upper Mississippi River and to allow the Detroit 
District to focus on the Great Lakes. Rounding out this conceptual plan, Major General 
Harris proposed the transfer of the St. Louis District from the Lower Mississippi Valley 
Division to the North Central Division. The whole North Central Division was to 
benefi t from this conceptual framework, in which three western districts (St. Paul, Rock 
Island and St. Louis) would share responsibility for the Upper Mississippi River all the 
way down to its confl uence with the Ohio River, and two eastern districts (Detroit and 
Buffalo) would share responsibility for the Great Lakes.8
Although the plan had merit conceptually, it had little to recommend it politically. 
The Illinois politicians quickly blocked the move to close the Chicago offi ce, and local 
interests in St. Louis successfully resisted the transfer of that district to the North 
Central Division, leaving just one part of Harris’s proposal alive: the realignment of the 
St. Paul and Detroit districts. At issue was the Corps’ presence in Duluth. Predictably, 
Congressman James Oberstar, whose congressional district included Duluth, opposed 
the transfer. Oberstar was close to the Corps. Before his election to Congress in 1974, he 
had served as administrative assistant to his predecessor, Congressman John Blatnik, 
and had been an administrator for the House Committee on Public Works from 1971 
to 1974. He preferred to deal with an offi ce in St. Paul rather than Detroit, and he 
pointed out that the St. Paul District in its present confi guration served almost the 
whole state of Minnesota. However, Oberstar, a Democrat, received no support from 
Minnesota’s other members of Congress. In the previous election year, the Republicans 
had campaigned on a platform of reduced government, and Minnesotans had elected 
two new Republican senators and a Republican governor, none of whom opposed 
the plan.9 Moreover, the Carter Administration favored the realignment and Vice 
President Walter Mondale, Minnesota’s most infl uential Democrat, was loyal to the 
administration initiative. Oberstar fi nally withdrew his opposition to the realignment 
after conferring by telephone with Mondale’s offi ce. The transfer was formally 
announced a few days later in mid-November 1979.10
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What did the St. Paul District and the Corps gain or lose by this realignment? The 
harbor at the extreme western end of Lake Superior serves the cities of Duluth, 
Minnesota, and Superior, Wisconsin. Harbor improvements by the Corps date from 
1867 in Superior and 1871 in Duluth. The ports were combined in 1896, and the facilities 
were subsequently expanded and modifi ed by ten separate River and Harbor Acts, 
the latest (in 1960) authorizing the Corps to increase the depth of several channels and 
slips to accommodate deep-draft Great Lakes vessels. The Corps had completed most 
of the harbor-deepening project by 1968 at a cost of $14.5 million. All previous harbor 
improvements had amounted to $1.5 million, while the cost of maintenance from the 
fi rst year they were authorized until 1979 was $18 million.11 The harbor area is about 
19 square miles and contains 17 miles of dredged channels. Most of the cargo shipped 
in and out of the harbor consists of iron ore, grain, coal and limestone. The extensive 
facilities and the amount of commerce make this harbor one of the most important on 
the Great Lakes and in the nation.12
In 1979, the Duluth fi eld offi ce had 
an annual budget of $3.5 million and 
employed about a hundred people 
at peak season. Dredging and other 
activities contributed another $1.2 
million to the area economy. Despite 
initial concern that the realignment 
would cost Duluth money and jobs, the 
personnel and dredging equipment in 
Duluth were not relocated. The Corps’ 
personnel in the Duluth offi ce accepted 
the change with equanimity; some 
happily anticipated a greater degree 
of autonomy in working under the 
supervision of the more distant Detroit 
offi ce.13 Duluth’s port director, Davis 
Helberg, noted that dealing with Detroit 
would pose some logistical challenges 
but this could be offset by the Detroit 
District’s greater involvement in Great 
Lakes operations.14
The realignment mainly impacted the 
St. Paul District offi ce, where twenty-
eight employees were slated for transfer 
to Detroit to supervise Duluth-area 
operations.15 It resulted in the loss of 
several construction projects at a time 
when the St. Paul District already faced 
a declining workload. It also eliminated 
the district’s most visible point of contact 
with the general public – the Marine 
Duluth jetties, Minnesota:  Transfer of the 
Duluth harbor from St. Paul District to 
Detroit District took place in 1979. (Photo 
by Casondra Brewster, courtesy of Detroit 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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Museum in Duluth, which attracted hundreds of thousands of visitors annually.16 On 
the other hand, it allowed the St. Paul District to focus on rivers, as the reorganization 
plan had originally conceived, and offi cials presumed that the Detroit District benefi ted 
by the infusion of expertise from St. Paul for managing projects on the Great Lakes.17
The challenge of leading the St. Paul District personnel through the process of 
realignment fell largely on the shoulders of the new district engineer, Colonel William 
W. Badger, who took command of the district in June 1979. The reduction in size of 
the district from four major watersheds to three, and its loss of the harbors on Lake 
Superior – which cut the district’s dredging work by half – left Colonel Badger with 
limited options. He assumed charge of an offi ce that was already top heavy with 
senior staff and imposed a virtual hiring freeze for two years. In the political climate 
surrounding the realignment, he found it diffi cult to be innovative. In an effort to 
justify more senior-level positions, he proposed to his division commander, Major 
General Harris, that his people could take responsibility for river dredging, geophysical 
investigations and hydropower studies for all districts in the North Central Division. 
The St. Paul District, Badger suggested, could even handle all small fl ood control 
projects throughout the division. Harris cautiously agreed that the St. Paul District 
would become one of the lead districts for low-head hydropower studies, but he could 
not make the St. Paul District a regional resource center for the other items on Badger’s 
agenda. It was not possible, Harris explained, “in light of the reorganization decision.”18
The search for projects required much of the district engineer’s energy. Prior to his 
assignment to the St. Paul District, Colonel Badger had served the Chief of Engineers 
as special assistant for international programs. It was a new position, in which Colonel 
Badger had helped to develop a growing overseas program for the Corps largely 
funded by foreign governments. After his arrival in St. Paul, Badger tried to involve 
the St. Paul District in water conservation projects in Gabon, Nigeria, China and 
elsewhere overseas.
This search for additional work outside the district brought little reward. By the end 
of his three-year tenure, Colonel Badger was focusing on planning, concerned about 
further reductions in the workload in the future. He had become worried that he would 
“not have the projects in the pipeline that will keep the district healthy in the future,” he 
told an interviewer. “This may sound like survivalism, and in a way it is. I look at the 
district as a national asset, especially during a time of mobilization.”19
Although the St. Paul District lost Duluth in the realignment of 1979, it survived; 
and in the 1980s, efforts to change the organizational structure of the Corps focused 
primarily on staff development, staff organization and project management – internal 
developments that will be discussed later in this chapter. These innovations could only 
go so far, however, in addressing the organizational problems that were evident in 
1979: declining workload, rising overhead costs and, as a further consequence of the 
Corps’ diminishing horizons, an aging professional workforce. Moreover, as military 
construction declined toward the end of the Cold War, the Army Corps of Engineers 
found another one of its primary missions fading. As a result, Corps’ leadership called 
for renewed discussion of a major reorganization of the Corps’ fi eld structure. This 
time, the St. Paul District was on the list for elimination.
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The Reorganization Plan under the First Bush Administration
In 1988, the new Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General Henry Hatch, initiated a 
comprehensive review of the Army Corps of Engineers’ missions, goals and structure. 
He identifi ed reorganization of the Corps’ divisions and districts as a vital component 
of reinventing the Corps. The effort gained momentum with passage of the Energy 
and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1990, which directed the Corps to 
“initiate a broadbased conceptual study of potential fi eld organizational structures.” 
Congressional reports accompanying the appropriations bill for fi scal year 1991 
reinforced this directive.20
In June 1990, Chief of Engineers Hatch formed a study team under Fred H. Bayley III, 
chief of engineering in the Vicksburg District, Lower Mississippi Valley Division, to 
develop alternative approaches to reorganization. The study team’s report, called the 
Bayley Report, proposed fi ve alternative conceptual approaches for reorganization: 
realignment, regionalization, decentralization, elimination of division offi ces and a 
“combination option.” Pursuant to Congressional directive, the report was merely 
conceptual; it did not recommend specifi c changes that would impact one district or 
another. The Bayley Report was submitted to Congress on January 4, 1991.21
In the meantime, other developments were afoot that would have a crucial effect on the 
reorganization process and its outcome. With the end of the Cold War, the Department 
of Defense began to examine the need for reorganization of the entire U.S. military, with 
an emphasis on military installations that might be closed or consolidated. This wider 
effort commenced in mid-1988 after Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney established the 
Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, or BRAC Commission. Recognizing 
that base closures would affect local economies, that the economic consequences would 
fall unevenly across the nation and that the process would therefore become highly 
politicized, Congress attempted to cope with this problem in the Defense Authorization 
Amendments and Base Realignment and Closure Act of October 24, 1988, which 
provided that the Secretary of Defense and Congress must accept all or none of the 
recommendations by the BRAC Commission. However, this only raised the political 
stakes. Reluctant to accept the BRAC  Commission’s early recommendations, Congress 
passed the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, which established 
another commission to review the recommendations made by the Department of 
Defense. The latter commission’s recommendations would also require approval 
or rejection in their entirety. As these developments were brewing in 1990, Corps’ 
leadership began to consider whether the Corps’ plan for reorganization should be 
incorporated into the BRAC plan. Given the way Congress had picked apart the Corps’ 
previous reorganization effort in the late 1970s, it appeared that the BRAC process 
might offer the Corps the best chance for pushing its own reorganization plan through 
Congress. As a result, when Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) Dr. G. 
Edward Dickey submitted the Bayley Report to Congress on January 4, 1991, he averred 
that the next phase of the Corps’ reorganization effort would be aimed at inclusion in 
the BRAC process.22 
By this time, Chief of Engineers Hatch had formed a second reorganization study team 
for the specifi c purpose of hitching the Corps’ effort to the BRAC Commission’s 
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wagon. Lieutenant General Arthur E. Williams headed the new team. While the team 
included many members of the Bayley team, it worked on an independent report 
using various methodological tools provided by the BRAC Commission, most notably 
a “D-PAD Model.” In essence, the D-PAD computer analysis involved scoring each 
district and division on numerous capabilities and weighting the relative importance of 
those capabilities in order to determine the most effi cient scenario for realignment. After 
the D-PAD analysis was completed, the team sought intuitive input from twenty senior 
leaders in the organization “to supplement the purely analytical results” from D-PAD.23 
District leaders, however, were not invited to participate in the process.24
The Williams team worked from November 1990 to February 1991 and produced 
its own report, “The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Reorganization Study.” It made 
specifi c recommendations to realign the existing ten divisions and thirty-fi ve districts in 
the contiguous United States into six divisions and twenty-two districts. The plan called 
for a parallel realignment of divisions for the Corps’ civil works and military support 
missions, but division and district boundaries would conform to watershed boundaries 
for the civil works mission, whereas division boundaries would conform to state 
borders for the military support mission. Just one district in each division would be 
responsible for military construction throughout the division’s jurisdiction (compared 
to fi fteen districts with a military construction mission under the existing structure). The 
plan would eliminate 2,600 jobs and transfer 6,600 others. The authors estimated a cost 
for implementation of $266 million and annual savings of $112 million.25
The plan called for the closing of the St. Paul District together with twelve other 
districts. The St. Paul District would be combined with the Rock Island and St. Louis 
districts to form a single district for all of the Upper Mississippi River with its central 
offi ce in St. Louis. The plan contemplated expansion of the North Central Division and 
relocation of its headquarters to Louisville, Kentucky.
The Williams team released the scores used in its D-PAD analysis together with 
its recommendations. These scores revealed that the St. Paul District ranked high 
in the two broad categories of “fl exibility and expendability” and “quality of life/
competence,” – it had a skilled professional staff and it was admirably situated in St. 
Paul to take advantage of educational opportunities and other services. It was average 
in “operational effi ciencies” – a general measure of the cost of doing work. Its score 
suffered, however, in the two broad categories of “mission essentiality” and “mission 
suitability.” These categories refl ected the basic problem of a declining workload, and 
the D-PAD analysis indicated that the St. Paul District was feeling that pinch more than 
other districts. Indeed, the D-PAD analysis ranked the St. Paul District in twenty-fi rst 
place among thirty-six civil works districts. (Districts with military construction were 
ranked separately.)26
As soon as the Corps’ reorganization plan was completed, members of Congress whose 
districts would suffer the loss of a division or district offi ce – including Congressman 
Bruce Vento (DFL-Minnesota), whose congressional district included St. Paul – began to 
pressure the Administration to scuttle the plan. They threatened to oppose the military 
base closures initiative if it included Corps’ offi ces. Members of Congress argued that 
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the Corps could not be included under BRAC because congressional oversight of the 
Corps fell to the Senate and House committees on public works, not the committees 
on armed services. Anxious to protect the BRAC process, Secretary of Defense 
Cheney announced in April that he would not propose the Corps reorganization plan. 
Although he supported it in principle, the Administration would not try to include 
the Corps’ reorganization with the Administration’s current push to close thirty-one 
military installations around the nation. Not content with Cheney’s announcement, 
Congressman Vento went to Corps’ headquarters in Washington, D.C., to confi rm 
the plan was tabled. “There is no proposal or decision as of today to close the St. Paul 
District offi ce,” he told reporters afterwards.27
A month later, on May 24, 1991, Cheney announced the reorganization plan for 
the Corps. Although it was now separate from the base-closing plan submitted in 
April, there was no change in the Corps’ approach.28 Immediately the Corps’ concept 
for reorganization fell under attack. Governor of Minnesota Arne H. Carlson and 
Governor of Wisconsin Tommy Thompson argued that the reorganization plan was 
poorly conceived; the Corps would be unable to provide the same quality of service 
from a remote location in Buffalo, New York, or St. Louis, Missouri.29 Other critics 
charged that the reorganization plan was based on politics. For example, it seemed 
the St. Paul District and Rock Island District offi ces were to be consolidated with the 
St. Louis District offi ce, the smallest of the three, because the latter happened to be 
located in the district of House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt. Congressmans Vento 
and Oberstar responded to Cheney’s announcement by going to the chairman of the 
House appropriations subcommittee on energy and water development, Congressman 
Tom Bevill (D-Alabama), and obtaining a formal commitment that none of the Corps’ 
appropriations for the next fi scal year could be used to close or relocate the St. Paul 
District offi ce.30
At this point, the BRAC Commission entered the debate over the Corps’ reorganization 
plan. In a clear signal to Congress that it wanted to include the Corps within its 
purview, it invited various witnesses to testify at a June 5 hearing on the Corps’ 
reorganization. On July 1, it made its recommendations on base closures. The 
recommendations included a provision that would allow Congress an opportunity to 
develop its own plan for reorganizing the Corps but at the expiration of one year (July 
1, 1992) the Administration’s reorganization plan for the Corps would go into effect 
under BRAC’s authority. On July 10, President George H. W. Bush presented the BRAC 
Commission recommendations to Congress without comment on this provision.31
In the fall of 1991, Congress passed a series of acts that fi rmly detached the Corps 
from the BRAC process and crushed the Corps’ reorganization plan. First, it explicitly 
rejected the one-year deadline for developing a plan of reorganization for the Corps 
when it approved the BRAC recommendations on base closures. Second, it prohibited 
the expenditure of funds for closing Corps’ division or district offi ces in both the public 
works and armed services appropriations bills. Finally, for good measure, it included a 
provision in the appropriations bill for 1992 that defi ned what could be considered a 
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The Corps of Engineers Centre: A Brief History 
The building that housed the Army Corps of 
Engineers, St. Paul District, from 1993 to 2010, enjoys 
a rich history, with ties to the fl ourishing fur trade 
industry of the nineteenth century; nationally 
renowned Minnesota architect Clarence Johnston; 
and Minnesota’s favorite son, Charles Lindbergh. 
The building at 333 Sibley in St. Paul was fi rst 
constructed as an industrial structure to house the 
manufacturing and sales activities of the Gordon & 
Ferguson Company, a fur corporation fi rst founded 
by Richards Gordon in 1854. In 1912, the company, 
under the leadership of Charles Gordon, Richards’ 
son, began planning construction of the building 
at Sibley and 4th Street. Gordon hired the famed 
Minnesota architect, Clarence Johnston, for the project. At a cost of $250,000, 
the structure, named the Gordon & Ferguson Building, covered nearly half of a 
city block to the height of nine stories, with eight above ground and one below. 
The main entrance was originally located on Sibley Street. While housed in this 
structure, the Gordon & Ferguson Company prospered, even manufacturing 
the fl ight suit worn by Charles Lindbergh on his precedent-setting, non-stop fl ight 
from the United States to Paris in “The Spirit of St. Louis.” By 1944, the Gordon & 
Ferguson Company had outgrown its residence, and it abandoned the building, 
leaving it vacant for nearly fi fteen years.
In 1958, John J. Kaplan, president and treasurer of the Globe Paper Box 
Manufacturing Company of St. Paul, purchased and refurbished the structure, 
renaming it the Nalpak Building (Kaplan spelled backwards). Under their 
ownership, the structure housed mostly state offi ces, including the Minnesota 
Department of Administration, Records Management Division; the Minnesota 
Council on Developmental Disabilities; and the Minnesota Department 
of Human Rights. The Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, began 
leasing portions of the building in 1988 for eighty employees of the district’s 
Construction-Operations Division. In 1993, after more than 53 years in the old 
Post Offi ce, the St. Paul District adopted the building as its headquarters. The 
structure was completely renovated for the district and renamed the Corps of 
Engineers Centre.
-Matt Pearcy, St. Paul District Historian (from 2001-2006)
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military installation under BRAC. A military installation did not include “any facility 
used primarily for civil jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.”32
In the spring of 1992, the Administration went back to the drawing board. Offi cials 
who had worked for months to develop a plan of reorganization under the BRAC 
process felt disappointed and chastened by Congress’s action. Newly appointed 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) Nancy Dorn told a House committee in 
March 1992: “The message that Congress sent was clear. While there may be a need to 
reorganize the Corps to meet the challenges of the 21st century, the proposed plan was 
unacceptable and there should be an opportunity for Congressional involvement in 
any future plan.” Congressman Vento, who impugned the previous year’s effort as a 
“sort of top-down type of slam dunk effort to reorganize the Corps,” welcomed Dorn’s 
“fresh perspective.”33
The Corps formed a fi eld advisory committee to develop a new reorganization plan. In 
contrast to the Williams’ team, the fi eld advisory committee included representatives 
from every district and division. Louis E. Kowalski, Planning Division chief, served as 
the St. Paul District representative. After several months of data gathering, a smaller 
task force, under the leadership of Brigadier General Albert J. Genetti, Jr., produced a 
report in July 1992. That same summer saw a change of Corps’ leadership, according 
to the usual four year rotation of the chief of engineers, Lieutenant General Arthur E. 
Williams, who had been closely involved with reorganization over the previous year-
and-a-half, replaced Hatch. During September and October, he reviewed the new 
reorganization plan with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) and other 
Administration offi cials and released it on November 19, 1992, shortly after the election.
The new proposal refl ected the infl uence of Congress. Districts would be given a robust 
standing in the new fi eld organization while divisions would be consolidated and 
downsized. The number of divisions in the contiguous United States would be reduced 
from eleven to six, and the number of districts would be increased by one to thirty-six. 
However, some district capabilities would be consolidated: planning and engineering 
functions would be transferred from twenty-one districts to the remaining fi fteen, 
which would be called technical centers.34
The St. Paul District was identifi ed as one of the technical centers. Staff writers for 
the News-Tribune were quick to note the turnaround. “The St. Paul District offi ce of 
the Army Corps of Engineers that was to all but close under a plan last year, instead 
will almost double in size to more than 800 workers under a major restructuring,” 
they wrote. District Engineer Richard W. Craig explained that the St. Paul offi ce had 
been selected to be a technical center because it had a nearby airport and a signifi cant 
technical staff already in place and it could obtain room to expand. (He was prepared 
to relocate the offi ce from the old post offi ce building to the Sibley Building at 5th and 
Sibley streets one block away.)35
Ironically, in developing a plan more to Congress’s liking, the Corps cut itself off from 
the new Administration. Chief of Engineers Williams was premature in unveiling the 
plan two weeks after the election, without even a pause for consultation with President-
elect Bill Clinton’s nominees for Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army. One day 
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after President Clinton took offi ce, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the 
plan was withdrawn.36
Restructuring under the Clinton Administration
Chief of Engineers Williams gradually lowered the drumbeat for reorganization, 
despite the investment that he and so many other Corps’ offi cials had put into it.37 
He was in an awkward position with the new Administration and needed to build 
credibility with Secretary of Defense Aspin and other incoming civilian political 
appointees in the Department of Defense. Moreover, he understood that the rank and 
fi le in the organization were tired of all the uncertainty and stress that had accompanied 
the reorganization effort and they needed a reprieve. Many people who worked 
under Williams were relieved when the new Chief told Congress he would prefer 
not to restudy the issue. The St. Paul District Commander, Colonel Craig, applauded 
Williams’ position. The St. Paul offi ce had been on a roller coaster ride – facing closure, 
then expansion and then uncertainty again – and Craig wanted to restore his staff’s 
confi dence. “We’ve been down at the lowest levels, and we’ve been at the highest 
levels,” Craig told an interviewer. “We’re on a norm now, and we recognize the turf 
that we’re on, and, hopefully, we won’t go up or down.”38
The Clinton Administration made its effort to introduce organizational change in the 
Corps part of a much larger strategy of “reinventing government.” In his election  
campaign, Clinton promised to make government work better while costing less 
money to the taxpayers. On March 3, 1993, Clinton requested Vice President Albert 
Gore head a taskforce of some two hundred people to conduct an intensive review of 
how the federal government performed. The effort, called the National Performance 
Review, had six months to make its report. After the taskforce completed its work in 
October, the Clinton Administration drafted legislation to implement various changes 
in government processes. The legislation addressed numerous agencies in all the 
departments of the executive branch. Clinton’s plan for the Corps appeared in Section 
3201 of the bill:
The Secretary of the Army shall reorganize the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers by 
reorganizing the Headquarters offi ces, reducing the number of Division offi ces, and 
restructuring the District functions so as to increase the effi ciency of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers and reduce staff and costs, with the goal of achieving approximately 
$50 million in net annual savings by fi scal year 1998.39 The legislation was eventually 
enacted as the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994.
The Clinton Administration’s strategy for “restructuring” the Corps – a term it 
preferred to “reorganization” – followed from the National Performance Review. It 
focused on the headquarters and divisions and eliminated various functions that were 
redundant with functions carried out at the district level. For example, it divested 
the divisions of responsibility for technical review. It also worked on consolidating 
(regionalizing) human resources offi ces and fi nance offi ces in the Corps. These 
initiatives resulted in signifi cant reductions of “full time equivalent” positions, or FTEs, 
in the headquarters and division offi ces. While some of these changes were anticipated, 
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a decisive innovation in the Clinton plan was that it accomplished these changes using 
the “General Expenses” account in the Corps’ budget, thereby obviating the need for 
Congress to approve a line item for the cost of “reorganization.”40 Moreover, by leaving 
all districts intact, it recovered control of the reorganization process from Congress. 
However, the problem of realigning the divisions and districts remained.
The Clinton Administration commenced its own study of reorganization of the Corps’ 
fi eld structure in June 1994, when Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil 
Works) John Zirschky called a conference of about two hundred people comprising 
division and district Corps’ personnel and representatives of non-federal Corps’ 
partners to examine relationships between headquarters, divisions and districts. For 
obvious reasons, this effort was accompanied by little fanfare. Eventually, the Clinton 
Administration arrived at a plan that did not differ too much from the plan the Corps 
unveiled in November 1992. Instead of reducing the number of divisions from eleven 
to six, they were reduced to eight. There were two signifi cant innovations. Divisional 
offi ces in Portland and Omaha became regional offi ces, and all of the districts on the 
Mississippi River were combined under one command, the Mississippi Valley Division. 
As with the Clinton Administration’s other restructuring efforts, this approach allowed 
the plan to be implemented using General Expense accounts of the headquarters 
and divisions. Rather than closing any division offi ces, they were converted (and 
downsized) to regional centers. The new divisional structure went into effect on April 1, 
1997, with full implementation – expressed most simply in terms of reduced FTEs – to 
be accomplished by April 1, 2002.41
The divisional restructuring placed the St. Paul District in a new division. It was 
transferred from the North Central Division to the Mississippi Valley Division with 
headquarters in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The change was not entirely comfortable. 
Colonel J. M. Wonsik, district engineer, characterized the St. Paul District and the 
North Central Division as “introspective” in the way they conducted business, while 
the Mississippi Valley Division was “aggressive” in its practices. Concerned that his 
district risked losing its edge, he encouraged his staff to communicate more with their 
counterparts in the other districts within the Mississippi Valley Division and to learn 
from the district’s “new neighbors.” Wonsik advised his staff to examine what the 
districts on the lower Mississippi River were doing and “steal shamelessly what other 
people are doing very, very well.” He also wanted his people to take every opportunity 
to help those districts’ staffs learn from them. In his view, realignment of the Mississippi 
Valley Division presented an opportunity for “crossfertilization” between districts.42
Reorganization had a signifi cant impact on employee morale and productivity. People 
feared for their jobs and all the discussion about redundancy and streamlining lowered 
people’s sense of commitment. The concern about job loss was most critical in 1991, 
when Corps’ leadership proposed to deactivate the St. Paul District. But the duration 
of the process upset people as well. In the mid-1990s, the offi ce was under constant 
pressure to reduce FTEs, and people grew impatient with the continuing uncertainty 
as reorganization was simply held in abeyance. Finally, the divisional restructuring 
that took effect in 1997 provided a measure of relief by simply bringing an end to 
the process, but it too left a mark on the St. Paul District staff. It accentuated the St. 
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Paul District’s vulnerability even as districts strengthened their position within the 
organization. Change was unsettling. Although the realignment brought opportunity, 
it also caused insecurity. Wonsik told an interviewer in January 1998, with apparent 
misgivings, “It felt like we were traded from the [Minnesota] Vikings to the [Green Bay] 
Packers.”43 All factors combined, morale in the district probably reached a low point 
during Wonsik’s tour from 1995 to 1998.
Changes in Internal Organization
Much of the restructuring that occurred 
under the Clinton Administration involved 
changing how staffs were organized within 
each offi ce or how the Corps got its work 
done. Some of these initiatives fl owed 
from the National Performance Review; 
other initiatives began much earlier. Like 
the reorganization effort, these internal 
organizational changes were made in 
response to two broad imperatives. First, the 
Corps sought to reinvent itself in light of its 
increasing role in environmental protection. 
Second, the Corps sought to change the way 
it managed civil 
works projects 
in order to 
perform more 
effi ciently at 
less cost. 
Addressing Environmentalism
The environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s refl ected profound shifts in public 
attitudes about the environment and resulted in numerous laws aimed at reforming 
society’s relationship to the natural world. The American people’s new environmental 
awareness extended into many areas, including wilderness preservation, endangered 
species protection, reduction of air and water pollution and hazardous waste cleanup. 
The broad ranging issues that underpinned the environmental movement were as 
interwoven as they were varied. They stemmed from such broad societal trends as 
the nation’s rising affl uence in the post-World War II era, the increasing scientifi c 
understanding of ecology and the environment and the threats posed to humanity’s 
very existence by the development of nuclear weapons, the pressures of population 
growth and the depletion of nonrenewable resources.44 Practically all facets of 
This cartoon from a Sierra 
Club publication, 
published in the early 
1970s, presents the 
Corps of Engineers as 
a large, powerful force 
that bullied small, weak 
environementalists.
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environmentalism impinged on the Army Corps of Engineers’ missions. Moreover, the 
Corps acquired new missions specifi cally aimed at protecting the environment.
Environmentalism was an outgrowth of conservation, but it also differed from 
conservation in fundamental ways. Traditional conservation, which blossomed in the 
early twentieth century, posited that the federal government had a responsibility to 
protect and manage natural resources for effi cient and sustainable use for the good 
of the nation. The conservation movement resulted in legislation directed at ensuring 
an effi cient and democratic approach to resource development. In contrast to the 
great giveaway of public domain that characterized public land policy in the late 
nineteenth century, conservation laws in the early twentieth century emphasized the 
commons: water resources, forest lands, fi sh and wildlife, scenic wonders. One of the 
fi rst great legislative acts of the conservation movement was the Reclamation Act of 
1902, which sought to develop rivers for purposes of irrigating arid Western lands. 
A central tenet of the conservation movement was the role of the scientifi c expert in 
resource management. Fledgling federal agencies like the Reclamation Service and the 
Forest Service assembled staffs of experts in their respective scientifi c disciplines and 
emphasized centralized planning in resource development. The Corps of Engineers, 
long recognized for its expertise in river and harbor improvement, fi t easily into the 
traditional conservation milieu.
In contrast to the earlier conservation movement, the environmental movement of the 
1960s and 1970s displayed a mistrust of federal resource management and a refusal 
to defer to scientifi c experts. More broadly, the new environmentalism emphasized 
the  interconnectedness of the natural world. It doubted the ability of federal 
agencies concerned primarily with developing a single resource such as timber or 
water to consider the ramifi cations of their actions on the total environment. Indeed, 
environmentalists found that federal agencies such as the Forest Service, Atomic Energy 
Commission and Corps of Engineers were among the worst offenders against the 
environment.45 Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas did not mince words when 
he called the Corps of Engineers “public enemy number one.”46
To address these concerns, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act, 
or NEPA, of 1969. This law, the most important environmental legislation of the era, 
mandated federal agencies to coordinate their efforts in managing the nation’s resources 
and to integrate public review and comment into all of their resource planning efforts. 
These guiding principles of national environmental policy recognized the need for a 
more holistic approach to the environment as well as the need to make decision-making 
more public and democratic.47 NEPA provided a clarion call for agencies such as the 
Army Corps of Engineers to reform their planning processes.
Various studies of the Corps have stated that the agency responded admirably to the 
new requirements mandated by NEPA. One study characterized the Corps’ response as 
“sincere, swift, and impressive.”48 Another study praised the Corps for the amount of 
autonomy it gave to environmental analysts in conducting environmental reviews. An 
internal study by the Corps’ Historical Division stated that the agency “developed new 
procedures to insure that environmental issues were properly addressed. Consequently 
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the Corps became the fi rst federal water resources agency to institutionalize 
environmental views.”49
The critical provision of NEPA was the requirement that federal agencies produce 
an Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS, for each proposed action signifi cantly 
affecting the environment. The EIS evaluated environmental impacts from the 
standpoint of various scientifi c and social-scientifi c disciplines to arrive at a well-
rounded understanding of the consequences of an action. Rather than complain that 
the EIS requirement was onerous, the Corps built the EIS into its project authorization 
process and publicly stated that the EIS was helpful in allowing it to do a better job. 
The procedure for completing an EIS included an opportunity for public comment, so it 
defl ected criticism that the Corps ignored public opinion.50
Corps’ leadership at Headquarters initiated organizational changes to increase public 
participation and environmental sensitivity in Corps’ decision-making, and the 
divisions and districts soon emulated their example. Agency policy required that the 
district engineer hold public meetings when proposing a project. The object was to give 
local interests the “full opportunity to express their views on the character and extent 
of the improvement desired, on the need and advisability of its execution, and on their 
general willingness and ability to cooperate with the Federal Government.”51
In the early to mid-1970s, a number of districts experimented with citizen advisory 
boards.52 A fl ood control project in Minneapolis exemplifi ed the new emphasis on 
public participation. To help plan the project on Bassett Creek, which runs through 
the city, the St. Paul District assisted in forming a nine-member commission composed 
of interested citizens rather than experts. The Corps developed a fl ood control plan 
incrementally with frequent input by the commission and its consulting engineer, and 
the Corps prepared an EIS in tandem with this process. A member of the commission, 
Edward Silberman, lauded the result. “In the Bassett Creek fl ood-control problem, 
incremental plan development has been so effective that the Commission did not have 
to take a formal vote to adopt its fi nal plan,” he wrote. “This was not an accident but 
rather the result of a carefully conducted melding of bureaucratic and public input 
by the Bassett Creek Flood Control Commission with important assistance from its 
consulting engineers.”53
NEPA’s EIS requirement also led the Corps to hire new staff with expertise in fi sheries 
biology, wildlife biology, archeology, history, economics and sociology. As a result 
of this infusion of new staff skills into the organization, the Corps acquired greater 
sensitivity to environmental concerns. The interdisciplinary team that prepared an EIS 
for a project was usually situated in an environmental branch attached to the Planning 
Division. Indeed, the basic function of the environmental branch was to produce 
EISs. One of the challenges in changing the internal organization of the Corps was to 
integrate these units effectively into corporate decision-making. Engineers referred 
to the new staff positions as the “exotic disciplines,” and they tended to accord these 
specialists less respect than they did their fellow engineers. It took time to develop an 
interdisciplinary ethos in the agency.54
In the St. Paul District, the Environmental Branch was originally housed within the 
Engineering Division. The relationship was not a smooth one. The district’s fi rst chief  
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ecologist, Dr. Barbara Gudmandson, was fi red in December 1971. She appealed her 
dismissal and was reinstated in April 1972, but was replaced one month later by chief 
ecologist Keith B. Larson. A year-and-a-half after taking the job, Larson resigned in 
protest, claiming that the district engineer, Colonel Rodney Cox, had signifi cantly 
altered a draft EIS, which in its original form found a proposed $18-million coal 
terminal at Pig’s Eye Lake in St. Paul to be environmentally unsound. At a press 
conference, Larson also disclosed that someone in the Corps had altered the conclusions 
of several contracted environmental reports prepared by forty-fi ve scientists from 
colleges and universities in Minnesota, Wisconsin and North Dakota. Environmental 
groups expressed concern. A Sierra Club spokesman 
charged the Corps with removing environmental 
staff whenever they became effective and called 
for an independent citizens’ review of operations 
in the St. Paul District offi ce. A representative of 
the Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens 
Association asserted that the district’s Environmental 
Branch was “window dressing that has turned out 
to be pie in the face of the Corps.”55 These public 
controversies notwithstanding, the district stayed the 
course in its effort to integrate environmental review 
into its planning process.56
By 1980, the so-called exotic disciplines had made 
further inroads into the engineer-dominated agency. 
Some of the environmental staff was located in the 
Environmental Resources Branch under the direction 
of Robert Post, while some of it was in the Planning 
Branch headed by J. Robert Calton. Both of these staff 
groups remained in the Engineering Division under 
Roger Fast. Colonel Badger, district engineer, wanted 
to combine the two branches and elevate the latter to 
division status – separating the two staff groups from 
the Engineering Division. However, Calton and Fast, 
both veterans of more than thirty years in the district, 
opposed the change. Colonel Badger waited for the two 
men’s retirements in 1980 and 1981, respectively, and then appointed Louis Kowalski 
as chief of the Planning Branch and moved him into an offi ce next to his own. His new 
chief of the Engineering Division, Peter Fischer, occupied an offi ce on the other side. 
The position of these offi ces on either side of the district engineer’s offi ce, Colonel 
Badger found, prepared the district staff for the change that followed one year later. 
With the approval of the Chief of Engineers, Colonel Badger created the Planning 
Division on April 4, 1982. He appointed Robert Post assistant chief of the Planning 
Division as well as chief of the environmental resources staff.57
The Planning Division took the lead in encouraging the Corps to embrace more 
environmentally sensitive approaches in its project designs. Certainly the clearest 
manifestation of the Corps’ increasing sensitivity to the environment was its advocacy 
President Jimmy Carter 
and First Lady Rosslyn 
Carter on board the Delta 
Queen at Lock and Dam 
6, on August 18, 1979. 
(Photo by Lyle Nicklay, courtesy 
of St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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of nonstructural measures for fl ood control. Traditionally, the Corps supported 
structural improvements – primarily dams and levees – to reduce fl ood hazards. As 
Corps’ planners increasingly took an interdisciplinary view of river systems and their 
fl oodplains, they favored alternatives to dams and levees. These included buyouts 
of private property in the fl oodplain (and relocation of existing buildings away from 
the fl oodplain) and other means of social engineering to change land uses in fl ood-
prone areas.58 In 1979, the St. Paul District produced a report on The Development of 
Nonstructural Alternatives.59 The change from structural to nonstructural fl ood controls 
is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
If diversifi cation of staff specializations within the Corps was an important factor 
encouraging greater consideration of nonstructural projects, President Jimmy Carter’s 
controversial reform effort was another factor. Carter saw a need to revise how the 
Corps justifi ed civil works projects to Congress in order to make the Corps move away 
from its long-standing commitment to construction of dams and levees. The Corps’ 
traditional emphasis on hard structures, Carter found, was embedded in the Flood 
Control Act of 1936 as amended in 1938. The law provided for full funding of fl ood 
control structures. Local communities were far more supportive of structural than 
nonstructural fl ood controls because hard structures, such as dams and levees, were 
federally funded while nonstructural remedies 
entailed costs that had to be born by local 
governments. In 1977, Carter issued executive 
orders and proposed legislation that aimed to end 
this bias by introducing cost-sharing requirements 
for local governments on all fl ood controls – 
regardless of whether they were structural or 
nonstructural. The Administration termed this 
initiative a “redirected public works program.” 
Although Carter implemented the costsharing 
plan administratively, the plan did not receive 
congressional sanction until nine years later.60
As the Corps began to propose nonstructural 
solutions for fl ood control, environmental 
organizations took note. In 1975, Audubon ran an 
article praising the Corps’ “new look” in fl ood 
control. It cited the example of Prairie du Chien, 
Wisconsin, where the Corps recommended 
evacuation of the fl oodplain as the only 
economically justifi able solution to fl ood hazards. 
“No dams. No levees,” Audubon commented. 
“Instead, the Corps recommended that one 
hundred and fi fty-seven buildings be relocated 
out of the fl ood-prone area, that another forty-
eight buildings be purchased and demolished by 
the federal government, that thirty-three homes 
be raised above fl ood levels, and that seven other 
Colonel William Badger, district 
engineer, and First Lady Rosslyn 
Carter. (Photo by Lyle Nicklay, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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buildings be fl ood-proofed. The Corps also recommended that the cleared fl oodplain 
become a greenbelt, protected by state and local regulation.”61
Environmentalists were not the only group to note the change in the Army Corps of 
Engineers. Respected journals such as The Nation and Business Week commented on the 
Corps’ new approach to fl ood control. The agency was adapting, these journals pointed 
out, because growing concern about the environment had exposed serious limitations 
in the Corps’ traditional benefi t-cost analysis of proposed projects. One writer 
characterized the organizational change in the Corps as an “internal struggle” between 
engineers trained to “optimize economic aspects” of a project and others who wanted to 
modify projects “to enhance or preserve the environment.”62
The popular magazine Ms. examined organizational change in the Corps from a 
feminist perspective, noting not only the infusion of non-engineer specialists into the 
ranks of this peculiarly civilian unit of the Army but the Corps’ push to recruit more 
women as well. Speaking of the latter initiative, one offi cial was quoted, “We have a real 
shortage. We could use a lot more.”63 The increasing numbers of women in the Corps 
changed the face of the organization. The Corps was not alone in taking affi rmative 
action to hire more women in the 1970s; other federal agencies with traditionally male-
dominated staffs, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, underwent 
a similar transition during the decade.
In the 1970s, the Corps of Engineers acquired a new mandate relating to environmental 
protection. It became the administrator of regulatory programs aimed at protecting the 
nation’s wetlands. In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(later known as the Clean Water Act). Section 404 of the law prohibited the discharge 
of dredged or fi ll material into the “waters of the United States” without a permit 
from the Army Corps of Engineers. During the next few years, environmentalists 
sought to affi rm that the law applied to wetlands as well as navigable waterways. 
Environmentalists pushed the Corps to assert its regulatory responsibility under the 
law as widely as possible. Although the Corps initially resisted taking an aggressive 
stand on wetlands protection, judicial decisions in the mid-1970s forced the Corps to 
take a wider view of its “Section 404” responsibilities. According to historian Jeffrey K. 
Stine, the regulatory responsibilities of the Corps fundamentally altered its relationship 
with the environmental community. Some of the Corps’ staunchest critics in the 
environmental community suddenly began courting the Corps because of its key role 
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.64
The evolution of the Corps’ regulatory program for the protection of wetlands and 
the regulatory activities of the St. Paul District in Minnesota and Wisconsin will be 
discussed in detail in another chapter. Suffi ce it to say here that Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act had a profound effect on the Corps’ organization. To staff the program, the 
Corps recruited ecologists who specialized in ecological processes and values associated 
with wetlands, and it hired biologists who specialized in aquatic fl ora and fauna. 
Like the interdisciplinary teams that prepared EISs, the ecologists and biologists who 
evaluated Section 404 permit applications brought new perspectives to the organization. 
By 1991, the Section 404 permitting program funded thirty-one positions, including
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fi eld offi ce positions located at Bemidji and Duluth, Minnesota, and Waukesha, Fox 
River, Green Bay and La Crosse, Wisconsin. Ben A. Wopat was chief of the Regulatory 
Branch, which was attached to the Construction-Operations Division.65 By 2001, the 
Regulatory Branch had grown to thirty-nine positions with fi eld offi ces in Two Harbors 
and Brainerd, Minnesota, and Waukesha, Green Bay, Stevens Point and La Crosse, 
Wisconsin. Robert J. Whiting was chief of the Regulatory Branch, while Wopat was 
assistant chief of the Construction-Operations Division.66
The St. Paul District’s Section 404 responsibilities involved the organization directly 
with state offi cials in Minnesota and Wisconsin. For purposes of wetlands regulation, 
the St. Paul District’s jurisdiction covered all of these two states. The district boundaries 
followed state lines rather than watersheds. The staff was organized into sections, one 
for each state. From 1977 to about 1987, there was a Surveillance and Enforcement 
Section. In the 1990s, a Metro Permit Section was created. The locations of some of 
the fi eld offi ces changed 
frequently. Organizational 
changes in the Corps 
provided tangible evidence 
that it was adapting to 
new public concern for the 
environment. Changes in staff 
organization and personnel 
enabled the Corps to address 
new legal requirements, such 
as the EIS, effectively. 
Organizational changes 
facilitated the Corps’ move 
toward nonstructural 
approaches to fl ood control 
and its increasing role in 
environmental protection 
– particularly wetlands 
protection. How these changes 
became manifested in particular 
projects and programs will be 
explored in subsequent chapters.
Improvements in Business 
Operations
The civil works program was 
once the lifeblood of the Corps of 
Engineers, and new civil works 
projects were what sustained 
the program. 67 As the average 
Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, nonstructural fl ood 
control project:  In 1978, the city of Prairie du 
Chien relocated numerous residents whose 
homes stood in a fl oodplain. This house was 
the fi rst to be moved under guidlines jointly 
developed by the St. Paul District and the city. 
Shown here is the homeowner, a man in his 
eighties who had built the house himself more 
than fi fty years earlier. (Photo courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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size of new civil works projects decreased in the 1960s and 1970s, the administrative 
cost of moving any given project through consecutive phases of planning, design 
and construction rose proportionally. Moreover, small projects sometimes brought 
the Corps into direct competition with private- sector engineering fi rms, further 
highlighting the cost of its project-related work. By the mid-1970s, the Corps faced 
signifi cant pressure to reduce costs. During the next two decades, the Corps introduced 
various new approaches in how it funded and managed civil works projects. Two 
initiatives were of particular importance: cost-sharing and project management.
While these initiatives developed out of specifi c changes in the Corps’ civil works 
program – namely the smaller size of projects and the Corps’ greater sensitivity to the 
environment – they also mirrored much broader public concerns about the federal 
bureaucracy. Public confi dence in government fell sharply in the 1960s and early 1970s 
in response to the U.S. embroilment in Vietnam, the civil unrest in American cities, the 
degradation of the environment and, fi nally, the Watergate scandal. In the last quarter 
of the twentieth century, U.S. presidents made various attempts to reform the federal 
bureaucracy and to overcome the deep public cynicism toward government. President 
Jimmy Carter saw the public’s cynicism as rooted in mistrust of public offi cials and 
sought to restore government’s credibility. President Ronald Reagan responded to 
the public’s disillusionment by promising to cut taxes and to get government off 
people’s backs. President Bill Clinton believed the way to restore public confi dence 
in government was to make bureaucracy function more effi ciently, in large part by 
making it emulate certain aspects of the private sector. Organizational changes in the 
Corps mirrored these presidential initiatives, each of which cut across the whole federal 
bureaucracy: a heightened commitment to openness and accountability in the Carter 
years, an emphasis on downsizing and cost reduction in the Reagan-Bush years and a 
commitment to innovation and effi ciency in the Clinton years. Not since the Progressive 
Era and the New Deal had the United States experienced such a sustained effort to 
reform how its government worked. 
Some of the initiatives designed to make the Corps more open to public scrutiny and 
public input have been discussed above. The St. Paul District supported efforts in 
the 1970s to involve the public in decision-making through citizen advisory boards 
and hearings on EISs. In May 1979, President Carter introduced legislation aimed at 
stimulating greater involvement by state and local governments in the Corps’ civil 
works projects through mandatory cost-sharing. He proposed a requirement that state 
and local governments contribute 5 to 10 percent of the cost of each new river or harbor 
improvement project. In addition, state governments would contribute 5 percent and 
local governments would contribute 20 percent of the cost of each new fl ood control 
project. The state or local government would be responsible for its share of the cost 
from the project’s inception – beginning in the planning phase. Carter contended that 
the requirement for local participation would increase the quality of consideration of 
potential projects, “thereby improving the public’s ability to judge the comparative 
merits of many water project opportunities.” By the same token, it would give state 
and local governments a fi rmer role in rejecting unwanted federal projects.68 Congress 
did not pass this legislation, though it would adopt the cost-sharing model seven years 
later in the Water Resources Development Act of 1986. In the meantime, the Corps 
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moved to implement cost-sharing agreements administratively wherever state and local 
governments were willing to cooperate.
For many fl ood-prone communities in the St. Paul District, the cost-sharing initiative 
was unwelcome. The editors of Fargo’s The Forum objected that the partnership 
would be unequal. “Hardly any state has the experience in construction of water 
projects that has been amassed by the Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Bureau 
of Reclamation,” they noted. Most of the obvious water projects were already built, 
so it was unfair to require state and local governments to share costs of determining 
whether water projects were economically feasible.69 The St. Paul Pioneer Press was more 
receptive to the Carter proposal but agreed with The Forum that the legislation would 
not pass Congress. Environmental groups, meanwhile, wanted the states to contribute 
up to a fourth of the cost of water projects.70
The Reagan Administration intensifi ed the push to implement cost-sharing agreements 
between the Corps and state and local governments. After Reagan took offi ce, Colonel 
William W. Badger, district engineer, was surprised by the strength and swiftness of the 
message that the new Administration delivered through Headquarters to the district 
engineers. “The essence of the new policy arrived very quickly and the comments about 
what we could say and could not say about cost-sharing were very exact,” Badger said 
in a March 1982 interview. The intent of the policy was to shift some of the burden 
and responsibility for civil works from the federal to the state level. Ironically, Badger 
noted, in its haste to federalize or decentralize the Corps’ operation, the Administration 
was moving the Corps “toward a more centralized operation.” Like a good soldier, 
Badger delivered the new Administration’s message that new projects would require 
signifi cantly greater state and local participation.71
Colonel Ed Rapp, who replaced Colonel Badger as district engineer in 1982, continued 
to take the Reagan Administration’s message to state and local governments within the 
St. Paul District. He held cost-share discussions with Wisconsin state offi cials over a 
highway project at La Crosse. In Minneapolis, city offi cials “signed up for cost-sharing” 
on the Bassett Creek fl ood control project. In North Dakota, Rapp held “preliminary” 
but “signifi cant” discussions concerning cost-sharing at Lake Darling. When the City 
of Rochester in Minnesota refused to share costs with the Corps for fl ood control on 
the South Zumbro River, Rapp was philosophical: “They could afford cost-sharing,” he 
told an interviewer. “They just chose to see if they could get a better deal somewhere 
else.” Much of the colonel’s discussion with local sponsors remained theoretical, while 
Congress deliberated over the cost-share proposal, laying the groundwork for future 
projects. “The Administration is getting in their licks,” he commented, “and I was glad 
we were able to support the Administration’s fi rm position.”72
In addition to wanting more cost-share agreements, the Reagan Administration sought 
to accelerate and streamline the Corps’ planning process. It wanted faster decisions, 
more results, less study. “Signals very quickly came down through the system,” Badger 
recalled. “People were stating over and over again that government should get off the 
people’s backs.”73 In particular, the Corps’ Section 404 program for the protection
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 of wetlands came under attack. 
The Reagan Administration 
criticized the Corps’ permitting 
as excessively ponderous and 
obstructionist, and it wanted 
the Corps to streamline its 
process for reviewing and 
issuing permits.74 While this 
position found congressional 
support in some parts of the 
country, it was not popular 
in Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
The people of Minnesota and 
Wisconsin were generally 
sensitive to loss or degradation 
of wetlands, since the region 
contained such an abundance 
of wetlands, lakes, rivers and 
potholes, and they did not 
want to roll back the Corps’ involvement in wetlands 
protection. As the Reagan Administration moved to 
weaken the Corps’ Section 404 program nationwide, 
the St. Paul District worked hard to preserve its 
cooperative relations with the state governments. The 
greatest challenge to the Section 404 program in the 
St. Paul District, in Colonel Badger’s view, was that 
the Corps was regulating with uniform regulations 
nationwide when the regions were “drastically 
different.” The states of Minnesota and Wisconsin 
wanted more stringent standards than the Corps 
could support in other regions.75
Congress passed the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, or WRDA-86, ending 
a decade-long stalemate over the Army Corps’ civil works program. This landmark 
act not only included new project  authorizations – the fi rst in twelve years – but also 
added force to the Corps’ efforts to develop more responsive and cost-effi cient ways 
of conducting business. WRDA-86 required the Corps to obtain cost-share agreements 
with local sponsors for virtually all new fl ood control projects. In general, the non-
federal share was between twenty-fi ve and fi fty percent of the cost of the project, 
with at least fi ve percent cash. Since the federal government would no longer bear 
the entire cost of acquiring land and relocating buildings out of the way of reservoirs, 
the law made future reservoir projects much less likely. WRDA-86 also required local 
sponsors contribute fi fty percent of the cost for feasibility studies. This provision had 
two major consequences. First, it signifi cantly reduced the number of feasibility studies 
undertaken, since local sponsors were reluctant to fund a feasibility study when the 
project authorization was in doubt. Second, it encouraged the local sponsor to take a 
much larger role in the project through its design and construction phases. WRDA-
Construction on the 
South Fork Zumbro River 
Flood Control Project, 
1993:  Although the city of 
Rochester initially balked 
at cost-sharing measures, 
the project later became 
one of the St. Paul District’s 
showcases for how to involve 
communities in fl ood control. 
(Photo courtesy of Russel Snyder, St. 
Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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86 placed an even heavier burden on the local sponsor for coastal harbor projects (a 
provision that did not adversely affect the St. Paul District). It did not require cost-
sharing for inland waterways; however, Section 1404 imposed a fuel tax on commercial 
users. Revenue collected from the fuel tax would eventually contribute fi fty percent 
toward new inland waterway projects through the Inland Waterways Trust Fund.76
WRDA-86 energized the Corps. As so many years had elapsed without the passage of 
a water resources bill, people began to wonder what would happen to the Corps’ civil 
works mission. Was the Corps simply going to do maintenance on existing projects 
and use the continuing authorities program to complete those projects that had been 
in progress for the past twelve years? WRDA-86 gave the Corps a more promising 
future, and it ratifi ed the move toward cost-sharing that the Corps had been slowly 
implementing without congressional sanction since the Carter years. Colonel Joseph 
Briggs, St. Paul District commander when WRDA-86 was passed, described the effect 
as dramatic. “This [was] brand new in terms of how we were going to cost share and all 
of the new requirements placed upon different customers, whether the customers were 
within the Corps or outside of the Corps,” Briggs commented in 1988.77
As new cost-share projects came on line, the Corps gained experience in its new 
relationship with local sponsors or “partners.” Much effort went to cost-accounting so 
that sponsors would be cooperative and responsible in making regular payments to 
keep the project running. Colonel Roger L. Baldwin, St. Paul District commander from 
1988 to 1991, commented that this fi rst stage in the new relationship was developing 
smoothly. “We go out monthly and tell sponsors that they’ve got to have a check for so 
much in to the Treasurer or in to the Finance and Accounting Offi cer by such a date so 
that we can maintain the fi nancial progress of the project, and we’ve had, happily, no 
problems here,” he told an interviewer in 1991. “That system is established and working 
well.” Baldwin anticipated that project closeouts, when both parties conduct fi nal audits 
and reconcile their respective allowable costs, might raise disputes. Although the St. 
Paul District was keeping fi nancial records for each project, it had not yet closed out any 
projects nor had it developed procedures for working with sponsors in that area.78
Partnering with local sponsors occasionally led to disputes and the threat of litigation, 
as when the City of Minneapolis disputed real estate credits in cost-accounting for the 
Bassett Creek Project. To keep such disputes out of the courts, the Corps developed a 
process called Alternative Dispute Resolution in 1988. As Chief of Engineers Arthur E. 
Williams explained the program, Alternative Dispute Resolution “helps to create an 
atmosphere in which the clash of alternative viewpoints can be synergized into creative 
solutions. A neutral, third party mediator helps fi nd a middle ground to facilitate 
decisions which are acceptable to all parties.”79 The St. Paul District was the fi rst in the 
nation to use Alternative Dispute Resolution to resolve a real estate credit dispute.80
Another aspect of cost-sharing was the need to demand decisions by the sponsor 
to keep a project moving. Delays drove up costs. In one case, the St. Paul District 
redesigned a project fi ve times before the local sponsor approved it. Colonel Richard 
W. Craig, St. Paul District commander from 1991 to 1993, suggested that the Corps, and 
the St. Paul District in particular, had to get “a little tougher” with local sponsors who 
hesitated to make decisions. “We have small communities out there that have a tough 
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time coming up with the money,” he stated. The St. Paul District had exceptionally 
good relations with partnering communities, Craig noted, but project costs were higher 
as a result.81 By the mid-1990s, the St. Paul District’s costs for engineering design were 
running ten to twelve percent higher than most other districts. Since the entire Corps 
performed engineering design at about ten percent higher cost than private engineering 
fi rms, the St. Paul District ran the risk of losing customers to the private sector.82
As more cost-sharing projects developed, it became clear the Corps must adopt a new 
process for moving projects through their planning, design and construction phases 
more effi ciently. The Corps’ traditional method of managing feasibility studies and 
projects was termed “functional management.” A project was passed from planning to 
engineering to construction, or from one functional unit to the next, and each functional 
unit assigned a different manager to the project. Project review occurred vertically 
in the organization. Planners at the district level, for example, submitted their work 
to planners at the division and headquarters 
levels. The problem with this process was that 
projects frequently bounced back and forth from 
one functional unit to another, with no single 
person responsible for keeping the project on 
schedule and on budget. Working within what 
were referred to as “stovepipes,” staff members 
became invested in their functional unit rather 
than in each project.83
The St. Paul District began experimenting with 
project management before other districts. 
Colonel Badger detailed what he termed 
“management by objective” in a memorandum 
dated April 30, 1981.84 Project managers had 
oversight of projects, but functional managers 
supervised the technical people who performed 
the engineering or environmental work on 
projects. It was a “matrix system” in which 
project managers and functional managers 
shared dual supervision over the staff. In 
an effort to promote teamwork – one of the 
essential goals of project management – Badger 
contracted with a consultant to conduct team-
building courses for the Engineering Division and the 
project managers. He also emphasized cross-training in 
order to improve communication between functional 
units.85
Without fi rm direction from Headquarters, however, the 
stovepipes continued to operate in spite of the district 
commander’s best efforts to move projects along. After 
three years as district engineer, Badger expressed great 
Site survey:  Mike 
Dahlquist (left) and Jim 
Sentz look at survey 
information for the 
St. Cloud, Minnesota, 
erosion control project. 
(Photo by Shannon Bauer, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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frustration with the technical staff members who held projects back. Increasingly, he 
went to congressmen and senators to apply outside pressure on the Corps in order to 
work projects through the system. “I have come to the conclusion … I can’t just wait 
until all the minutia is done before sending a project forward and the technocrats or 
termites, the minutia people at that level, ask a lot of questions and send it back,” 
he told an interviewer in 1981. “I can’t live with a system that runs back and forth 
between termites. What I have to do is wrap up my projects, kick them up to the 
higher Headquarters.” To his chagrin, Badger found himself in favor of “going 
outside the system, getting the language written into law so that the Corps system is 
short-circuited.”86
Discussion of the need for changing the “Corps system” intensifi ed after Congress 
passed WRDA-86. Cost-sharing highlighted how often the Corps understated project 
costs and fell behind with project schedules. In response, the Corps adopted a new 
method of operations, modeled after the private sector, which it called “project 
management.” Initiative 88, distributed to all district engineers in July 1988, called 
for a project manager to be assigned to each civil works project. The project manager 
was responsible for keeping projects on schedule and on budget. The project manager 
oversaw a team of specialists drawn from the different functional units within the 
district offi ce.87 In practice the team remained fl uid, but the project manager generally 
stayed with the project and provided continuity through the life of the project.88 The 
project manager also served as a consistent contact for the local sponsor and others 
outside the Corps who had an interest in the project – an important public relations 
feature of project management known as “one door to the Corps.”89
Under Initiative 88, Headquarters directed each district offi ce to implement project 
management. All district commanders were directed to appoint a civilian as a deputy 
district engineer for project management, or DDE (PM). (Later the acronym changed to 
DPM, which was an abbreviation for deputy district engineer for program and project 
management.) Although the DPM reported to the district engineer, headquarters 
created an Offi ce of Project Management that fostered and protected the development 
of project management. Under the Chief Engineer’s directive, the new organizational 
structure was to be established without adding new staff positions.90
Project management introduced a matrix system – it did not do away with the 
functional units. The project managers had two signifi cant limitations: they did not have 
any control over year-to-year project funding, which remained in the hands of Congress 
and the president, and they did not control the resources, which were still organized 
by function. Nonetheless, the project managers were supported as leaders in the new 
system. Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General Henry Hatch affi rmed that the deputy 
district engineer for project management had equal rank with the chiefs of engineering 
and construction in each district. Hatch established a Project Management Division at 
the Headquarters level and directed district engineers to create similar divisions. By 
1991, the St. Paul District had a Programs and Project Management Division. In effect, 
the project management initiative resulted in its own stovepipe.91
The St. Paul District made a relatively smooth transition to project management. It 
had been a leader in developing interdisciplinary teams during the 1970s and 1980s 
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and anticipated the push from Headquarters.92 It easily implemented procedures that 
were developed for the whole Corps, notably Life Cycle Project Management. District 
commanders provided project team meetings. They fostered better communication 
between functional division chiefs and project managers. Problems with the matrix 
organization persisted a decade after Initiative 88, however, particularly among some 
of the senior civilians. As District Engineer Colonel Kenneth Kasprisin remarked, 
“Anytime you change people, process, organization, or culture, it creates other issues 
… People get into a very comfortable routine, and anything that takes them out of that 
routine, out of that comfort zone, brings consternation.”93
Cost-sharing and project management were the big drivers of internal organizational 
change in the 1980s and 1990s, but the Corps pursued other innovations as well. 
Following the National Performance Review by the Clinton Administration in 1993 
and passage of the Government Performance and Results Act later that year, the Corps 
furthered its efforts to streamline procedures. In 1996, for example, the Corps revised 
its document review process to eliminate redundancies at the headquarters, division 
and district levels. To Headquarters fell the task of “policy review” – ensuring the 
Corps complied with law and administration policy. Divisions limited their review 
to “quality assurance review” – ensuring quality of planning and engineering in 
accordance with approved quality assurance plans implemented for each district. 
Districts were responsible for “technical review” – controlling the technical adequacy 
of the planning and engineering documents. Previously, the review process wended 
through the district, division and Headquarters of the Army Corps and could include 
the former Washington Level Review Center, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil 
Works) and the Offi ce of Management and Budget as well. The revised review process 
compressed review time and reduced costs.94
While the National Performance Review and the Government Performance and Results 
Act provided a certain amount of philosophical guidance to the Corps’ reorganization 
efforts, much change resulted simply from the brute requirement of having to reduce 
full-time equivalent employees to mandated levels. Critics referred to this hatchet 
method of change as “salami slicing.” Across the nation, efforts to “downsize” the 
Corps resulted in a reduction of 1,770 FTEs, or about six percent of the workforce, 
between 1990 and 1995.95
Conclusion
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Corps faced two imperatives for 
organizational change. First, environmentalism created a host of new public values 
and legislative mandates to which the Corps responded. Second, government reform 
initiatives led the Corps to introduce fundamental changes in how it conducted 
business. These new imperatives forced change in the St. Paul District in two ways. 
Sometimes the district responded to decisions that occurred at a higher level in the 
Corps, the Administration or Congress, as with realignment of district boundaries 
and staff reductions. In other instances, the district took initiative in developing new 
approaches to its work, as when it teamed with local citizens on the Bassett Creek Flood 
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Control Commission. Environmental Impact Studies, public review, cost-sharing, 
project management – these were the mechanics of internal organizational change 
in the Corps in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In the following chapters, we will see 
how the St. Paul District put these new mechanisms to work in executing the Corps’ 
various missions.
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Navigation:  Several 
barges being locked 
through Lock and Dam 
10 in Guttenberg, Iowa. 
(Photo by Shannon, Bauer, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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Meandering over 2,000 miles from Minnesota’s Lake Itasca to the Gulf of 
Mexico, the Mississippi River was once described by Mark Twain as the 
“crookedest river in the world, ... not a commonplace river, but on the 
contrary ... in all ways remarkable.”1 The upper portion of the waterway, 
stretching from the river’s headwaters to Guttenberg, Iowa, has been 
managed by the Corps of Engineers since the early nineteenth century. 
Throughout these years, the Upper Mississippi has been a vital lifeline of commerce and 
recreation for the Midwest. It has also functioned as a center of biodiversity and cultural 
heritage. To facilitate the different functions of the river and to preserve environmental 
quality, the St. Paul District has the task of dredging, straightening and widening the 
river; of ensuring that residents in the Upper Mississippi River Basin have adequate 
fl ood protection; and of mitigating the environmental effects caused by these activities.
The district’s navigation and fl ood control mission on the Upper Mississippi both 
fall under the umbrella of its civil works program. At the dawn of the twenty-fi rst 
century, the civil works program was drastically different than in 1975. Laws such as 
the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, or NEPA, forced the Corps to become more environmentally conscious. 
Whereas large structures such as dams and reservoirs characterized the Corps’ fl ood 
control efforts for much of the twentieth century, non-structural solutions were 
increasingly prevalent by 2000. Throughout the 1900s, the Corps dredged the Upper 
Mississippi River and other waterways with little consideration of the environmental 
effects on wildlife habitat and fi sh populations; but by 2000, the St. Paul District 
dredged far less than before, used the dredged material for constructive purposes and 
carried out an Environmental Management Program that restored habitat on the Upper 
Mississippi. In addition, although the federal government largely paid for most civil 
works projects, cost-sharing measures implemented in the 1980s shifted some 
3Civil Works Program I:The Upper Mississippi
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of the expenses to local sponsors, allowing local participation and involvement and 
establishing high levels of trust and cooperation. But some critics charged that the 
Corps still had a long way to go in accepting environmental responsibility and pointed 
to the controversial Upper Mississippi River/Illinois Waterway Navigation Study, 
which supposedly used skewed benefi t-cost analyses to justify extensive navigational 
developments on the Mississippi, as proof. Although there was some merit to the critics’ 
contentions, it was clear that the Corps of Engineers generally and the St. Paul District 
specifi cally had made great changes in the last quarter of the twentieth century. As John 
Anfi nson, former district historian, related, there was now “a much more open mind 
in St. Paul District as an organization to doing better by the environment and [still] 
meeting the needs of people who want fl ood protection and navigation.”2
Dredging the river:  A Corps’ dredge in operation on the Upper Mississippi River. 
(Photo courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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The Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission and GREAT I
After the passage of NEPA in 1969, the Corps faced numerous attacks from 
environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club, for its alleged support of 
navigation interests on the Upper Mississippi and on the detrimental effects of its 
dredging program on fi sh and wildlife. Through leadership and cooperation on a 
number of studies and commissions about the Upper Mississippi, including the Great 
River Environmental Action Team, or GREAT, and the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
Commission, the St. Paul District gradually embraced its role as protector of the river. 
Although criticism came from all sides, the St. Paul District continued to try to balance 
the different uses of the river.
Even before NEPA passed, Congress decided the time had come to coordinate 
navigation interests with wildlife and fi sh habitat protection and appointed the Corps 
of Engineers as the leader in this management. In 1962, a resolution adopted by the 
Senate Committee on Public Works called for the development of “a comprehensive 
plan of improvement for the Upper Mississippi River Basin.” In response, the Corps 
initiated the Upper Mississippi River Comprehensive Basin Study, an examination 
Dredging the Mississippi River:  The Dredge Hauser, a small dredge operated by 
the St. Paul District. (Photo courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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of the river by an interagency committee chaired by the division engineer of the 
North Central Division. By the 1970s, this committee had morphed into the Upper 
Mississippi River Basin Coordinating Committee, containing representatives from 
the Departments of Agriculture; Commerce; Health; Education and Welfare; Housing 
and Urban Development; Interior; and Transportation, as well as individuals from the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Power Commission. After consulting 
with seventy federal and state agencies about how to solve the water and land resource 
problems on the Upper Mississippi, the committee published its report in 1972, calling 
for “an orderly development of water and related land resources” through cooperation 
between federal, state and local agencies, including the Corps.3
Complementing the recommendations of the study was a request from several Upper 
Mississippi Basin governors for the completion of a river management plan. By 
executive order, President Richard Nixon established the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
Commission in 1972 to satisfy this demand. The commission immediately focused 
on the Corps’ nine-foot navigation channel. In the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1930, 
Congress authorized the Corps to dredge the Upper Mississippi to a depth of nine 
feet so that larger barges could traverse the river. During the years, the Corps often 
dredged three or four feet below the nine feet requirement in the interest of reducing 
the frequency of dredging operations. Along with the deeper dredging, the Corps 
constructed a series of twenty-nine locks and dams big enough for larger vessels.4 The 
pools created by the locks and the disposal of dredged material in side channels leading 
to open backwater areas accelerated sedimentation in backwaters. These backwaters 
served as important fi sh and wildlife habitat, so the loss of approximately twenty-fi ve 
percent of these areas to marshlands heavily impacted fi sh and wildlife populations.5
According to Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission chairman George W. 
Griebenow, for years “commercial fi shermen, biologists, and sportsmen ... expressed 
deep concern” over Corps maintenance of the nine-foot channel. Their main complaint 
was that commercial navigation dominated the Upper Mississippi to the detriment of 
recreation and fi sh and wildlife management, even though Congress had established 
the Upper Mississippi River Wildlife and Fish Refuge in 1924 to preserve lands and 
waters for waterfowl.6 The situation intensifi ed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when 
the Upper Mississippi River Comprehensive Basin Study called for a twelve-foot 
channel and the Corps examined this possibility. Environmentalists worried that such 
deep dredging would cause the Mississippi to overfl ow into wetlands, that the increase 
in dredged disposal material would further damage already impaired wildlife habitats 
and that a deeper channel was not economically justifi ed.7 The Corps did not disagree; 
in the early 1970s an EIS prepared by the Corps on the nine-foot channel revealed, in 
the words of two St. Paul District employees, that dredging and channel maintenance 
caused “signifi cant damage to the fragile backwaters, marshes, and sloughs” of the 
Upper Mississippi. However, the Corps at that time seemed unable or unwilling to 
mitigate these effects, in part because of questions over whether it was authorized to 
alleviate the damage.8
Based on information gained from the EIS, Representatives Albert Quie (R-Minnesota) 
and Vernon Thomson (R-Wisconsin), together with the Minnesota/Wisconsin Boundary 
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Area Commission, recommended the Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission 
delineate a river system management plan that would coordinate navigation, fi sh 
and wildlife interests, recreation, watershed management and water quality. At the 
same time, a lawsuit brought by the state of Wisconsin in the 1970s against the Corps 
temporarily halted dredging activities on the Upper Mississippi, convincing Congress 
that an investigation of dredging was needed. Congress appropriated $375,000 for 
a study in 1974 and provided $9.1 million more when it offi cially authorized the 
examination in the Water Resources Development Act of 1976. Upon the suggestion 
of the North Central Division of the Corps and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the 
Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission transformed its Dredged Spoil Disposal 
Practices Committee into the Great River Environmental Action Team, a collection 
of appointees from Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota, including representatives from 
the Corps, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and the Department 
of Transportation, with members from other interested organizations serving as 
ex-offi cio members. William R. Pearson, the chief of special studies for the St. Paul 
District, cochaired the study, which was divided into three parts: GREAT I examined 
the Upper Mississippi from 
the Twin Cities in Minnesota 
to Guttenberg, Iowa; GREAT 
II investigated the river from 
Guttenberg to the mouth of 
the Missouri River at Saverton, 
Missouri; and GREAT III 
studied the river from Saverton 
to its confl uence with the Ohio 
River at Cairo, Illinois.9
From 1975 to 1980, GREAT 
I explored the question of 
how the St. Paul District’s 
navigation and dredging could 
be coordinated with other 
river uses. As two members of 
the study related, because the 
team consisted of individuals 
from a variety of backgrounds, 
it was able to provide “a 
meaningful interdisciplinary 
approach through education 
and understanding of the 
many resources and physical 
factors involved with a river 
system so diverse as the 
Upper Mississippi.” In order 
to give different aspects of 
the river equal emphasis, 
Cooperation:  The GREAT I studay area. (Map 
courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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the team divided into twelve work groups, each led by a different agency: dredging 
requirements, side channel openings, material and equipment needs, sediment and 
erosion control, fi sh and wildlife management, plan formulation, dredged material 
uses, recreation, water quality, commercial transportation, fl oodplain management and 
public participation and information. The Corps led the dredging requirements and 
material and equipment needs work groups. Dennis Cin, St. Paul District chief of the 
Mississippi River Maintenance Section, chaired the dredging requirements group, and 
Wayne Knott, an engineer for the district, led the material and equipment needs team.10
As it studied the river, GREAT I developed three 
different levels of goals: short-range or day-to-day 
decisions about the Mississippi; midterm, defi ned as 
those programs that could be completed within the 
study’s time frame; and long-range, referring to the 
master plan of overall river management.11 By 1978, 
GREAT I was reporting several accomplishments 
within its short- and mid-term goals. For one, it had 
helped convince the district to implement a reduced-
depth dredging program in 1976 that ended the practice 
of dredging three or four feet below the required nine-
foot depth. This change reduced the amount of material 
dredged from the Upper Mississippi from 1.6 million 
cubic yards to 650,000 cubic yards. For another, GREAT 
I recommended the Corps use advance site preparation 
to ensure that dredged material did not enter wetlands. 
Instead of depositing dredged spoils in backwaters, 
the Corps began placing them in seven pre-selected 
disposal sites on land, thus decelerating sedimentation 
in backwaters and creating recreational beaches at some 
areas. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, GREAT I 
facilitated communication among management agencies, 
the Corps and the general public, in large part through 
its Public Participation and Information Program, which 
held eleven public town meetings, nineteen special 
hearings and forty-one citizen executive board meetings 
about the Upper Mississippi.12
Between 1979 and 1980, the study’s different work groups 
submitted their individual reports. In September 1980, 
GREAT I published its general report, using information 
compiled by the different work groups and containing 
eighty recommendations on how the St. Paul District 
could better manage the Upper Mississippi. Among its 
suggestions was that Congress provide the Corps with 
additional authority and funding to implement wildlife 
enhancement projects, that the Corps place dredged 
material at pre-selected sites and that the Corps alter 
The Dredge William A. 
Thompson:  The Thompson 
was the largest dredge in 
the St. Paul District’s Fleet. 
After 67 years of service, 
the William A. Thompson 
was replaced by a new 
dredge in 2005. (Photo 
courtesy of Marc Krumholz, 
St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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side channels and make structural fl ow modifi cations to alleviate sedimentation in 
backwaters.13 When district offi cials saw the report, they did not entirely agree with its 
conclusions but decided to support them anyway. As Colonel Badger, district engineer 
from 1979 to 1982, related, “We can never fully agree with a multi-agency report. But I 
think the effort that went into it was good, the ideas were good, and they [were] trying 
to do the right thing.”14 Other districts within the Corps, however, criticized St. Paul 
for allowing state and local entities to dictate 
how the Corps should conduct its affairs, and 
some offi cials even referred to St. Paul District 
employees as “ecofreaks” because of their 
environmental concerns.15
To ensure that GREAT I’s proposals were 
realized, Badger produced an implementation 
report, detailing what recommendations the 
St. Paul District considered to be of highest 
priority, how the district would execute 
these recommendations and what legislation 
and funding were needed. In this report, 
Badger discussed three possible future 
programs: the Basic Program, which would 
continue nine-foot channel dredging with 
only incidental considerations of fi sh and 
wildlife and recreation interests; the First 
Priority Program, which would consider fi sh 
and wildlife, recreation and water quality 
issues in nine-foot channel dredging; and the 
GREAT I Program, which would fully execute 
GREAT I’s suggestions by signifi cantly 
enhancing recreation and fi sh and wildlife 
opportunities. Taking the costs and benefi ts 
into consideration, Badger concluded the First 
Priority Program was the best plan to follow.16
To implement this program, Badger recommended 
that the St. Paul District receive $3 million a year from 
Congress in order to protect the fi sh and wildlife habitat 
on the Mississippi from Minneapolis to Guttenberg. This 
money would go toward purchasing land rights from 
owners in order to build new dredge disposal sites and 
would also be used to slow down the sedimentation 
occurring in the Upper Mississippi’s backwaters.17 As 
Badger stated, the plan enabled the district to “swim in the 
middle of the river” by balancing navigational interests 
and environmental concerns.18 This middle-ground 
approach, however, infuriated proponents of navigation. 
The Upper Mississippi River Waterway Association 
Dredging the Mississippi 
River:  J. Skrede, a 
member of the crew on 
the Dredge Dubuque, 
positions pipe that will 
carry dredge material. 
(Photo courtesy of, St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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denounced it because it “literally puts confi scation of private lands within the grasp 
of environmentalists,” while the U.S. Coast Guard believed it would eventually 
cause safety problems for river vessels. On the other hand, many environmental 
organizations, such as the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency, generally supported the program as a step in the right direction, 
although they also claimed the Corps was not going far enough in environmental 
protection.19
By 1992, the St. Paul District had worked hard to execute the First Priority Program. 
The district had developed a forty-year dredged material placement plan for fi fteen 
active dredging sites, taking into consideration economic, environmental, cultural and 
social impacts on each location. In addition, the district developed a comprehensive 
Channel Maintenance Management Plan which governed the placement of dredged 
material. It successfully reduced the average annual dredging volume from 1.6 million 
cubic yards to only 650 thousand cubic yards. In the opinion of one project manager in 
the St. Paul District, the reduced dredging was one of the major environmental changes 
the district made in the last quarter of the twentieth century.20 At the same time, the 
district implemented the Weaver Bottoms Rehabilitation Project in 1987 to decrease 
sedimentation and restore habitat in that backwater lake, which was situated between 
Winona, Minnesota, and Wabasha, Minnesota. Although the Corps had deferred some 
of GREAT I’s recommendations, it had taken signifi cant steps toward alleviating the 
problems it considered most pressing, and it continued to develop plans for future 
mitigation efforts.21
Complementing the GREAT I study was another analysis of the Upper Mississippi 
coordinated by the Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission. On October 21, 1978, 
President Jimmy Carter signed the Inland Waterway Authorization Act, which directed 
the commission to compile a Comprehensive Master Plan for the Management of the 
Upper Mississippi River System. This authorization resulted from a controversial 
Environmental Restoration
Environmental Restoration:  The fi rst Upper Mississippi River Environmental 
Management Program project completed by the St. Paul District included the 
backwater restoration in 1987 of Island 42. The Corps excavated the channel 
in the center of the left photo. Pictured on the right is Island 42, a fi ll site. (Photo 
courtesy of Dan Wilcox, St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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Corps’ proposal to replace Lock and Dam 26 at Alton, Illinois, with two new locks 
that could accommodate larger barges, thereby improving navigational use of the 
Upper Mississippi. Railroad interests feared the new locks would be a boon to barge 
companies. Environmentalists worried about the ecological effects of increased 
navigation. Both tried to prevent the construction of the locks through unsuccessful 
appeals to Congress and the courts. Although opponents could not halt construction of 
one of the locks, they were able to convince Congress to forestall building the second 
lock until a master study had been conducted.22
According to the 1979 Annual Report of the Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission, 
the Comprehensive Master Plan intended to “seek a balance of present and future 
commercial navigation activities with the economic, recreational, and environmental 
objectives” of the river by specifi cally examining how an enlargement of navigational 
capacity would affect the Mississippi. After seeking public input, the commission 
adopted a Plan of Study on August 15, 1979, divided into four work teams – Resources 
and Transportation, Dredged Material Disposal Demonstration, Computerized 
Analytical Inventory and Analysis and Public Participation and Information – and 
commenced the study, hoping to complete it in four years.23 On September 11, 1979, the 
Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 
with the Corps, stating that the Corps would take an active role in developing 
the master plan.24 The St. Paul District had the responsibility of determining the 
navigational carrying capacity of the Upper Mississippi, as well as evaluating the cost 
and benefi ts of depositing dredge spoil material in additional contained areas out of 
the fl oodplain.25
The commission worked on the master plan for two years before issuing the report 
to Congress in late 1981. Upon its appearance, environmentalists were disappointed, 
believing that the plan sacrifi ced environmental interests for the sake of navigation. In 
the report, the Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission, with input from the Corps, 
concluded the second lock at Lock and Dam 26 was justifi ed, but that Congress should 
also provide more than $20 million for the next two years to control erosion along 
tributary streams and to protect backwater lakes and sloughs. The plan also called for 
the establishment of a ten year environmental management program. The Sierra Club, 
however, saw these proposals as mere smoke and mirrors. “The commission’s tangible 
recommendations are for improving navigation on the river,” Jonathan Ela, Midwest 
representative of the Sierra Club, stated. “The environmental stuff they recommend 
is puff.” Rod Searle, chairman of the UMRBC, disagreed. The barge industry, he 
declared, was “not as happy as Mr. Ela would want us to believe. Since we don’t 
have everybody happy (with the plan), that leads me to believe that we’ve certainly 
accomplished something.”26 For the St. Paul District, the plan merely reinforced many 
of the recommendations offered by GREAT I, especially backwater rehabilitation 
and erosion mitigation, and showed the value of interagency planning on the Upper 
Mississippi. Although President Ronald Reagan abolished the Upper Mississippi River 
Basin Commission due to budget constraints soon after it issued its master plan, the 
commission, together with GREAT I, had developed recommendations that pushed the 
district toward formulating an environmental management program on the river. 
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Upper Mississippi River System Environmental Management Program
Indeed, largely because of the Upper Mississippi River Basin Commission’s report 
suggesting the establishment of a ten-year environmental management plan, Congress 
authorized the Upper Mississippi River System Environmental Management Program, 
Upper Mississippi River:  Locations of habitat rehabilitation and enhancement 
projects conducted by the St. Paul District for the Upper Mississippi River System 
Environmental Managment Program. (Map courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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or EMP, in the Water Resources Development Act of 1986. According to a report 
on the program, it was “designed to protect and balance the resources of the Upper 
Mississippi River Basin and guide future river management.” In order to accomplish 
this, fi ve elements received emphasis: habitat rehabilitation and enhancement, long-
term resource monitoring, recreation projects, the economic impacts of recreation, 
and navigation traffi c monitoring. In terms of resources, the habitat rehabilitation 
and enhancement and long-term resource monitoring were the largest components, 
while the recreation facets received no funding “due to a low federal priority.” Habitat 
rehabilitation and enhancement projects consisted of restoring river and fl oodplain 
habitats degraded by dredging or other activities, while the resource monitoring 
program called for biological and ecological research to determine what actions would 
best preserve the river’s ecosystem. Federal management of the program lay with the 
Corps, which coordinated with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Geological 
Survey, the Upper Mississippi River Basin Association (an organization formed by 
Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri and Wisconsin after the UMRBC’s demise) and 
representatives from fi ve Upper Mississippi states. Although the North Central Division 
of the Corps chaired the project as a whole, the St. Paul District supervised habitat 
rehabilitation and enhancement in Minnesota and Wisconsin.27
In order to implement the EMP, the St. Paul District consulted with river management 
agencies, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the River Resources Forum. The forum, 
fi rst created in 1981 as the Channel Maintenance Forum (renamed the River Resources 
Forum in 1990), was an interagency team chaired by the Corps and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service to continue the coordination of channel maintenance and other river-
related projects instigated by GREAT. Together, these groups evaluated different 
pools and areas along the Upper Mississippi and made a priority list of areas needing 
restoration. The fi rst project completed by the St. Paul District included backwater 
restoration in 1987 at Island 42, located in Pool 5 of the Upper Mississippi between 
Locks and Dams 4 and 5 in Minnesota. Because backwater sloughs were not receiving 
enough water fl ow to maintain dissolved oxygen levels for fi sh, the district excavated a 
channel, built a structure to bring fresh water into the sloughs and dredged the area to 
create a deep-water fi sh habitat.28
Another important undertaking included the Pool 8 Islands Habitat Project, involving a 
section of the river near Stoddard, Wisconsin. When the Corps completed construction 
of Lock and Dam 8 in 1937, it submerged the fl oodplain of Pool 8, initially enhancing 
the fi sh and wildlife habitat. But by the late 1980s, nearly 80 percent of the islands in 
Pool 8 had eroded, leading to increased wind fetch and turbidity. These conditions 
destroyed aquatic plants used by migrating canvasback ducks for food. In 1989, the St. 
Paul District, under the leadership of project manager Gary Palesh, began restoration on 
seven islands in Pool 8, reconstructing them from dredged material and protecting them 
with riprap and vegetation. The district also constructed six rockfi ll “seed” islands to try 
to stimulate growth and recommended periodic water drawdowns. The fi rst two phases 
of construction were completed in 1999, and the project received the Minnesota Society 
of Professional Engineers’ Seven Wonders of Engineering award in 2002. According to 
St. Paul District hydraulics engineer Jon Hendrickson, “River currents and sediment 
deposits were returned to a more natural condition, wind-driven wave action was 
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reduced and fl oodplain habitat was restored,” leading to a large increase in the number 
of canvasback ducks in the area.29
By 2003, the district had fi nished twenty habitat restoration projects, many led by 
Palesh and Don Powell, with two more under construction and seven in the planning 
and design stage.30 Although Congress originally authorized the EMP for only fi fteen 
years,  its life-span was extended indefi nitely in the 1999 Water Resources Development 
Act, providing the district reported on its EMP activities every six years.31 In 1999, 
Powell and Palesh estimated the program had “brought environmental benefi ts to more 
than 10,000 acres of habitat on the Upper Mississippi River.”32 Indeed, the EMP had 
two major impacts on the St. Paul District: fi rst, it provided steady work, and, second, 
it showed the district not only cared about the environment but could successfully 
implement projects to alleviate environmental damage. As District Engineer Colonel 
Richard W. Craig related in 1993, “We do [EMP] business very well ... We’re always 
going to do those types of environment-related activities very well because we have 
people here that are more interested in those types of projects than people in other 
regions of the country.”33 Colonel Roger L. Baldwin, district engineer from 1988 to 1991, 
concurred, recognizing that both environmental and navigation interests had praised 
EMP projects. The EMP, he continued, “has demonstrated that we are capable of pulling 
off a major program that consists of many separable elements and have done so with a 
variety of constituencies and stakeholders in these individual projects.”34
Locks and Dams 1-10 Rehabilitation
Despite the success of the EMP, some organizations 
still believed the Corps promoted navigation on the 
Upper Mississippi above environmental concerns. 
Whether or not this was an accurate criticism, the 
Corps continued to maintain the nine-foot channel 
and its locks and dams. Indeed, beginning in the 
late 1970s, the St. Paul District undertook a major 
rehabilitation effort at Locks and Dams 1-10 on 
the Upper Mississippi. Because the Corps had fi rst 
built these structures, which had fi fty-year design 
lives, in the 1930s, they were all nearly fi fty years 
old and in need of extensive maintenance in order 
to operate effectively for another fi fty years. The fi rst 
efforts began on Lock and Dam 1 in 1979 with fi ve 
major objectives: improving hydraulic operation, 
improving structure stability, extending the lock’s 
service life, providing more protection  to the lock’s 
foundation and improving recreational and aesthetic 
aspects.35 One of the main problems, however, 
included completing the rehabilitation without 
disrupting barge traffi c on the river. In order to fulfi ll 
this goal, the Corps mainly worked on the locks and 
Facelift:  Lock and Dam 5A 
after its rehabilitation. (Photo 
courtesy of Carl Gray, St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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dams in the winter, usually reopening the structures in May. According to Craig Hinton 
of the district’s Dredging and Structures Section, this meant that the rehabilitation was 
“intensive work in a short time, under the worst conditions.”36
In 1983, the district completed the renovations on Lock and Dam 1, rededicating the 
structure in June. That same year, it began rehabilitating the other locks and dams as 
part of a $225 million effort. Throughout the 1990s, work was completed on various 
locks and dams; but by 2003, some were still undergoing maintenance to be completed 
by the end of 2004. According to John Bailen, chief of the Engineering Division, the 
rehabilitation would allow Locks and Dams 1-10 to continue to operate effi ciently for 
another fi fty years.37
The Midwest Flood of 1993
But not all were convinced that locks, dams and levees 
were appropriate for the Mississippi River. The Corps 
faced serious debates about its entire fl ood control 
function when a fl ood of historic proportions hit regions 
around the Upper Mississippi in the summer of 1993. 
Problems began when a low-pressure system stalled over 
the Midwest for two months, dumping large amounts 
of rain on the area. This started a chain reaction of 
fl ooding on the Upper Mississippi. In portions of the 
river stretching from the Quad Cities of Illinois to St. 
Louis, Missouri, water levels were at times more than 
three feet higher than previous records. On this stretch, 
the river broke through numerous levees constructed 
by agriculturists to protect rich farmland near the 
Mississippi, and water poured into surrounding areas, 
causing signifi cant damage. Several roads, including 
major arteries such as Interstate 29 and U.S. 40 near St. 
Louis, closed due to fl ooding, while water inundated a 
treatment plant in Des Moines, Iowa, contaminating the 
drinking supply of 250 thousand people. The fl oods also 
submerged locks on the Upper Mississippi, forcing the 
Corps to close the waterway to barge traffi c and causing an 
estimated $300 million in losses to the shipping industry. 
When the waters fi nally receded, at least fi fty-two people 
were dead, 2,300 were injured, 56 thousand were homeless 
and property damage totaled more than $10 billion.38
Using complicated and technical comparisons of peak fl ood stage/discharge data 
and stage/discharge damage curves, the Corps claimed that its fl ood control projects 
and response efforts actually prevented more than $8 billion in damages, but others 
believed the levees worsened the fl ood. According to an article in the Engineering 
News Record, several environmental groups argued that the construction of levees 
Flooding:  St. Peter, 
Minnesota, 1993. 
(Photo courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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along the Mississippi River aggravated conditions “by restricting fl ow and raising 
water levels to unnatural heights.” They also created a false sense of security that 
encouraged communities to build in the fl oodplain.39 The devastation wreaked by the 
river was proof, many said, that levees could not work alone. Therefore, politicians 
and environmental organizations called for a reexamination of fl ood control on the 
Mississippi. “If we continue down the old path, we do so at our own peril,” said Jim 
Tripp of the Environmental Defense Fund.
Representative Jim Lightfoot (R-Iowa) echoed these sentiments. “The Corps is very 
good at what they do,” he admitted. “But quite frankly, I think their book needs to 
be rewritten.”40 Bill Bertrand, chairman of the Upper Mississippi River Conservation 
Committee, believed the Corps needed to implement “ecosystem planning,” whereby 
wetlands would be restored, levees would be removed and the river would be returned 
“to a more natural condition.”41
The Corps defended levees against these attacks, believing its fl ood control system 
on the Mississippi River truly did protect communities. In this system, reservoirs 
restrained tributary fl ows, while smaller levees protected agricultural land and urban 
levees and fl oodwalls shielded city centers. Reservoirs were designed with enough 
storage capacity to offset some of the fl ood stage increases caused by the channelization 
of the river, while agricultural levees were constructed to overtop during heavy 
fl ooding to relieve pressure on urban levees.42 According to the Corps, then, the real 
problem in 1993 was not its fl ood control system but a phenomenal natural event. 
“The paramount purpose of the levee system is to prevent loss of life,” Gene Gamble, a 
Corps’ spokesman, related. “That’s what they did well.”43 Gary L. Dyhouse, a St. Louis 
District hydrologist, agreed. “There are many reasons for changes in a fl ood elevation 
besides levees,” he claimed. “Contrary to the beliefs of some, the Great Flood of 1993 
... was not caused by levees.” Instead, Dyhouse continued, unprecedented rainfall 
triggered fl ooding and made water levels rise to extraordinary heights. “The Great 
Flood of 1993 was probably the largest fl ood seen at St. Louis since the fi rst European 
settlers entered the area in the 1700s,” he concluded.44 Yet the Corps also realized that 
levees alone could not adequately protect river communities and lands. Besides, they 
were not always aesthetically pleasing. “A wall all along the Mississippi River is not 
something a lot of people would support,” Colonel Richard Craig, district engineer 
of the St. Paul District, admitted.45 Therefore, the Corps reiterated that nonstructural 
solutions such as relocation, fl oodplain zoning and land-use planning were, in the 
words of Dyhouse, “good companion measures that should be included with traditional 
structural fl ood reduction measures like levees and reservoirs.”46 The Corps also 
declared it would not fi nance the repair of any levees destroyed by the fl ood that local 
sponsors had not properly maintained.47
Because of extensive fl ood damages, criticisms arose about federal fi nancial assistance 
to natural disaster victims. When the federal government intervened in emergencies, 
taxpayers ended up paying for cleanup and repairs to private residences, in part 
because the federally funded National Flood Insurance Program, fi rst established 
in 1968, covered areas at risk. This irritated Americans such as Richard Reeves, a 
syndicated columnist who wondered why citizens had to pay “higher taxes and 
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insurance premiums to protect property that is uninsurable under any rational 
system.”48 Such complaints dovetailed with cries for better fl oodplain management and 
for a revised fl ood insurance program. In part because of these criticisms, Congress 
ordered the North Central Division to conduct a study on fl ood control on the Upper 
Mississippi. David Loss, a project manager in the St. Paul District, chaired this 
examination, and the resulting report reiterated that the federal government needed to 
use other fl ood prevention methods besides levees, including purchasing land in the 
fl oodplain and improving fl ood insurance.49
Additional studies reached the same conclusions. A post-fl ood examination conducted 
by the North Central Division explained that although fl oods could not be “100 percent 
controlled,” they could be “greatly reduced and better managed with structural and 
nonstructural improvements.”50 Likewise, the Interagency Floodplain Management 
Review Committee appointed in 1994 to investigate existing fl oodplain and watershed 
management programs on the Upper Mississippi, recommended the implementation 
of policies that focused fi rst on “inappropriate use of the fl oodplain;” second, on 
“minimizing vulnerability to damage through both structural and nonstructural 
means;” and, third, on “mitigating fl ood damages when they do occur.” It also 
recommended that the National Flood Insurance Program mandate fl oodplain 
management before allowing communities to participate in the program. In addition, 
the Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee proposed that federal 
Navigation:  Several barges being locked through Lock and Dam 10 in 
Guttenberg, Iowa. (Photo by Shannon Bauer, courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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agencies, including the Corps, increase fl oodplain management education and outreach, 
but hardly any of the committee’s recommendations were ever legislatively enacted.51
Upper Mississippi River-Illinois Waterway System Navigation Study
No matter what solutions the Corps proposed, many environmentalists remained 
convinced the organization would continue to restrict rivers to the detriment of the 
environment. Accusations surrounding a Corps’ navigation study in the late 1990s 
only reinforced this perception. As part of its navigation planning function, the Corps 
began two separate reconnaissance studies in 1990 on the Illinois Waterway and the 
Upper Mississippi River in order to identify sites and structures needing navigation 
improvements. In 1993, the Corps combined these two reconnaissance studies into 
a system feasibility study, which examined what the Corps could do on the Upper 
Mississippi and the Illinois to relieve traffi c congestion and delays.52
Congestion on the Upper Mississippi had been 
a worrisome problem for years. As increasing 
numbers of barges traversed the river, delays 
became commonplace at many locks and dams. 
Part of the problem was that most of the locks 
on the Upper Mississippi were only 600 feet 
long, while most towboats pushed lines of fi fteen 
barges approximately 1,200 feet long. This meant 
that when a tow approached the lock, it would 
have to be dismantled into two separate tows in 
order to pass through, causing a delay of roughly 
an hour. Of special concern to the Corps were 
Locks 11 through 25. Because of regular delays 
on these sixteen locks, the navigation study 
specifi cally examined whether or not it was 
feasible to increase their length to 1,200 feet. The 
Corps also explored whether or not to expand 
seven locks close to St. Louis.53
The feasibility study, entitled the Upper 
Mississippi River-Illinois Waterway System 
Navigation Study, lasted into the twenty-fi rst 
century, costing about $50 million. The St. Paul 
District participated in the study, along with the 
Rock Island and St. Louis districts, under the 
supervision of fi rst the North Central Division 
and then the Mississippi Valley Division. By 1998, 
the economics work group, chaired by Donald 
Sweeney of St. Louis District, determined that 
the costs of lock expansion, which approached $1 
billion, far outweighed the benefi ts. The group, 
Repairs:  Richard Princko and Joe 
Kupietz, tender boat operators 
at the maintenance and repair 
unit in Fountain City, Wisconsin, 
remove a clamp bar and 
bottom seal during dewatering 
of the lock at lower St. Anthony 
Falls, Minneapolis in 2003. (Photo 
by Shannon Bauer, courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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therefore, recommended that enlargements not occur. Sweeney claimed that after his 
team issued this fi nding, he was relieved from his duties and replaced by another 
economist. Eventually, he argued, the Corps developed a draft report showing that 
large-scale expansion of the seven locks was economically viable. Sweeney charged 
senior Corps’ offi cials, including Major General Russell L. Fuhrman, deputy chief of 
engineers and deputy commanding general of the Corps; Major General Phillip R. 
Anderson, Commanding General of the Mississippi Valley Division; and Colonel James 
V. Mudd, district engineer of the Rock Island District, with deliberately altering data 
in order to produce this favorable benefi t-cost analysis. Sweeney offi cially fi led an 
affi davit with the U.S. Offi ce of Special Counsel detailing these charges, and the Offi ce 
of Special Counsel instructed the Department of Defense to investigate. In November 
2000, the Inspector General of the Army issued a report that substantiated some of 
Sweeney’s charges, specifi cally that Mudd improperly told Corps’ employees to use a 
lower N-value (a variable measuring how much consumers would be willing to pay for 
better barge transportation) than was warranted, and that Fuhrman and Anderson told 
subordinates that the Corps should act as an advocate for navigational interests. The 
report also found that an attitude of “Grow the Corps” existed, whereby divisions and 
districts were pressured to deliver projects.54
After the Inspector General released his fi ndings, environmental groups expressed 
anger, but not amazement, with the Corps’ conduct. Even before Sweeney delineated 
his suspicions, an article in Forbes magazine argued that “it is foreordained that the 
Corps will ask for new locks, and will say that without them the competitiveness of 
U.S. grain exports is at risk.”55 An editorial in the Minneapolis Star Tribune agreed. 
“The remarkable thing” about the Inspector General’s fi ndings, it concluded, “was how 
plainly the Corps’ conduct on the Mississippi and Illinois rivers locks project illustrates 
what so many have suspected but been unable to prove.”56 Likewise, Ted Williams, in 
an essay in Audubon, saw the controversy as just another chapter in an ongoing history: 
“The Corps’ military pooh-bahs have traditionally used trick arithmetic to justify 
environmentally hurtful, make-work projects.”57 Williams’ perception was that the 
Corps routinely manipulated its benefi t-cost analyses to validate projects it wanted. 
This opinion was nothing new. Since the 1970s critics had disparaged the Corps’ 
benefi t-cost system, which used various fi gures to produce a ratio comparing the 
benefi ts accruing from a project with the amount of money expended. According to 
the national economic development criterion employed by the Corps, if a project had a 
ratio of 1.0 or greater (meaning that for every dollar spent, benefi ts greater than a dollar 
resulted), it was economically justifi ed. But in the 1970s, economist Robert H. Haveman 
of the University of Wisconsin argued that two-thirds of the Corps’ projects could not 
“pass a rigorous and correct cost-benefi t test.”58 Others believed the benefi t-cost process 
was inherently fl awed because of the discount rates used in the calculations. Since water 
projects usually stretched over long periods of time, the Corps, like other government 
agencies, used discount rates, usually a fi gure lower than the current market interest 
rate, to equalize future dollar values with present rates. As Stephen A. Thompson of 
Millersville University in Pennsylvania explained, “Public spending uses a discount 
rate lower than that used by private markets. Low discount rates favor capital-intensive 
projects that produce benefi ts many years into the future; this is precisely the character 
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of most water projects.”59 Thus, according to journalist Steve Slade, “The Corps’s 
outdated benefi t-cost type of analysis is consistently biased toward endorsing proposed 
construction projects.”60 Attorney Michael S. Baram extended this argument, stating that 
“by manipulating the discount rate, assigning arbitrary values to identifi ed costs and 
benefi ts, excluding costs that would tilt the outcome against the preferred option, and 
using self-serving assumptions about distributional fairness,” the Corps could easily 
justify any desired project.61
Another problem with benefi t-cost analysis was the diffi culty of making an economic 
estimate on environmental effects. As Ted Williams questioned about the Upper 
Mississippi River-Illinois Waterway System Navigation Study, “What, I wondered, 
is the dollar value of the two dozen bald eagles ... [or] the pileated woodpecker” that 
would be displaced by the lock expansion? Williams, quoting a study performed for the 
Fish and Wildlife Service in 1999, placed “the economic contribution of fi shing, hunting, 
wildlife viewing, and sightseeing along the Upper Mississippi at $6.6 billion per year,” 
but such fi gures were diffi cult to verify.62
In some ways, then, the controversy over the Upper Mississippi River-Illinois 
Waterway System Navigation Study was part of an ongoing disagreement over the 
benefi t-cost system itself. Even though the Inspector General’s report castigated the 
Corps, it recognized the subjectivity of the benefi t-cost process and supported some of 
the changes the Corps had made in its economic analysis of lock construction because 
of this.63 But the damage had been done, and the Upper Mississippi River-Illinois 
Waterway System Navigation Study came to a halt in 2000 while the National Academy 
of Sciences’ National Research Council conducted an independent review. On February 
28, 2001, the National Research Council issued its fi ndings and recommended the study 
broaden its scope to focus on both environmental and economic factors. Acting on these 
recommendations, the study acquired a new name, the Restructured Upper Mississippi 
River-Illinois Waterway Navigation Study, and began again in the summer of 2001, 
with a projected completion date in 2004.64
Even though no one from the St. Paul District was implicated in the scandal, the district, 
as well as the Corps as a whole, still learned some lessons from the process. Although 
the benefi t-cost manipulations were disturbing, the charges that the Corps was 
primarily interested in navigation and as an organization concentrated on getting work 
for itself regardless of the cost to taxpayers was perhaps more damaging. Some Corps’ 
personnel clearly needed to change their perspective, but in the St. Paul District, which 
had traditionally been more environmentally conscious than other Corps’ units, the 
issue, according to Colonel Kenneth Kasprisin, district engineer from 1998 to 2001, was 
more about projecting an accurate image than about revising its benefi t-cost analyses. 
“I think that the Corps has a very high integrity,” Kasprisin asserted. “I think that we 
take a lot of pride in what we do.” The problem, he continued, was conveying that 
impression to the public, and he called on the Corps in general to improve its efforts “to 
tell our story of what it is that we do to help the communities.”65
While the Corps continued to address criticism of its handling of the Upper Mississippi 
River, the 2002 publication of an interim report by the Restructured Upper Mississippi
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River-Illinois Waterway Navigation Study began to rectify the challenging issues in the 
original study. “A collaborative process has been applied in restarting the restructured 
navigation study,” the report stated, and this process consisted of consulting with 
“other Federal agencies, state agencies, the public, and economic and environmental 
non-governmental organizations” about how “to give equal consideration of fi sh and 
wildlife resources and navigation improvement.”66 For the duration of the study, this 
collaboration was to continue. The question remained as to how the Corps would deal 
with the problems associated with benefi t-cost analyses, but, as the successes of GREAT 
I and the UMRBC master plan showed, consistent coordination with other agencies 
would help.
Endangered Species – Lampsilis higginsii
As the Corps dealt with the problems arising from the Upper Mississippi River-Illinois 
Waterway Navigation Study, the St. Paul District faced diffi culties from another 
source: mussels on the Upper Mississippi. The district became concerned with mussels 
because some varieties were endangered species and because an exotic species, the 
zebra mussel, threatened to destroy the native population. In 1973, Congress passed the 
Endangered Species Act, which required federal agencies to ensure their actions did not 
harm any endangered species or its habitat. This complicated matters for the St. Paul 
District because of the presence of Lampsilis higginsii, or the Higgins’ eye pearly mussel, 
in several waterways under its jurisdiction, including the Upper Mississippi and St. 
Croix rivers. Because of a decrease in abundance and range of the Higgins’ eye, the Fish 
and Wildlife Service listed it as an endangered species in 1976.67
That same year, various individuals and agencies expressed concern for the Higgins’ 
eye mussel. When the St. Paul District held public hearings on its nine-foot channel 
maintenance dredging, for example, the Fish and Wildlife Service conveyed its 
trepidation about the effects of this action on the Higgins’ eye, especially in the eastern 
channel at Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin. In response, the district held a meeting with 
commercial clammers, Prairie du Chien’s city council and representatives from the 
State of Wisconsin, as well as the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and 
GREAT, to determine exactly where in the east channel the mussel resided. The group 
discovered that, although mussel beds existed in the southern part of the channel, they 
were not known in the northern part. Based on this information, the district decided 
to dredge the east channel from the north, rather than the south. Marian Havlik, a 
Wisconsin resident who had educated herself about the Higgins’ eye, objected to 
this effort, believing it would still disrupt the mussel’s habitat. The Corps, however, 
believed that because of a slow river current, the dredged material could settle before 
reaching the mussel beds. Besides, the mussels had already survived heavy periods 
of natural siltation due to fl ooding, and the short duration of the dredging would not 
harm them. All interested agencies and commercial clammers accepted the district’s 
revised plan.68
But after the dredging, Havlik went through the spoil and found, in her own words, 
“hundreds of Higgins’ Eye shells.”69 Angry that the St. Paul District had not listened 
to her, Havlik wrote President Jimmy Carter and United States representatives and 
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senators from Wisconsin and Minnesota, protesting that the Corps had knowingly 
violated the Endangered Species Act by not conducting a thorough survey of Higgins’ 
eye mussels before dredging.70 Perhaps exasperated at the outcry Havlik made, some 
Corps’ personnel began referring to her as “that clam lady,” but her actions helped the 
St. Paul District become more aware and knowledgeable about the Higgins’ eye mussel. 
Before this incident, Havlik related, “There was no one in the Corps who could identify 
a mussel species.” After her protests, she said, “The Army Corps realized that never 
again could it dredge a channel without fi rst doing a survey of mussel species in the 
path of the dredge boat.”71
As the district continued to discover Higgins’ eye mussels in its dredging areas, it 
developed a greater concern for them. In 1977, for example, the district discovered the 
half-shell of a dead clam in dredged spoils from the Minnesota River. Although the 
clam could not positively be identifi ed as a Higgins’ eye, the district stopped work for 
two days while a malacologist investigated. Such inconveniences led James Braatz, a 
St. Paul District spokesman, to declare in 1980, “The problem with the Higgins’ Eye is 
that it keeps cropping up where we want to work.” To solve the Higgins’ eye issue, the 
district advocated the establishment of specifi ed areas outside of dredging sites where 
the species could be placed and protected. The Fish and Wildlife Service investigated 
this possibility, but took no action in the 1980s.72
In the 1990s, anxiety about the mussel increased after the St. Paul District learned that 
an exotic mussel species, Dreissena polymorpha, or the zebra mussel, had invaded the 
Upper Mississippi River. The zebra mussel, usually around one inch long, is native to 
central Asia but migrated to Europe in years past. In 1985 or 1986, commercial barges 
with the mussel attached entered the Great Lakes, unintentionally leaving the creature 
behind. Thereafter, the mussel was carried to the Mississippi River by recreational and 
commercial crafts. Once in the Mississippi, the mussel created three problems: fi rst, 
it used strong threads to attach itself to any hard substrate, including water intakes, 
C
ivil W
orks Program
 I:  The Upper M
ississippi
3
65
pipes, valves, buoys, screens and other underwater structures, causing clogging and 
sinkage; second, its large numbers could ruin fi sh spawning habitat; and third, it could 
potentially eliminate the Higgins’ eye and other native mussels by competing for food 
and attaching to their shells, thereby preventing them from migrating or burrowing.73 
The St. Paul District initiated a monitoring process of the zebra mussel at its locks 
and dams in 1992; but by the end of the decade, the population of the organism had 
exploded on the Upper Mississippi.74
In 2000, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a Final Biological Opinion for the operation 
and maintenance of the nine-foot channel navigation project which concluded that 
because of barge movement, the project would continue to facilitate the growth of zebra 
mussel populations, thereby diminishing the survival chances of the Higgins’ eye. 
The Service recommended the Corps conduct a study as to the feasibility of relocating 
populations of the Higgins’ eye mussels to stimulate their population growth, and 
a reconnaissance/feasibility study commenced. In April 2002, the St. Paul District 
released a draft relocation plan under the direction of biologist Dennis Anderson. 
This report proposed establishing ten sites throughout Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa and 
Wisconsin, where the Corps could place Higgins’ eye mussels in order to ensure that 
at least fi ve new populations survived. The ten-year plan, estimated to cost $2.66 
million, also called for raising juvenile mussels on certain fi sh species at hatcheries 
and then transplanting these mussels to the relocation sites.75 The next decade would 
show whether or not this plan enhanced Higgins’  eye populations, but the Corps was 
optimistic. Meanwhile, the St. Paul District worked on a zebra mussel reconnaissance 
study, but what solutions this proposed remained to be seen. For the foreseeable future, 
the zebra mussel, in the words of one district offi cial, would continue to be a “multi-
million-dollar pest” to the Corps.76
Mussels:  Corps’ 
bilogists relocate 
immature Higgins 
eye mussels 
pursuant to 
the Biological 
Opinion. Left 
to right:  Randy 
Urich, Dan Kelner 
and Dennis 
Anderson. (Photo 
by Shannon Bauer, 
courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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Conclusion
By 2003, civil works projects on the Upper Mississippi River had produced numerous 
opportunities for the St. Paul District to show its concern for the environment and to 
demonstrate its cooperation with federal, state and local entities. Although the Upper 
Mississippi River Navigation Study and the Midwest Flood of 1993 produced new 
concerns about the Corps’ commitment to environmental values, the St. Paul District’s 
work on commissions, such as GREAT and the Upper Mississippi River Basin 
Commission, together with its implementation of the EMP and its efforts to preserve 
the Higgins’ eye mussel, evinced the district’s environmental awareness. Events on 
the Upper Mississippi showed that balancing the interests of different parties was 
diffi cult and controversial, and that most of the time the Corps could not satisfy all 
viewpoints. The key, according to District Engineer Colonel William Badger, was to 
“swim in the middle of the river” and hope that a moderate approach appeased some 
of the concerns.77
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Zumbra River:  Channel modifi cations 
on the South Fork Zumbro River in 
Rochester, Minnesota, showing 
the pedestrian bridge and riprap 
implemented by the St. Paul District, 
1995. (Photo courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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Throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century, much of the St. 
Paul District’s civil works efforts focused on the Mississippi River. 
However, that waterway was not the district’s only responsibility; it also 
performed fl ood control projects on rivers and lakes throughout North 
Dakota, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Just as district undertakings on the 
Mississippi showed the impact of environmentalism on the Corps’ civil 
works mission, so too did these other fl ood control projects demonstrate the evolution 
of the St. Paul District’s environmental awareness. In these other regions, the Corps 
faced different problems than in the Mississippi River Basin. For one thing, agriculture 
dominated the Northern Great Plains, where many of these projects were built, leading 
to confl icts between urban environmentalists intent on halting undertakings and rural 
agriculturists who, in their estimation, needed the projects to survive. For another, 
the fl at topography and cold climate of the Northern Great Plains ensured that Corps’ 
activities would consist primarily of fl ood control, with few navigational concerns. 
Indeed, the La Farge project in Wisconsin, the Devils Lake undertaking in North 
Dakota, the Grand Forks/East Grand Forks project in North Dakota and Minnesota 
and the South Fork Zumbro River undertaking in Minnesota, raised several interesting 
quandaries for the district and are especially good examples of the controversial issues 
and innovative solutions that developed between 1975 and 2003.
La Farge, Wisconsin
The La Farge Project in southwestern Wisconsin was an attempt to tame the Kickapoo 
River, a waterway that fl ows 95 miles through nine communities ranging in population 
from a hundred to more than seven hundred. The river mainly traverses hilly farmland 
before emptying into the Wisconsin River only 16 miles from the Wisconsin’s juncture
4Civil Works Program II:Flood Control Projects
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with the Mississippi. Other than the development of the Corps’ Upper Mississippi 
River policies, perhaps no other project better highlights the impact of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA, and the environmental movement on the Corps’ 
civil works program. The beginnings of the project stretched back to the 1930s, when 
Kickapoo Valley residents, tired of fl oods that had inundated the region in 1907, 
1912, 1917 and 1935, asked the Corps for assistance. In 1938, the Corps performed a 
preliminary examination of the river but the outbreak of the Second World War stalled 
any decisive action. In January 1962, the St. Paul District issued a report recommending 
that a dam and reservoir be constructed at La Farge for fl ood control, fi sh and wildlife 
enhancement and recreation purposes, and Congress authorized the project that same 
year. In order to build the dam and reservoir, the district acquired 348 tracts of land, 
totaling 8,569 acres, from private residents in the Kickapoo Valley in 1969.1
When the Corps began constructing the dam, Congress had just passed NEPA, thereby 
requiring federal agencies to take into account environmental effects of their actions. 
Bolstered by this statute, environmentalists quickly objected to the La Farge Dam, 
believing that the resulting 1,800-acre lake would inundate a scenic portion of the 
Kickapoo River, would be environmentally unsound and would damage endangered 
plant species such as arctic primrose and northern monkshood. The Corps’ own 
Environmental Advisory Board, created on April 2, 1970, to provide recommendations 
and aid to Corps’ leadership on environmental issues, requested the La Farge project 
be used as a test case to implement Environmental Advisory Board suggestions as to 
how the Corps should interface with the public on controversial issues. However, in 
1971, Environmental Advisory Board chairman Charles H. Stoddard charged both the 
St. Paul District and the North Central Division with, in the words of historian Martin 
Reuss, “undermining the Board’s efforts in the case of the La Farge Dam.” Stoddard 
La Farge:  An 
artist concept 
drawing of La 
Farge Lake and 
Dam produced 
in 1972. (Photo 
courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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La Farge:  Project map, 1998. (Mapo courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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believed that district and division representatives had pressured state offi cials to review 
recommendations for fl ood control rather than forming an independent panel for that 
purpose, meaning that no signifi cant dialogue had been conducted about fl ood control 
alternatives. Instead, construction of the dam merely continued.2
In the early 1970s, the Sierra Club fi led two lawsuits against the Corps to stop Corps’ 
work at La Farge but both were dismissed. Late in 1974, the issues reached a head. 
Wisconsin Governor Patrick Lucey and U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wisconsin), 
both former proponents of the dam, called for a halt to construction after a University 
of Wisconsin report revealed the lake would probably be rich in nutrients and 
susceptible to weeds and algae due to farmland runoff. Lucey and Nelson asked the St. 
Paul District to consider alternatives to the dam and reservoir. Schooled in traditional 
Corps’ beliefs that dams and reservoirs were the best fl ood control devices regardless 
of environmental  effects, District Engineer Col. Max Noah reluctantly agreed, but 
observed, “I think we do owe it to the [Kickapoo Valley] community as a whole to 
continue the project.”3 James Braatz, St. Paul District spokesman, also expressed 
skepticism about alternatives, stating the original proposal was “the only way to go.”4 
Such comments prompted the Capital Times in Madison, Wisconsin, to editorialize, 
 Nothing better exemplifi es the ossifi ed, stratifi ed, obdurate bureaucratic mind    
 at work than the attitude of the Army Corps of Engineers toward any suggestion    
 that, maybe, the dam they are constructing across the Kickapoo River at La Farge    
 might be an environmental mistake.5
The differences between environmentalists and the Corps over the La Farge Dam 
refl ected the general tensions that abounded in the 1970s between the two groups. 
Whereas environmentalists perceived engineers as narrow-minded dam builders 
who were insensitive to environmental concerns, engineers saw environmentalists 
as unrealistic “tree-huggers.”6 Part of the problem was different perceptions of fl ood 
control. Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club endorsed nonstructural solutions 
to fl ooding, such as removing development from the fl oodplain and other management 
techniques, while the Corps still focused mainly on structural answers, such as dams 
and reservoirs. Although the Corps would eventually begin to implement nonstructural 
solutions, the La Farge Project saw it clinging to the structural method.
The St. Paul District agreed to study alternatives to the dam. It formed a partnership 
team for that purpose and even issued a report reviewing alternatives, but it still 
believed that the dam and reservoir were the only viable solutions. After the 
partnership team issued a report in March 1975, affi rming the eutrophic nature of the 
proposed lake and the expense of trying to improve its water quality, Noah defi antly 
declared, “It’s never been my intention to review alternatives,” adding that as long as 
Congress provided the necessary funds, the district would continue to construct the 
dam.7 A Kickapoo Valley organization, Citizens for Kickapoo, agreed with Noah’s 
stance, presenting Governor Lucey with a 7,000-name petition in support of the dam. 
Faced with the obstinacy of Noah and Kickapoo Valley residents, Nelson, who wanted 
to relocate individuals from the fl oodplain and create a riverway park system, and 
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U.S. Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisconsin), who was concerned about the escalating 
costs of the dam, took the matter to the Senate Subcommittee on Public Works and 
eliminated construction funding in November 1975. In response, La Farge residents 
burned Proxmire in effi gy and buried him in a mock funeral, angered that he had 
helped place the project in a state of “bureaucratic limbo.”8
Proxmire’s vilifi cation highlighted another signifi cant theme – the battles between 
urban and rural residents over fl ood control. Most of the opposition to La Farge came 
from residents of Madison and Milwaukee; most of the proponents were centered in 
the Kickapoo Valley. “Kickapoogians” believed the recreation potentials of the dam 
and reservoir were needed in order to stimulate the area’s economy and claimed the 
reservoir was necessary to prevent farmland fl ooding. They resented the intrusion of 
“outsiders,” people who they believed had no economic interest in the project. Jane 
Johnson, a resident of La Farge, expressed her discontent with Nelson and others who 
were “playing on our emotions,” while Bernice Schroeder, also a La Farge citizen, stated 
that opposition to the dam “shows the insensitivity of the urban people to the needs 
and wants of the people here.”9 Ward Rose’s despair went even deeper, as he believed it 
did not matter what La Farge residents actually wanted because, “We are going to end 
up with what some rotten politicians want us to have.”10 Environmentalists disagreed, 
arguing that “the fate of the Kickapoo Valley is of great concern to all Wisconsin 
residents, as the Kickapoo River is an important natural treasure enjoyed by residents 
from all areas of Wisconsin.”11 The St. Paul District was caught in the middle, wanting 
to build the dam and reservoir but facing intense opposition from the other side. 
By the time Nelson and Proxmire successfully persuaded Congress to cut the dam’s 
funding, the Corps had spent approximately $18 million and completed nearly forty 
percent of the project. The dam itself lay across the valley, stopping just at the river. 
A concrete intake tower was fi nished, as was a conduit tunnel and a maintenance 
building.12 Because no taxes were levied on the lands the Corps had purchased from 
valley residents, the community suffered a decrease in tax revenue. Those who sold 
the property criticized the Corps for removing them from their homes for no purpose. 
With such problems, it became imperative either to de-authorize the project or to fi nd 
another solution. Several proposals were introduced, including Nelson’s idea to build a 
riverway park for the National Park Service to administer. But early in 1976, the Interior 
Department declared that the stretch of the Kickapoo River, including La Farge, did 
not meet the criteria for national park or scenic waterway status.13 In 1977, President 
Jimmy Carter recommended the abandonment of the La Farge Project as part of his 
fi ght against unnecessary fl ood control projects, advocating instead the need to focus on 
nonstructural alternatives in the Kickapoo Valley.14
The need to resolve the fl ooding became more urgent in 1978 when the region 
experienced severe summer inundations that caused an estimated $10 million in 
damages.15 After water at a depth of six feet fl owed down its main street, Soldiers 
Grove, a community of fi ve hundred on the Kickapoo, worked with the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development to relocate its homes and businesses a half-mile 
away, placing them out of the fl oodplain.16 Other towns, including La Farge, were not 
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so willing to uproot. Thus, 
when Steven Gunderson 
(R-Wisconsin) began 
serving in the House of 
Representatives in 1981, 
he decided to try to fi nd 
a less radical solution to 
the Kickapoo Valley’s 
problems. Gunderson 
asked the St. Paul District 
to consider completing the 
dam as a dry dam, with no 
resulting reservoir. District 
Engineer Colonel William 
Badger agreed to study the 
proposal, but admitted that 
ultimately, Congress had 
the responsibility of telling 
the district what to do with the project. “I’d be willing to do 
whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides,” Badger stated.17 
But Congress took no steps toward deauthorization, leaving 
Badger somewhat frustrated: “It really creates problems for 
me because it is not being funded and yet I have to maintain 
it. I have to keep it clean and keep security on it.”18
Despite Badger’s concerns, the dam remained in limbo. In 
1983, Congress appropriated funds for the dry dam study, 
which was completed in 1984. This report concluded that 
neither a dry dam nor a wet dam was feasible for several 
reasons, including poor benefi t-cost ratios and inadequate 
fl ood protection.19 With no relief forthcoming, some Kickapoo 
Valley residents decided to take matters into their own 
hands and instituted lawsuits against the Corps to force the 
completion of the dam. In October 1985, Martha Rose Driscoll, 
who had sold 200 acres to the Corps in 1970; Ronald Driscoll; 
and Pat Driscoll fi led a suit seeking $110,000 in damages 
and requiring the St. Paul District to fi nish the dam. Two 
months later, Leita Slayton, Darold and Loretta Hanson and 
Schwert Farms fi led a similar suit, claiming that stoppage of 
the project had led to “loss of jobs, tax revenues, and profi ts,” 
and that the lack of fl ood protection “hurt property values 
and left crops unprotected.”20 U.S. District Judge Barbara 
Crabb dismissed the suits in December 1988, but stated that 
if residents “were to show that the Corps acted improperly, 
they might be entitled to have the Corps redetermine whether 
the project should be completed.” Pat Driscoll thus redirected
La Farge Project: 
The La Farge Project 
soon after work was 
suspended, 1979. The 
concrete intake tower 
is in the foreground.
(Photo courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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his efforts and fi led another suit in December 1989, asking the Corps sell acquired 
land back to the landholders if it could not fi nish the dam.21 In September 1990, U.S. 
District Judge John C. Shabaz dismissed the suit, stating that because Congress had 
not provided funds to the Corps for the dam, the Corps could not be obligated to 
complete it.22
With no solution forthcoming, La Farge residents and the St. Paul District continued to 
wait. Some of the land itself, however, was still in use. The St. Paul District leased the 
maintenance building to the town of Stark, Wisconsin, and more than a thousand acres 
of land to nearby farmers. In addition, the Corps allowed some events to occur in the 
vicinity, including annual dog training clinics by the Blackhawk Retrievers Club and a 
couple of gatherings by the Rainbow Family, a group promoting alternative lifestyles.23 
A fi nal resolution of the project was still necessary.
In 1991, Governor Tommy G. Thompson of Wisconsin asked the people in the Kickapoo 
River Valley to study the problem and devise a solution. Assisted by Alan Anderson, 
an economic development specialist with the University of Wisconsin-Extension, the 
residents developed a proposal for the government to transfer the disputed 8,500 acres 
of land to the state which would then have a local board administer it as public land. 
In addition, the locals asked the St. Paul District to complete improvements to State 
Highway 131, a road the Corps was supposed to have relocated after the dam was 
constructed. Thompson, stating that the plan went “far towards putting this twenty-
fi ve year source of pain and confl ict behind us all,” asked Gunderson to usher it 
through Congress.24
In June 1994, Gunderson and U.S. Representative Thomas Petri (R-Wisconsin), 
together with U.S. Senators Russell D. Feingold (D-Wisconsin) and Herbert H. Kohl 
(D-Wisconsin) introduced legislation implementing the proposal. It stated the land 
would be transferred to the state of Wisconsin and designated as the Kickapoo Valley 
State Reserve. It also set up a local citizen’s board to manage the land and provided 
$17 million to complete the road construction and to develop recreational features. 
The law also provided for a part of the 8,500 acres to be given to the Ho-Chunk Indian 
Nation, which resided in the area. Since the early 1970s, numerous surveys in the 
Kickapoo River Valley had uncovered hundreds of archeological sites in the area. When 
Alan Anderson discovered this in the process of developing the transfer proposal, he 
contacted the Ho-Chunk to determine the tribe’s view of these historic and cultural 
resources. Two Ho-Chunk leaders, Joann Jones and Chloris Lowe, subsequently asked 
the federal government give all 8,500 acres to the Ho-Chunk. The Water Resources 
Development Act of 1996 stipulated that no more than 1,200 acres be given to the tribe 
and stated that negotiations over the fi nal amount had to be concluded with the Ho-
Chunk before the State of Wisconsin could receive its land.25
For several months, the Corps and state representatives negotiated with the tribe. 
In October 1997, the two sides agreed the tribe would take 1,200 acres – 840 acres 
south of Wildcat Mountain State Park and 360 acres near Black Hawk Rock in the 
southern section of the reserve.26 After this land reverted to the Ho-Chunk, the 
remaining acreage would go to the State of Wisconsin to be governed by the Kickapoo 
Reserve Management Board. The board promised not only to preserve the unique 
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environmental characteristics of the valley but also to promote its use “in a manner that 
encourages an appreciation and advocacy of a natural area.” Kickapoogians hoped that 
increased tourism would arise from this settlement and that the natural reserve would 
mitigate future fl ooding.27
Meanwhile, the St. Paul District used the $17 million provided in the law to improve 
State Highway 131 and to clean up some environmental hazards. The district fi lled in 
the concrete intake tower, capped numerous wells, extricated contaminated soil from 
old dumping sites and conducted real estate surveys. When these necessary functions 
were completed, the district transferred the deeds to the land to the state and the 
Department of the Interior. Except for the ongoing construction on State Highway 131, 
the Corps no longer had a presence at La Farge.28
The unfi nished dam remained at the site, a symbol, according to former district 
historian John Anfi nson, of the impact of NEPA. Anfi nson and others did not see the 
incomplete dam as a Corps’ failure; instead, it merely represented how NEPA had 
affected the Corps’ civil works program. Had the project been constructed before the 
passage of the act, nothing could have been done to stop the destruction of endangered 
plants, scenic beauty and archeological remains. After NEPA became law, it was no 
longer appropriate for the Corps to build without any regard for environmental effects 
and the project was stopped. As Anfi nson related, “The Corps did an excellent job of 
building that project and working on that project and doing what it was supposed 
to do. It couldn’t do anything about NEPA being passed and implemented,” except 
adapt itself to the new regulations.29 Because of controversies like La Farge, it became 
increasingly clear to the Corps that such adaptation was both necessary and desirable.
Devils Lake, North Dakota
Although the La Farge project 
ultimately reached a reasonable and 
acceptable solution for all sides, such 
an answer remained elusive for the 
St. Paul District and the residents of 
Devils Lake, North Dakota. Perhaps 
no other project illustrated the 
diffi culties that could result when 
congressional delegations from 
different states pursued opposing 
solutions to the same problem, and 
perhaps no other project presented 
as many interested parties – federal, 
state, local and international – all 
clamoring for what they thought was 
best for Devils Lake. Whereas most 
fl ood control situations occurred 
on rivers, Devils Lake was a closed-
Devils Lake:  Map of Devils Lake, North 
Dakota, and the vicinity. (Map courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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basin lake with unpredictable water levels. 
As the lake continued to rise and inundate 
property in the 1990s, Devils Lake residents 
pushed for the St. Paul District to build 
an outlet into the Red River of the North. 
This proposal met neither legal nor Corps’ 
standards and caused an outcry from various 
other “publics,” including the Canadian 
government whose offi cials claimed that it 
would dump damaging levels of saline into 
the Red River, which ultimately fl owed into 
Canada; the Spirit Lake Tribe, which believed 
that the water was sacred and should not be 
manipulated; and environmentalists, who 
believed that the adverse environmental 
effects of an outlet exceeded its benefi ts. 
Caught in the middle of these various 
perceptions, the Corps struggled to fi nd 
a solution that would meet the different 
concerns and still be within its own rigid 
justifi cation guidelines.
Devils Lake, described by North Dakota journalist Peter Salter as “a wooded jewel in 
[the] middle of the prairie,”30 lies at the extremity of a closed subbasin of the Red River 
of the North Basin in north central North Dakota. Unlike most lakes, the waterway has 
no natural outlet unless its water level reaches approximately 1,457 feet above mean sea 
level, whereupon it spills into the Sheyenne River.31 Surrounded by the communities 
of Devils Lake, Minnewaukan, Fort Totten and the Spirit Lake Indian Reservation, the 
lake has been an important economic resource in the area for many years, bringing 
in approximately $50 million annually from recreation.32 Because of climatic swings, 
water levels have traditionally fl uctuated between rising and falling cycles. Around 
1860, the lake entered a falling phase that dropped the water level from 1,438 feet to 
1,402 feet.33 The lake then shifted into a rising cycle that eventually resulted in fl ooding. 
In 1979, lake levels reached 1,426 feet, wiping out railroad bridges and culverts.34 The 
lake continued to rise, leading Congress to authorize the Corps in 1983 to conduct 
studies to determine the best way to protect communities from the rising water. Many 
residents believed the only solution was to provide a man-made outlet for the water. “It 
is impossible to manage the water level in the lake without an outlet,” an editorial in a 
local newspaper suggested.35 Jack Zaleski, managing editor of the Devils Lake Journal, 
agreed. “The cost of no outlet. . .will, in the long run, be very expensive,” he stated.36
St. Paul District leaders did not necessarily oppose construction of an outlet but 
explained it would not be feasible until the lake rose an additional seven feet.37 Colonel 
Edward Rapp, district engineer from 1982 to 1985, cautioned community members 
to consider rising lake levels in their long-term context: “In a very real sense, mother 
nature owns all that property below the natural outlet at 1,457 feet.” Rapp declared that 
fl oodplain management was necessary no matter what other fl ood control solutions 
Devils Lake:  A fl ood control 
diversion channel constructed 
by the North Dakota State Water 
Commission in the northeastern part 
of the Devils Lake watershed. (Photo 
by Lyle Nickly, courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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were implemented and committed the district to a thorough investigation of the 
problem, no matter how long it took. “You should not be panicked into a quick fi x 
which could be bad in the future,” he counseled the community.38 In the meantime, the 
Corps installed levees to protect the City of Devils Lake to a level of 1,440 feet, a project 
that was completed in 1987.39
Part of the reason for the district’s reluctance to place an outlet in the lake was the 
complicated nature of a conduit. William Spychalla, Devils Lake project manager, 
explained there were several obstacles the district needed to overcome before an outlet 
could be constructed. For one thing, the outlet was embroiled in a larger debate over the 
Garrison Diversion reclamation project.40 Authorized in legislation passed by Congress 
on August 5, 1965, the Garrison Diversion Unit would have provided water to eastern 
North Dakota from the eastern end of Lake Sakakawea, a reservoir fi rst formed by 
the construction of Garrison Dam in the late 1940s. The original authorization of the 
unit called for the diversion of Missouri River water to Devils Lake to reduce its high 
salinity, while also recommending the discharge of Devils Lake water into the Sheyenne 
River, which drains into the Red River, thereby tying an inlet and an outlet together. 
In 1974, the Bureau of Reclamation abandoned this plan because of adverse effects it 
would have on the water quality of the Sheyenne and Red rivers, but the idea continued 
to be debated. Some entities, including Canada and the state of Minnesota, objected 
to the strategy because diversions would allegedly transfer water and biota from the 
Missouri River Basin to the Red River, which ran into Canada, in violation of the 1909 
Boundary Waters Treaty between Canada and the United States.41
Because of public clamor for an outlet, the St. Paul District studied the possibilities and 
concluded in a 1988 draft feasibility report that an outlet could be constructed at the 
western end of Devils Lake. The report also proposed studies on regulating upper basin 
drainage areas, evacuating low-lying structures and regulating lakeshore development. 
That summer, however, North Dakota and other Midwestern states entered a period of 
severe drought which dropped the lake from its 1987 high of 1,428 feet to 1,422 feet by 
1993, prompting fears of fi sh kills and other recreational and environmental harm from 
the high salinity of the remaining water. The Corps thus examined how to solve both 
high- and low-water problems in the lake. In 1990, Congress appropriated funds for a 
reconnaissance study for a complete lake management plan conducted by the Corps 
and the Bureau of Reclamation, and, in February 1992, a draft report tentatively found 
that both an outlet and an inlet were economically feasible.42 Some offi cials within the 
St. Paul District were not comfortable with this recommendation. Colonel Richard W. 
Craig, district engineer from 1991 to 1993, believed the district acted too quickly in 
recommending feasibility. “I’m not sure it’s in the best interests of the Corps for there 
to be a Devils Lake project,” he stated in 1993. The ultimate solutions, he believed, were 
more policy-oriented than technology-oriented.43
Conditions again changed in the summer of 1993, when wet conditions drastically 
elevated water levels. Between June and November, the lake rose fi ve feet to 1,427 
feet, and its expansion continued. In 1991, the edge of the lake was approximately 
six miles away from the City of Minnewaukan; but by 1995, water was lapping at 
the community’s sewage lagoon. Hence, the Corps implemented emergency fl ood 
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Devils Lake
Two maps of Devils Lake, North Dakota, show the dramatic expansion of the 
water in the 1990s. (Maps courtesy of North Dakota Department of Natural Resources)
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measures in coordination with other federal, state and local agencies to protect 
lakeside communities from the water’s rapid expansion, including the construction 
of a protective berm around Minnewaukan’s lagoon.44 When the lake continued to 
rise in 1994 and 1995, the St. Paul District completed a contingency plan that outlined 
measures the district could take, including an emergency outlet, upper basin water 
management, relocation of residents and businesses and infrastructure protection.45 
In June 1996, the City of Devils Lake requested emergency assistance from the Corps 
to raise its levees an additional fi ve feet (later extended to ten feet), and the Corps 
complied.46 The district also participated in the Devils Lake Basin Interagency Task 
Force formed in 1995. This organization, according to chairman Michael J. Armstrong, 
used “the coordinated activity and commitment of numerous federal, state and local 
government entities along with elected offi cials, private citizens, environmental groups 
and representation from the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe” to “fi nd and propose intermediate 
solutions to reduce the impacts of high lake levels in the Devils Lake Basin.” By 1997, 
the task force had helped to develop fl oodplain maps for the entire basin, to relocate 
twenty-one homes on the Spirit Lake Indian Reservation, to move the sewage lagoon in 
Minnewaukan, to create with the North Dakota State Water Commission 30 thousand 
acre-feet of upper basin storage under the Available Storage Acreage Program and to 
implement agricultural programs to assist farmers who had lost money from fl ooding 
or from the Available Storage Acreage Program.47
Despite the best efforts of the district and the task force, the lake continued to rise, 
causing alarm for those living around it. In 1996, the lake sat at 1,438 feet and engulfed 
approximately 77 thousand acres. This was a signifi cant increase from 1993, when the 
lake rested at 1,428 feet and covered only 45 thousand acres. As the water continued 
to spread, seventy-eight homes in the area qualifi ed for the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration’s fl ood insurance buyout, while the Spirit Lake Nation 
moved more than fi fty homes on the reservation. Some estimates placed fl ood damages 
at $70 million.48 Just as important were the psychological effects. Bobby Michels, a 
lifetime Devils Lake resident, farmed the same land as his father. In 1993, his property 
was a good distance from the lake; but in 1996, the water rested only a mile from his 
house after swallowing 150 acres of his pasture land. The situation convinced him to 
sell his farm and leave the area, notwithstanding his ties to the land. “I don’t have any 
qualms about leaving,” he stated. “We’ve been under so much stress here.” John Grann, 
a farmer who had lost 7,000 of his 8,000 acres to the rising water, agreed. “It’s pretty 
hard to have any optimism,” he related.49
Faced with this situation, many Devils Lake residents clamored again for a man-
made outlet, believing this solution would alleviate the situation. As Tim Heisler, 
Ramsey County emergency management director, argued, “There’s only one solution, 
getting rid of some of the water. We need to stabilize the lake.”50 Acting on this public 
sentiment, North Dakota’s congressional delegation, consisting of Senators Kent Conrad 
and Byron Dorgan and Representative Earl Pomeroy, requested in May 1996 that the St. 
Paul District prepare an Emergency Outlet Plan, and the district complied, issuing the 
report in August 1996. This plan, prepared under the direction of Thomas Raster, a civil 
engineer for the district, delineated the best place for an outlet as the West Bay of Devils 
Lake, where water would be pumped through Twin Lakes and the Fort Totten Indian 
C
ivil W
orks Program
 II:  Flood
 C
ontrol Projects
4
85
Reservation until it reached a natural divide and fl owed downhill to the Sheyenne 
River. The report also indicated that had an outlet been in place since 1985, it would 
have only lowered the lake’s level by one foot because of pumping capacities, high 
salinity concerns and Sheyenne River water levels. In addition, the same outlet concerns 
raised in the 1980s still existed: Canada, Minnesota, environmental organizations 
and citizens living along the Sheyenne River did not want Devils Lake water in their 
river, whether because of water transfer issues or because of fears that an outlet would 
exacerbate Sheyenne River fl ooding. Likewise, the Corps needed permission from the 
Spirit Lake Nation before outlet construction could begin since the unit would run 
across its reservation.51
Aware of these concerns, the federal government 
still decided to take action. In March 1997, President 
Bill Clinton sent a supplemental disaster aid bill to 
Congress that included $32.5 million to complete the 
design of an emergency outlet.52 Canada immediately 
registered its objections. Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian 
minister of foreign affairs, told the Winnipeg 
Free Press that Canada continued to oppose “any 
interbasin transfers of water as these may cause 
serious biota problems and degrade water quality 
in other basins.” Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon 
explained that Canada could not “support actions 
that will have adverse and possibly disastrous 
consequences for Manitoba and Canada.” Filmon 
urged Axworthy “to push every diplomatic button 
necessary to block the U.S. congressional proposal for 
the emergency outlet.”53
This was not the fi rst time the Corps clashed with 
Canada over a fl ood control project. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Corps examined ways to protect the city of Minot, North Dakota, from 
Souris River fl oods. The Souris River begins in Saskatchewan, fl owing south for 217 
miles before entering the United States and North Dakota. The river continues in a 
southeasterly direction through Minot to Velva, North Dakota, where it turns to fl ow 
north back into Canada, eventually joining the Assiniboine River in Manitoba, draining 
a 24,800-square-mile basin. Severe fl ooding in 1969 and 1970 pushed the Corps to 
develop a fl ood control plan for Minot; and in 1970, Congress authorized a two-pronged 
approach: modifying and straightening the channel and constructing a dam and 
reservoir at Burlington. Environmental groups and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
protested these proposals, especially since the resulting reservoir would periodically 
inundate the Upper Souris National Wildlife Refuge. Regardless, the channel 
modifi cation plan proceeded on schedule and was completed in 1979. But the furor over 
the dam caused its deferment in 1982 in favor of a four-foot raise of Lake Darling Dam, 
a unit constructed in northern North Dakota by the Fish and Wildlife Service in the 
1930s for migratory waterfowl management.54
Devils Lake:  A house 
surrounded by the 
rising water shows the 
predicament faced by many 
Devils Lake, North Dakota, 
residents. (Photo courtesy of 
the North Dakota State Water 
Commission)
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Some groups protested the Lake Darling decision, leading local interests to begin 
discussions with Canada about other solutions. At the time, Canadians were developing 
plans for two dams in Saskatchewan to provide increased power development in 
the area. In the late 1980s, the Corps and Canadian offi cials reached an agreement 
whereby the United States would purchase 400,000 acre-feet of fl ood storage in the 
Canadian reservoirs, thereby providing Minot and other North Dakota communities 
with protection against a hundred- year fl ood event. Under the leadership of Louis E. 
Kowalski, chief of the St. Paul District’s Planning Division from 1979 to 1996, the Corps 
successfully coordinated the agreement with Canada. Both dams, known as Rafferty 
and Alameda, were completed by the mid-1990s, giving North Dakota some measure 
of fl ood protection from the Souris River.55 In this case, interaction with the Canadians 
resulted in a favorable outcome.
But cooperation between Canada and the United States on the Devils Lake issue was 
not as forthcoming. In June 1997, Congress, ignoring Canadian opposition to a Devils 
Lake outlet, passed a bill authorizing the expenditure of $5 million by the Corps 
for preconstruction engineering and design on an emergency outlet, as well as the 
preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, or EIS.56 The driving forces behind 
the bill included Senators Conrad and Dorgan, both of whom believed the outlet was 
the best alternative. Because of their efforts, Congress also appropriated $5 million in 
October for the initial building stages, requiring, however, that before any construction 
began, the Corps show that an emergency truly existed, 
that the outlet was technically sound, that it had a favorable 
benefi t-cost ratio, that it would comply with NEPA and 
that it would not violate the Boundary Waters Treaty Act 
of 1909. Conrad and Dorgan also had to agree to shelve 
any plans for an inlet into Devils Lake, mainly because of 
the opposition of Senator Christopher Bond (R-Missouri), 
who publicly objected to the mixing of water between 
watersheds but privately worried that an inlet supplied 
with Missouri River water would reduce reservoir releases 
for commercial barge traffi c on the river, thereby adversely 
affecting an economic segment of the State of Missouri.57 
Even with this funding, the Corps estimated it would take 
at least thirty months to construct the outlet, now designed 
to be a 14-mile-long pipeline running from the west end of 
Devils Lake along Peterson Coulee to the Sheyenne River.58
As the Corps began the studies mandated by Congress, it 
also continued to investigate other ways of controlling the 
fl ooding, especially since the lake had risen in July 1997 to 
1,443 feet. Not only were buildings threatened but essential 
roads and state parks faced damage as well. In the spring of 1997, Highways 20 and 57, 
which provide access to the south side of Devils Lake and the Spirit Lake Reservation, 
were fl ooded, necessitating road elevation measures, while four state parks, including 
Narrows and Grahams Island state parks, experienced fl ooding as well. Faced with 
these problems, the Corps worked with other agencies, including the North Dakota 
Devils Lake:  Levee 
construction in 1998 on 
a southern section of 
the project adjacent to 
North Dakota Highway 
57. (Photo courtesy of 
St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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State Water Commission and the Fish and Wildlife Service, to implement two other 
solutions to the problem: basin-wide water management and infrastructure protection. 
Together with the emergency outlet proposal, these constituted a “three-legged stool” 
approach to the problem, with each “leg” dependent to some degree on the others. The 
water management strategy built on the Available Storage Acreage Program started by 
the North Dakota State Water Commission and the Devils Lake Basin Interagency Task 
Force in 1995, expanding the number of acres used for upper-basin storage to 75,000 
acres. Meanwhile, the Fish and Wildlife Service identifi ed thirty-six projects in the 
Devils Lake area that had the potential to store 12,774 acre-feet of water permanently 
and completed eight of them in 1996. It also called for wetland restoration in the 
area. As part of the infrastructure protection “leg,” the Corps and the state elevated 
seventeen roadbeds around Devils Lake in 1997 and relocated some pipes and pumps in 
the Ramsey County sewer system. The St. Paul District’s Devils Lake levee raise project 
fi t into the infrastructure protection category as well.59 As Colonel John M. Wonsik, 
district engineer from 1995 to 1998, related in January 1998, balancing environmental 
concerns with the protection of the surrounding communities had made Devils Lake “a 
major challenge for the district.”60
The district received help from other Corps’ entities as mitigation measures continued. 
The Institute for Water Resources prepared a report to Congress explaining whether 
or not an emergency outlet met the required criteria, while staff at the Corps’ 
headquarters assisted the district on two other issues: exploring the possibility of 
waiving the normal NEPA process in order to expedite the outlet’s construction and 
consulting with Canada through the International Joint Commission, or IJC, established 
by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to deal with water quality matters affecting 
both the United States and Canada.61 A decision on whether or not to expedite the 
NEPA process became more critical in October 1997 after a hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works. In that hearing, Senators Conrad and 
Dorgan, Representative Pomeroy and North Dakota Governor Ed Schafer all pleaded 
for an accelerated process; while Gary Pearson, vice president of the Dakota Prairie 
Audubon Society, strongly counseled against such a waiver.62 On December 19, the 
St. Paul District met with John H. Zirschky, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army of 
Civil Works; to discuss an expedited schedule, but after consultation with the Council 
on Environmental Quality, the overseer of NEPA compliance, Zirschky decided the 
district should “comply fully with the NEPA by completing the Environmental Impact 
Statement and Record of Decision using a normal NEPA process.” Zirschky counseled 
the district to try to complete the work by December 1999 to ensure a construction 
starting date in spring 2000.63
At the same time, consultations occurred among Corps’ headquarters, the IJC and the 
Department of State over Canada’s concerns with the emergency outlet. In October 
1997, Raymond Chrétien, Canadian ambassador to the United States, reiterated his 
country’s concern that “interbasin transfers have the potential to seriously damage 
Canadian waters and Manitoba’s multimillion dollar fi shery.”64 In March 1998, Zirschky 
asked the State Department to consult with the IJC about Devils Lake. Although initial 
reports indicated the outlet would have only a minimal effect on water quality once it 
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reached the Canadian border, the Corps still committed itself to additional hydrologic, 
hydraulic and water quality modeling of the border water.65
But as the studies and consultations extended into 1999, problems developed with 
the Peterson Coulee outlet route. For one thing, the Spirit Lake Nation withdrew its 
support of the course, stating that “the proposed Western Emergency Outlet would 
violate a majority of the sacred sites of the Spirit Lake Nation without regard to tribal 
and Federal laws to protect these culturally sensitive areas.”66 For another, EIS study 
numbers indicated that the Peterson Coulee route did not have a favorable benefi t-cost 
ratio. Finally, it seemed that Peterson Coulee could not meet water quality standards on 
both the Sheyenne and Red rivers unless fresher water could be brought into the outlet 
from the north. Although it was feasible to divert water from northwestern bodies such 
as Pelican Lake to Peterson Coulee, it would escalate project costs to between $75 and 
$110 million, making it even more diffi cult to justify the project economically. Because 
of these concerns, the St. Paul District examined other options, including diverting 
water from the eastern end of Devils Lake into the Stump Lakes. Since the Stump Lakes 
were within the Devils Lake basin, there would be no transfer of water and biota from 
one watershed to another. However, dumping water in the lakes would adversely 
affect a fi sh and wildlife refuge in the area. The need to examine these other alternatives 
delayed completion of the EIS.67
The lake rose to 1,447 feet in 1999. After discussions with Major General Russell L. 
Fuhrman, director of civil works for the Corps; Joseph Westphal, Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for Civil Works; and Conrad, Dorgan and Pomeroy, Major General Phillip R. 
Anderson, the Mississippi Valley Division commander appointed a team in May 1999 
composed of division and district employees to decide what conditions would warrant 
the construction of the emergency outlet.68 When the team issued its report in June, it 
concluded that none of the outlet plans had a favorable benefi t-cost ratio. However, it 
also determined that if an outlet operated when the lake reached 1,454 feet, it “would 
have substantially lower adverse effects than a natural overfl ow” and could “protect 
the population around the basin at a certain elevation.” It, therefore, recommended that 
construction of an outlet commence if the lake reached 1,453 feet, or six feet more than 
its current level.69 Based on this report, Anderson informed Conrad, Dorgan, Pomeroy 
and Governor Schafer that “while I understand your concern and frustration in fi nding 
a timely remedy for the rising lake, I have not reached a conclusion that an outlet is a 
necessary or appropriate solution to the recent rise of water in Devils Lake.”70
Upon hearing the report’s recommendations and Anderson’s conclusions, proponents 
of the outlet were infuriated. “My skin prickled when I read the report,” Schafer related 
before suggesting that state workers might start an outlet “and see if anybody stops 
us.” Schafer could not understand the Corps’ benefi t-cost analysis. “To me, this is like 
fourthgrade math,” he declared. “It costs $100 million to build an outlet. It costs us $25 
million in damages every time the lake rises a foot. So if they let it go up another six 
feet, that’s $150 million in damages.”71 Conrad agreed. “The cost/benefi t ratio is totally 
fl awed,” he stated. “The economic analysis of the Corps is completely detached from 
reality.”72 Residents living within striking distance of the lake’s lapping waters were 
even more livid. “I wish powerful lobbyists could experience the anguish we in Devils 
C
ivil W
orks Program
 II:  Flood
 C
ontrol Projects
4
89
Lake feel whenever heavy rains or another winter storm further raises the level,” one 
Devils Laker wrote. “Delaying actions of environmental organizations, downstream 
interests, and ... [the] Mississippi Valley Division have caused clinical depression 
among many of our citizens.”73 Others were not so refi ned in their expressions; some 
citizens began wearing T-shirts emblazoned with the phrase “Six More Feet My Ass.”74
One cause of the outcry was that critics either did not understand or did not agree 
with the method the Corps used to calculate the benefi t-cost ratio. When deciding on a 
fl ood control project on a river, the Corps looked at the probabilities of occurrence of a 
hundred- or fi ve hundred-year fl ood event and then calculated the benefi ts and costs 
based on those risks. Applying this method to Devils Lake caused problems because 
Corps’ data indicated that the lake had not fl ooded – or exceeded 1,457 feet msl – for 
hundreds of years. Since the probability of the lake reaching this elevation was unlikely, 
the project had a low benefi t-cost ratio. A scenario-based approach recognizing that 
problems were occurring even though the lake was below 1,457 feet would produce a 
high benefi t-cost ratio, but the rigidity of Corps’ guidelines for fl ood control projects 
did not allow the application of such a scenario in its analyses.75 Understandably, 
Devils Lakers could not comprehend why the Corps refused to abandon its guidelines, 
especially since the waterbody was a lake and not a river. But the Corps believed it had 
to maintain its standards, especially since Congress had stipulated when making its 
Devils Lake appropriation that the Corps use its normal economic evaluation principles 
and guidelines when analyzing benefi ts and costs. In the words of Colonel James T. 
Scott, district engineer from 1993 to 1995, “When you analyze [the lake] with those river 
methods, you fi nd that there’s no project authorized ... , but we can’t cut through the 
politics, the red tape associated with our standard system.”76
The district, then, faced a major dilemma. As Colonel William J. Breyfogle, who served 
as district engineer in St. Paul for six months in 1998, explained, on the one hand, 
studies showed the inadequacy of an outlet and its lack of economic viability because 
of the diffi culty of predicting whether or not the lake would continue to rise. On the 
other hand, North Dakota’s congressional delegation and residents in the area kept 
pushing for an outlet, believing it was the region’s only hope. “I think that’s why you 
didn’t really see us doing anything besides just sitting back and studying it,” Breyfogle 
commented, “because the powers in USACE knew that it was a losing battle.”77
No matter what justifi cation the Corps used for shelving the outlet, Conrad, Dorgan 
and others continued to fi ght for it. The situation reached a head in July 1999, when 
Conrad, frustrated by Anderson’s outlet position, told the division leader that he was 
“done meeting with [the Corps] because they’re not serious about this and the people 
of Devils Lake deserve better.” After this stormy meeting, Conrad requested that all 
Senate business affecting the Corps, including promotions, be halted, and also, in the 
company of Dorgan and Pomeroy, met several times with White House Chief of Staff 
John Podesta, Joseph Westphal and other Clinton Administration offi cials to underscore 
the importance of an outlet. The pressure tactics worked, as Corps’ headquarters 
assumed responsibility for Devils Lake fl ood control in July 1999, and in October, 
overruled Anderson’s earlier decision by announcing the Corps would resume design 
and engineering work on the outlet.78 When environmental groups heard about the 
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resumption, it was their turn to criticize the Corps. “The politicians have the Corps 
buffaloed on this one,” remarked Gary Pearson of the Audubon Society. “At this 
point, the science has all been thrown out the window.”79 Many environmentalists 
believed the ultimate solution to the problem was better management of the fl oodplain, 
evacuation of those residing in the lake’s bed and a restoration of wetlands in the area. 
In fact, using North Dakota State Water Commission documents from the 1950s and 
1960s, environmentalists claimed that wetland drainage was the chief culprit of the 
rising lake. When they remarked that people should have known better than to settle 
in the lake bed, however, they were accused of being unsympathetic to the plight of 
Devils Lakers.80
Tensions between the different groups mounted as the lake steadily rose. Reaching 
an all-time high of 1,448 feet in August 2001, the lake persisted in creating problems. 
The St. Paul District, meanwhile, maintained its commitment to examining upper 
basin water storage and infrastructure protection. The district completed the levee 
raises around Devils Lake in 2001, receiving a 2001 Chief of Engineers Design and 
Environmental Merit Award for the project.81 The district also continued with the EIS 
and outlet studies, but, because of the environmental and economic diffi culties with the 
Peterson Coulee and Stump Lakes outlets, it began focusing on a Pelican Lake outlet, 
whereby fresh water coming into Devils Lake from the west would be diverted south 
into the Sheyenne (see map of Devils Lake and the vicinity). A draft EIS came out in 
February 2002; and, in February 2003, Chief of Engineers Lieutenant General Robert B. 
Flowers decided the outlet to Pelican Lake was the best course to pursue.82
Flooding at Devils Lake was one of the most complex and controversial problems the 
St. Paul District attempted to solve in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Along 
with the environmental issues that it raised about interbasin transfers, it also saw the 
Corps working and negotiating with several different entities, all of which had their 
Devils Lake:  Biologist 
Randy Devendorf 
prepares distribution of 
175 copies of the two-
volume Environmental 
Impact Statement on 
Devils Lake, 2002. (Photo 
by Peter Verstegen, courtesy 
of St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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own beliefs about what was best for Devils Lake. In addition, the Devils Lake project 
raised several questions about the process of deciding how and when fl ood projects 
are justifi ed. Should a different economic standard exist for closed-basin lakes than for 
rivers? Is the benefi t-cost ratio the best way to determine a project’s economic viability? 
Should projects be allowed to continue because of political pressure when they do not 
meet environmental and economic standards? Who would stop them if the political 
pressure became too strong? The Corps would continue to wrestle with these questions. 
As David Loss, who assumed management of the project in 2000, related, Devils Lake 
showed the Corps that “we need to remain objective, look at the big picture, and 
understand that we are doing what is best for the federal interest” no matter what 
criticisms or pressures are levied.83 Even then, the chances of pleasing all sides are slim.
Grand Forks, North Dakota/East Grand Forks, Minnesota
At the same time, the St. Paul District dealt with Devils Lake, it was also deepening its 
involvement in a fl ood control project on the Red River at Grand Forks, North Dakota, 
and East Grand Forks, Minnesota. As with Devils Lake, this project contained elements 
of controversy, especially since the Corps had initial diffi culties in obtaining public 
support and cooperation. Unlike Devils Lake, however, a major catastrophe, the 1997 
fl ood, helped to convince residents of both Grand Forks and East Grand Forks that the 
Corps’ fl ood control plan was necessary. An examination of the project also shows some 
of the problems that arose from new cost-sharing measures that were delineated in the 
Water Resources Development Act of 1986.
The cities of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks rest in the heart of the Red River Valley, 
a predominantly agricultural region located approximately 
70 miles south of the Canadian border. Characterized by 
its severe winters, the basin, situated in a fl at glacial plain 
that allows water to spread in every direction, continually 
experienced spring fl ooding from the Red River, which 
forms near the cities of Wahpeton, North Dakota, and 
Breckenridge, Minnesota, and runs north for 400 miles 
before draining into Lake Winnipeg in Canada. Throughout 
the 1800s and 1900s, the Red fl ooded periodically, but 
severe fl oods became more frequent in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Flooding was exacerbated by the fact that spring snowmelt 
poured into the southern portions of the waterway and 
fl owed north into still-frozen reaches of the river, creating 
ice jams that pushed the river from its banks and into the 
surrounding communities and farmland.84
In the spring of 1978, the river crested only a foot-and-
a-half below the top of emergency levees in Grand 
Forks, intensifying an existing debate over the effects of 
agricultural diking on fl ooding. Beginning in 1975, farmers 
south of Oslo, Minnesota, had constructed dikes to protect 
Ice Jam on the Root 
River, 1982:  Ice jams are 
one cause of frequent 
fl oods in the shallow 
river valleys of northwest 
Minnesota and northeast 
North Dakota. (Photo 
by Lyle Nicklay, courtesy 
of St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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their crops from fl ooding. After the dikes successfully stopped the water, farmers 
constructed 38 more miles on the Minnesota side and 10 miles on the North Dakota 
side, providing them with protection against ten and fi fteen-year fl ood levels. Following 
the 1978 fl ood, however, residents of Grand Forks charged that the more numerous 
Minnesota dikes had pushed water to the North Dakota side and called for their 
removal. The St. Paul District investigated the situation, and, according to Peter Fischer, 
a district hydrologist, concluded there was a “potential [for] adverse impacts if [farm] 
levee construction were to continue uncontrolled.” The Corps instructed farmers to 
remove some of their dikes, but agriculturists refused to comply, stating the structures 
would remain until the state or the federal government provided suffi cient fl ood 
protection. In reply, the Corps threatened legal action.85 
Before anything could happen, the worst fl ooding since 1897 hit Grand Forks and 
East Grand Forks in the spring of 1979 and easily overtopped the farm dikes. The Red 
River crested at nearly 49 feet, more than 20 feet above fl ood stage, sending 82,000 
cubic feet per second of water through its channel at Grand Forks. Almost before the 
water receded, politicians and citizens called for solutions to the fl ooding problems and 
looked to the Corps for answers.86 U.S. Representative Arlan Stangeland (R-Minnesota) 
convinced the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation to hold a hearing 
in East Grand Forks on the 1979 fl oods and told his constituents that he could “no 
longer tolerate the lackadaisical attitude of the bureaucrats in Washington” about 
Grand Forks/East Grand Forks fl ooding.87
Because of Stangeland’s infl uence, the St. Paul District examined more closely fl ood 
control in East Grand Forks. Actually, the district’s authorization to perform studies 
on the Red River at East Grand Forks issued from the Flood Control Acts of 1948 and 
1950. Following the passage of these laws, the district had prepared fl ood control 
plans but could not get the community to agree to local cooperation until 1975. After 
several years of analysis under the leadership of Martin McCleery, project manager, 
the district rejected any channel modifi cation and dam and reservoir solutions in the 
early 1980s and tentatively proposed building earthen levees and concrete fl oodwalls in 
East Grand Forks at a cost of between $10.7 and $21.6 million to the federal government 
and between $9.8 and $11.6 million to the city. In part because of the cost and in part 
because the main plan the Corps favored would mean the relocation of numerous 
homes and businesses, the reaction of East Grand Forks residents to the proposal was, 
in the words of one newspaper account, “colder than dike patrol duty at 2 a.m. on a late 
March morning.” In order to give itself time to explore its options, the city declared it 
would take a few years to make a fi nal decision as to whether or not to implement the 
Corps’ plan. In December 1986, the Corps completed a general design memorandum, 
which proposed placing a fl ood barrier around part of the city, constructing levees, 
fl oodwalls, closure structures and interior drainage facilities within the city, and 
evacuating residences and businesses that remained unprotected. But in July 1988, the 
city decided to withdraw its support for the project because of high economic and social 
costs. One month later, the project was classifi ed as inactive.88
East Grand Forks’ rejection of the fl ood control project highlighted some of the effects 
of new cost-sharing requirements implemented by the federal government in the Water 
Resources Development Act of 1986. These provisions stipulated that non-federal 
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interests would have to pay from twenty-fi ve to fi fty percent of a fl ood control project’s 
cost and fi fty percent of any feasibility study undertaken by the Corps. In addition, 
local sponsors were responsible for real estate acquisition and relocation of businesses 
and residences.89
Since many buildings in East Grand Forks required moving, this cost, coupled with the 
other required funds, made the project too expensive for East Grand Forks. Although 
other factors were involved, cost-sharing measures ultimately convinced the city that 
federal fl ood control was too expensive and not worth the trouble. According to Colonel 
Kenneth Kasprisin, East Grand Forks was not alone. The problem with cost-sharing, he 
explained was “that there are a lot of communities that cannot pay; they don’t have the 
money to pay.” More and more, Kasprisin argued, the Corps would have to deal with 
its responsibilities to those communities that did not have the necessary funds.90 
Meanwhile, the City of Grand Forks faced problems because the Corps could not 
fi nd a project that met its economic feasibility guidelines. In the 1950s, the Corps had 
constructed a permanent levee project, but now no other projects had favorable benefi t-
cost ratios. “That doesn’t mean the city can’t protect itself physically,” Tom Raster, an 
engineer for the St. Paul District, explained, “but we had to get a dollar or more back 
with every dollar we spent there. On Corps’ standards, we couldn’t do it.” Because the 
district’s hands were tied, the city dealt with the problem itself, improving emergency 
levees along the river and working on an upward channel diversion of the English 
Coulee. According to Raster, such improvements would protect the city against fi fty-
year fl ood levels. “The city, I think, is doing just a fantastic job of self-help, in light of 
federal limitations,” he concluded.91
In 1985, however, city engineers and 
leaders in Grand Forks requested 
assistance from the St. Paul District 
to develop a more extensive fl ood 
control system. In response, the district 
completed a draft reconnaissance report 
in April 1991 that concluded a couple 
of different plans might exist with 
favorable benefi t-cost ratios. Based on 
this determination, the Corps began 
feasibility studies of the different 
proposals in January 1994. But despite 
city offi cials’ requests for help, the 
district had to try to heighten public 
support for fl ood control in Grand 
Forks. According to Edward McNally, 
who served as study manager for the 
feasibility report, city engineers realized Grand Forks did not have adequate fl ood 
protection, but the citizens themselves believed no problem existed. “They had fl ood 
fi ghts that they had successfully been able to weather,” McNally related, “and they had 
a spirit that said, ‘We can do it again, and we don’t need anybody’s help.’” In addition, 
the fl ood of 1979 was a distant memory. Although fl ooding occurred in 1989, it did 
Red River Flooding:  North Main Stem, 
1997, at U.S. Highway 2 (Kennedy) 
Bridge. (Photo courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps 
of Engineers)
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not approach the levels experienced in 1979. The challenge for the district, McNally 
explained, “was convincing them that the water could get” as high or higher than 1979, 
“and, in fact, at some point would get that high.” Moreover, he continued, “ it was in 
their interest to be proactive,” especially if economically viable solutions were available.
As the feasibility study neared completion early in 1997, the public began to accept 
the Corps’ position.92 But before the study could be issued, nature proved the need for 
additional fl ood protection. During the winter of 1996-1997, a record amount of snow 
fell in the Red River Valley, including Grand Forks, which had an accumulation of 97.7 
inches. In February and March, the National Weather Service predicted severe fl ooding 
in the Red River Valley. When a blizzard hit the region on April 6, it only added to 
the problems. Then, warmer temperatures arrived, causing a rapid snowmelt. With 
meltwater pouring in, the Red River rose to 53 feet at Grand Forks, far above fl ood level 
stage and four feet above the 1979 crest. Despite the best efforts of the Corps and the 
citizens of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks to prepare for the fl ooding, the water 
breached dikes and levees, sending torrents of water through the two cities, knocking 
out power and contaminating water supplies. Nearly everyone in East Grand Forks was 
forced to evacuate and ninety percent of Grand Forks’ 52 thousand citizens had to leave 
as well, especially after fi res broke out in the downtown area, burning eleven buildings. 
By the time the river crested at 54.3 feet, more than 26 feet above fl ood stage, water and 
fi re had nearly wiped out both communities.93
In the wake of the devastation, citizens in Grand Forks and East Grand Forks clamored 
for the Corps to provide fl ood protection. As McNally related, “The issue at that 
point of [citizens] trying to say that there was not a potential for fl ooding and that 
they weren’t really at risk ... was pretty much gone.”94 Before the fl ood hit, the Corps’ 
feasibility study was calling for hundred-year fl ood protection plan consisting of 
construction of a ring levee around Grand Forks at a cost of $39 million, with local costs 
slightly less than $10 million.95 In order to expedite the construction process, however, 
the Grand Forks feasibility study was never fi nalized; instead, planning, engineering 
and design authority for the East Grand Forks project was reactivated in May 1997, 
and the authority was expanded to include Grand Forks. As part of the planning, 
engineering and design process, the St. Paul District prepared a General Reevaluation 
Report to ascertain the best plans for fl ood protection in the two communities.96
In preparing the draft General Reevaluation Report, completed in August 1998, the 
Corps examined and rejected several primary strategies for fl ood protection, including 
upstream reservoir storage (because of the fl at drainage area upstream) and evacuation 
(because of its social unacceptability). The district also determined that the alternative 
preferred by the two cities, a split-fl ow diversion channel, was not cost effective, having 
a benefi t-cost ratio of 0.4. Instead, the Corps decided that a large setback levee and 
fl oodwall system along both sides of the river was the most feasible plan, whereby 
the Corps would build three “rings” of levees around the cities. But because the 
communities had already seen levees fail in the 1997 fl ood, they were reluctant to accept 
the Corps’ analysis, and some even believed the district was intentionally skewing the 
fi gures against a diversion. To forestall such criticisms, consultants were hired to study 
the diversion channel, and they reached the same conclusion as the Corps – a diversion 
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could not meet the economic standards and would be twice as expensive as the levees-
only plan. The communities accepted these conclusions and, on February 26, 1998, 
voted to approve the levees-only project, which was estimated to cost $342.7 million, 
$170.8 million of which was required as the non-federal cost.97
Throughout 1998, the Corps worked to fi nalize its General Reevaluation Report and 
the EIS under the leadership of Lisa Hedin, project manager, and Edward McNally, 
technical manager. In doing so, it encountered some opposition from residents of 
both communities over the placement of the levees. In order to provide the best fl ood 
protection, the levees would have to be set back on the riverbank, requiring the removal 
of residences and other structures. Just as in the 1980s in East Grand Forks, landowners 
were not pleased with this requirement, but district offi cials, through a series of public 
meetings and studies conducted by outside consultants, fi nally convinced citizens that 
most of the structures could not be protected and would have to be removed. At the 
same time, the public’s objections forced the Corps to examine other options, and in 
some cases, the district was able to use innovative alternatives, such as a mechanically 
stabilized earthwall and an invisible fl oodwall, to preserve some of the structures.98
With the levee placement resolved, the district completed its Final General Reevaluation 
Report and Environmental Impact Statement in 1999, issuing it less than eighteen 
months from its conception rather than the normal thirty-two to forty-eight months, in 
large part because of the diligent work of the project’s planning team. This effort was 
recognized in September 1999, when the district received an Outstanding Planning 
Achievement Award for Civil Works for the Grand Forks/East Grand Forks General 
Reevaluation Report and EIS from the deputy commander. The expedited schedule also 
allowed Congress to authorize the project in an omnibus spending bill in 1999, meaning 
that plans for construction could proceed.99
Only two years after the devastating fl ood, then, the Corps had the authorization and 
money for the Grand Forks/East Grand Forks project. This was not only important 
for the two communities but also for the St. Paul District, which was experiencing a 
decline in large fl ood control projects. In 1995, for example, Colonel James T. Scott, 
outgoing district engineer, noted that “St. Paul’s workload is falling off.” He lamented 
this drop, especially since the district “has had a great history of fl ood control and 
navigation within its area of responsibility.”100 The Grand Forks/East Grand Forks 
project reversed that decline and proved itself a boon to the district, both in terms of 
workload and employment. In the words of McNally, it was a “big step” for the district 
to receive authorization for the project.101 Colonel William Breyfogle echoed those 
sentiments, stating that Grand Forks was “something that we could do that would 
really make a difference.”102
With congressional funding, Phase I construction on the levees themselves began in 
the summer of 2001, with the completion date of the entire project estimated to be 
2004. Upon its completion, Grand Forks and East Grand Forks would have protection 
against a 210-year fl ood equivalent to the 1997 disaster.103 The St. Paul District involved 
both communities in meetings, making their leaders feel like part of a team.104 Grand 
Forks and East Grand Forks residents questioned the project before the 1997 fl ood, but 
C
iv
il W
or
ks
 P
ro
gr
am
 II
:  
Fl
oo
d
 C
on
tro
l P
ro
je
ct
s
4 96
they later cooperated with the district, providing suggestions and accepting Corps’ 
decisions, albeit with some grumbling. The productive collaboration stemmed in part 
from the good relationships that district employees established with residents during 
the fl ood fi ght in 1997, in part from the communities’ desire to protect themselves 
against future fl oods and in part from the Corps’ willingness to use outside consultants 
to validate its conclusions.
South Fork Zumbro River at Rochester, Minnesota
Probably the best example of citizen cooperation on a civil works project was the South 
Fork Zumbro River Flood Control project at Rochester, Minnesota, completed in the 
1990s. As Colonel James T. Scott said in 1995, this undertaking was “one of those classic 
projects that I would recommend to other district engineers to look at and to study 
if they want to know how to run a project.”105 Few other developments enjoyed the 
amount of local fi nancial support as Rochester and few won as many awards. Although 
there were some environmental controversies, the project was one of the major civil 
works successes for the St. Paul District in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
The city of Rochester, located in southeastern Minnesota about 80 miles south of St. 
Paul, is located on the fl oor of the South Fork Zumbro River Valley. At Rochester, three 
other streams join the Zumbro, a 50-mile tributary of the Mississippi, including Cascade 
Creek from the west, Silver Creek from the east and Bear Creek from the south. Some 
describe Rochester as sitting in a bowl, as the southern and western parts of the city 
consist of high undulating land while the eastern and northern ends have high bluffs 
and steep ridges. Because of the topography of the area and the confl uence of the four 
waterways, Rochester, with approximately a third of the city located in the fl oodplain, 
is susceptible to fl ooding, especially after heavy rainstorms.106
Flash fl ooding had periodically inundated the city since its founding in 1854. In order to 
solve this problem, Congress authorized the Corps to complete a study on the Rochester 
area in 1936, but little action occurred until a major fl ood in 1962 caused more than $1.6 
million in damages. By 1972, the St. Paul District completed preliminary examinations 
of channel improvements, fl oodwalls and levees for Zumbro River, Bear Creek and 
Cascade Creek; and by the mid-1970s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Soil 
Conservation Service (now known as the Natural Resources Conservation Service) had 
initiated plans to construct seven headwater reservoirs in the area. Congress endorsed 
these proposals in 1974; and for the next four years, the Corps worked with the Soil 
Conservation Service, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and local 
interests to develop the plans, completing a Phase I General Design study in 1977.107
Before the Corps could complete any further reports, however, a torrential rainstorm 
devastated Rochester. On the evening of July 5, 1978, approximately six inches of rain 
fell on the city, swelling Cascade Creek, Bear Creek and the Zumbro itself. By the next 
morning all three waterways had overfl owed, pouring water into downtown Rochester. 
When the Zumbro fi nally crested at 23 feet, it was 19 feet higher than it had been 
twenty-four hours earlier. The deluge of water killed fi ve people, forced fi ve thousand 
more from their homes and caused $60 million worth of damage.108 In response to the 
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fl ood, Representative Albert H. Quie (R-Minnesota) asked Congress to authorize the 
construction of the planned fl ood control project, stating that had it been in place in 
time for the rainstorm, “damage to personal property and public buildings would have 
been minimal.”109
Unfortunately, declarations of the necessity of the Rochester project occurred when 
congressional and executive support for federal water projects was ebbing. Because 
of environmental concerns, budget defi cits and the policies of both Jimmy Carter 
and Ronald Reagan, no omnibus water resource authorization bills passed between 
1976 and 1986, and the Rochester project itself received no funding. Although the 
undertaking seemed worthwhile, construction funds were unavailable until 1986.110
In the mid-1980s, Congress and the Reagan Administration agreed that local and state 
governments should make signifi cant contributions towards fl ood control projects. 
Based on that idea, Congress passed the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 
which implemented new cost-sharing requirements and authorized a hundred 
and fi fteen fl ood control projects for construction or study, including the project at 
Rochester.111 Under the new stipulations, Rochester had to contribute more than 
$17 million to the estimated $68 million necessary for the project, rather than the $7 
million under the old plan, but the city was prepared. Although the project had hung 
in limbo for several years, city leaders believed it would eventually gain approval. In 
1982, Rochester had added a one percent increase to the state sales tax and devoted 
the proceeds to fl ood control, collecting $10 million by 1987. These accumulated funds, 
together with the money that continued to accrue, largely handled the city’s cost-
Zumbra River 
Flooding:  
Rochester, 
Minnesota, 
1978. (Photo 
by Russ Snyder,  
courtesy of St. 
Paul District, 
Corps of 
Engineers)
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Before & After
The South Fork Zumbro River, before and after:  The fi rst photograph (top) 
shows the construction of walls along the river near the Civic Center. Note the 
house in the background that the project would protect. The second (below) 
shows the completed project, with the area of the fi rst image in the lower right 
quadrant.  (Photos by Russ Snyder, courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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sharing requirements. As Jim Gagnon, a St. Paul District project manager, explained, the 
city “had great foresight in setting up the sales tax.”112
By assuming a portion of the project’s costs, Rochester not only fulfi lled its legal 
requirements, but also made itself a partner with the Corps, enabling city leaders 
to offer suggestions and work with the district to ensure its desires were met.113 St. 
Paul District employees, who were not used to such involvement, soon realized 
local sponsors could provide meaningful dialogue and useful ideas in a project’s 
construction. Although confl icts inevitably developed, both the district and the city 
learned to work well together, providing the Corps with an example of what could 
happen with good partnerships.114
With cost-sharing funds and congressional authorization in place by 1987, the city 
signed a Local Cooperation Agreement and construction began. Following its 1970s 
proposal, the district, under the leadership of project manager Deborah Foley, began 
deepening and widening the channels of Zumbro River and Cascade and Bear creeks. 
Most of the undertakings occurred in downtown commercial areas, residential 
neighborhoods, parks and a municipal golf course. In order to provide slope protection, 
the district lined banks of the waterways with riprap, concrete and steel-sheet piling. 
Coupled with the storage reservoirs built by the Soil Conservation Service in the 1980s 
and 1990s, these changes provided Rochester with protection from a two hundred-year 
fl ood event.115
Despite the district’s best efforts, controversies arose. By 1990, the estimated cost of the 
project had escalated from $86 million to $120 million, and the district had to spend 
much time justifying these increases 
to the city. Because of the higher costs, 
Congress also had to reauthorize the 
project. Refl ecting these delays, the 
Corps calculated the project could 
not be completed in 1994, as it had 
originally estimated, but would now 
stretch into 1997. The city objected 
to this revised timeline, forcing the 
district to reconsider its reckonings. 
Upon a reexamination, the district 
determined that if all went well, it 
could complete the project in late 
1995. “There will be no slack in the 
schedule,” Foley admitted, “but it’s a 
doable schedule.”116
At the same time, environmental 
criticisms began to emerge. Although 
the Corps tried to mitigate the 
riprapping effects, many residents 
complained about the aesthetic 
degradation of the river, as well 
Zumbra River:  Channel modifi cations on 
the South Fork Zumbro River in Rochester, 
Minnesota, showing the pedestrian bridge 
and riprap implemented by the St. Paul 
District, 1995. (Photo courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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as the destruction of numerous trees lining the Zumbro’s banks. One letter to the 
Rochester Post-Bulletin objected to the Corps’ “rape of nature,” stating the project 
destroyed “dozens of beautiful oak trees and a pristine area of wildfl owers, fl owering 
shrubs and trees, a sanctuary for birds, squirrels and other wildlife.”117 Others called 
the project “outdated, expensive, impractical, and destructive,” believing it would 
only create “riprapped mud fl ats” at the expense of numerous trees.118 As one critic 
bluntly declared, “If this is [the Corps’] idea of ‘aesthetic design,’ please refrain from 
showing me any more of it.”119 In response to the complaints, the district intensifi ed its 
efforts to provide aesthetically pleasing features, laying topsoil and sod over riprap, 
commissioning artist Anne Plummer to create a mural for a downtown section of 
fl oodwall, placing decorative handrails throughout the project, using native plants for 
landscaping and emphasizing sustainable development wherever possible.120
Other problems arose from the destruction of wildlife habitat, especially fi sheries, 
because of channel deepening. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 
requested the Corps purchase lands adjacent to the Keller Wildlife Management Area to 
mitigate these impacts. Although it initially rejected that proposal, the Corps eventually 
acquired 140 acres near the Keller area and deeded them to the State of Minnesota. The 
Corps also placed rock structures in the river to serve as current defl ectors and fi sh 
cover, concentrated water depths in low-fl ow channels during dry seasons and used 
rock clusters, groins and weirs to create fi sh-spawning pools. In addition, the city’s Park 
and Recreation Department stocked the Willow Creek Golf Course and Chester Woods 
reservoirs with fi sh.121 These measures helped to dissipate some of the criticism, as did 
a prevailing belief that the project was necessary despite the environmental costs. “Any 
destruction of trees and natural habitat is a cause for regret,” an editorial in the Post-
Bulletin explained. “We would prefer a natural, meandering stream, but not at the cost 
of a never-ending risk of a disastrous fl ood.”122
As construction continued in the early 1990s, the Corps and the city were happily 
surprised when costs began dropping. In October 1991, construction bids for one 
portion of the project came in at less than sixty percent of the original estimate, 
providing a considerable savings.123 Innovations led to lower costs as well. For example, 
moving residences rather than building a half mile of proposed levee at the upstream 
end of Cascade Creek saved $800,000 and decreasing the scope of channel modifi cations 
on that creek from 9,000 to 4,000 feet recovered an additional $5 million, while also 
preserving existing parks and neighborhoods. According to Foley, value engineering 
accounted for a discount of $4 million. These reductions meant that instead of the $123 
million projected in the early 1990s, the total cost of the Corps’ portion of the project 
decreased to $97 million.124
When the Corps fi nished its construction in August 1995, one month ahead of schedule, 
all parties seemed pleased. Rochester Mayor Chuck Canfi eld declared it “the best 
project in the country” and many citizens agreed.125 Even before fi nal completion, 
people were using the 6.5 miles of recreational trails developed along the river, as well 
as the pedestrian plazas and picnic shelters. Frank Star, a planner for the district who 
helped design the recreational aspects, said he “felt good” when he saw how much 
people enjoyed the trails.126 Others in the district also recognized the “enthusiastic 
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local response” to the project, proudly claiming that “rather than mere satisfaction, the 
project has elicited delight from ... the citizens of Rochester, for its fl ood protection and 
social and economic benefi ts.”127
People outside of the St. Paul District also acknowledged the superiority of the project. 
In 1996, when the Minnesota Society of Professional Engineers proclaimed it one of 
the “Seven Wonders of Engineering” for that year, the judges emphasized the effective 
coordination between the Corps and the city.128 That same year, the project won the 
prestigious Award of Excellence from the Chief of Engineers Design and Environmental 
Awards Program. Although a Corps’ award, a non-Corps’ jury, which had to be 
unanimous, selected the winner. By 2004, the St. Paul District received four other 
Awards of Excellence – for the Lock and Dam 1 rehabilitation in 1983; for the Weaver 
Bottoms Rehabilitation Project in 1989; for the St. Paul, Minnesota, Flood Control 
Project in 1998; and for the Pool 8 Islands Project in 2004. In addition, Foley received 
the Corps’ Project Manager of the Year Award in 1996, and George V. Fortune, a design 
engineer on the Rochester project, received the 1996 Corps’ Design Engineer of the Year 
Award.129
For those associated with the project, it was not diffi cult to understand why it received 
so many accolades. Foley attributed it to numerous factors, including her capable 
district staff, the coordination between the district and the city and the recreational and 
aesthetic elements.130 Russel K. Snyder, a project manager and landscape architect in 
the district, believed the Rochester project was an ideal example of how cost-sharing 
created a working partnership between the Corps and a local sponsor.131 A Corps’ 
summary of the project explained that its success stemmed from cooperation between 
federal, state and local government agencies which generated “innovative solutions to 
benefi t the public.” No better example existed, the summary continued, “of recreational 
planning, attractive design, and environmental sensitivity integrated with high quality, 
cost effective urban fl ood control.” In fact, it concluded, the major reason for the 
project’s success “was the spirit of partnering and teamwork that prevailed throughout 
its design and construction,” whereby the local sponsors “became active members of 
the project team.”132
This project, then, was a showcase for the St. Paul District’s competence in civil works. 
Although environmental concerns were raised about the project, the Corps’ own 
mitigating efforts, coupled with aid from the city, mollifi ed these criticisms to a large 
degree. Perhaps no other project developed better cooperation between the district 
and the local sponsor, and this cooperation, as with the Grand Forks/East Grand Forks 
project, ensured the success of the undertaking. Relationships were not always perfect 
between district representatives and city leaders, but the creation of a team mentality 
facilitated good relations and enabled the Corps to implement effi ciently a project that 
provided security, recreation and economic benefi ts. As Colonel James Scott declared, 
“It was just a win/win situation.”133
Conclusion
The civil works projects discussed above were by no means the only important 
undertakings for the St. Paul District between 1975 and 2000. As with Rochester, 
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other projects received prestigious awards, such as the St. Paul Flood Control Project. 
Undertakings other than Devils Lake also had international implications. As with 
Grand Forks/East Grand Forks, other Corps’ work received more attention after 
disastrous fl oods, such as the Red River Project at Wahpeton, North Dakota, and 
Breckenridge, Minnesota. Finally, other undertakings besides the La Farge Project, 
including the Prairie du Chien Project of the 1970s and 1980s, were drastically affected 
by environmental concerns. But the La Farge, Devils Lake, Grand Forks/East Grand 
Forks and South Fork Zumbro undertakings clearly highlighted the major themes that 
the St. Paul District faced in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Environmentalism, 
cost-sharing, benefi t-cost analyses and cooperation with international, federal, state 
and local agencies all infl uenced the district and the Corps throughout this period. 
Because of these issues and because of important legislation such as NEPA and 
the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, the Corps’ civil works program 
changed dramatically. The successes of the St. Paul District resulted in large part 
from its willingness to accept that change – diffi culties with environmentalists, local 
communities and politicians arose, at least to some degree, from infl exible attitudes. As 
Colonel Kenneth Kasprisin explained, if district employees “see [the] opportunities with 
... change then we’ll continue to do extremely well. If they hide from it ... then there will 
be problems.”134 Nowhere was this more apparent than in the St. Paul District’s civil 
works program.
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Wetlands:  St. Paul District encompasses a 
variety of wetland types. (Photo by Steve D. 
Eggers, courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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The Corps has a responsibility to protect the nation’s wetlands. By 
authority of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, the Corps regulates activities that involve the discharge of dredge 
or fi ll material in waters of the United States – including wetlands. The 
St. Paul District, encompassing an area that contains more wetlands than 
any other Corps’ district outside of Alaska, has played a signifi cant role 
in the development of the Corps of Engineers regulatory program.
The protection of wetlands is an exceedingly political process, often pitting developers 
against environmentalists. In Minnesota and Wisconsin, the main threat to wetlands 
stemmed from agricultural activities. Farmers encountered new restrictions on 
what they were able to do with their own property. When environmental regulation 
impinged on private property rights, tension ran high. During one controversy in 
1989, upset farmers posted a handbill on grain elevators and farm supply stores across 
western Minnesota lambasting the Corps. “Farmers Take Notice Now,” this handbill 
read. “The U.S. Corps of Engineers is trying to tighten its stranglehold on all farm 
drainage with even stronger wording in Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ... Don’t lose 
your right to improve your property. The Corps of Engineers has too much authority 
already. Don’t give them anymore!”1 A political cartoon in the Mankato, Minnesota, 
newspaper at this time showed a farm with a patch of cattails in the foreground. 
Sticking out of the cattails was a sign:  “Property of the U.S. Government.”2 In order 
to implement an effective wetlands protection program in this political climate, the 
St. Paul District had to work assiduously to win the trust and cooperation of farmers 
and rural county governments. Owing in part to the farmers’ outcry, Minnesota and 
Wisconsin both developed strong wetland protection programs at the state level. 
One way in which the St. Paul District distinguished itself nationally was through its 
innovative coordination with these two progressive state programs. 
5The Regulatory Mission
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Minnesota and Wisconsin Wetlands
Much of the controversy surrounding wetlands protection stems from the complicated 
nature of this resource. Wetlands provide a variety of public values: for their role as 
fi lters in preserving water quality, for their function in absorbing water in time of 
fl ood and storing water in time of drought, for their importance to biota and for their 
recreational value to hunters, fi shers and wildlife watchers. Yet wetlands can be diffi cult 
to recognize, classify and delineate. Even within a two-state area such as Minnesota and 
Wisconsin, wetlands are extremely varied. Types of wetlands include prairie potholes, 
shallow lakes, inland fresh meadows, marshes and swamps.
The prairie pothole region, a legacy of the Ice Ages, includes parts of Minnesota, 
Iowa, North Dakota and South Dakota in the United States and parts of Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta in Canada. When the continental glaciers retreated more 
than 12,000 years ago, they left behind millions of depressions in the glacial drift. 
Today, these potholes trap rainwater and snowmelt to form isolated ponds of varying 
depths and sizes, each one an oasis of aquatic plants and animals. The region’s climate 
is characterized by mid-continent extremes of temperature and precipitation. The 
potholes are replenished in spring when snowmelt runs off the frozen soil. Most 
precipitation falls in summer in the form of short, violent cloudbursts. Variations in 
spring temperatures and the amount of summer rainfall may result in a pothole drying 
up one year and remaining wet throughout the next.3
Prairie potholes provide breeding habitat for immense numbers of waterfowl. These 
wetlands are estimated to support more than fi fty percent of all waterfowl in North 
America. In wet years, the percentage is even higher. Agricultural usage has made 
enormous inroads on this type of wetland in Minnesota, reducing the total area from 
approximately 12 to 3 million acres.4 A national wetlands inventory produced by the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 1984 described the prairie pothole region as one of nine 
“National Problem Areas.”5
Another group of wetlands in Minnesota and Wisconsin that are of unusual importance 
are the patterned peatlands. These areas exhibit many distinct landforms, including 
string bogs, ovoid islands, teardrop islands, bogs and fens.6 Like the prairie potholes, 
the peatlands are also a product of the Ice Ages. As the continental glaciers receded 
in northeastern Minnesota and northern Wisconsin, glacial meltwater periodically 
inundated the land. Drowned vegetation, instead of decomposing, accumulated in 
layers of organic sludge that turned to waterlogged peat. Today, these water-saturated, 
acid-peat soils form bogs. The bogs of northeastern Minnesota constitute the largest 
peatland complex in North America, while smaller bogs dot northern Wisconsin. Poor 
in nutrients, these bogs are colonized by sphagnum mosses, which in turn provide a 
mat for tenuous invasions by evergreen shrubs, tamarack and black spruce.7
In 1987, the St. Paul District published a pictorial fi eld guide, Wetland Plants and 
Plant Communities of Minnesota & Wisconsin. Patterned after popular fi eld guides to 
wildfl owers and other plant communities, the book sought to make wetland ecosystems 
recognizable to general readers. The authors, Steve D. Eggers, ecologist with the St. Paul 
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District, and Donald M. Reed, principal biologist for the Southeastern Wisconsin 
Regional Planning Commission, divided wetland plant communities in the two states 
into fi fteen vegetation types. While the authors’ focus on vegetation highlighted just 
one of three factors used in defi ning wetlands (it downplayed soil and hydrology), it 
emphasized the most visible feature. The book was offered as a companion to the more 
technical publication, Wetlands and Water Quality: A Citizen’s Handbook on How to Review 
Section 404 Permits.8
Eggers and Reed followed the wetland classifi cation system developed by John Curtis 
in The Vegetation of Wisconsin (1971). They divided the wetland vegetation types 
between two major fl oristic provinces, the fi rst characterized by “prairie-forest” and the 
second by “northern forest.” The transition or “vegetation tension zone” between the 
two provinces divided both states approximately in half on a meandering northwest-
southeast diagonal running from Roseau County, Minnesota, to Milwaukee County, 
Wisconsin. The prairieforest fl oristic province, included the eastern edge of the prairie 
pothole region. The authors classifi ed wetland plant communities into eight types: 
shallow, open water communities, marshes, inland fresh meadows, bogs, shrub 
swamps, wooded swamps, fl oodplain forests and seasonally-fl ooded basins (prairie 
potholes). Most of these classifi cations included at least two subclassifi cations. One 
noteworthy subclass comprised calcareous fens – distinguished by wet, seepage sites 
where calcium and magnesium bicarbonates and sulfates in the soil surface restricted 
Wetlands:  St. Paul District encompasses a variety of wetland types. (Photo by 
Steve D. Eggers, courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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vegetation to a select group of calcium-tolerant plants. Calcareous fens exhibited the 
rarest plant community in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and probably one of the rarest in 
North America. The fens usually had a disproportionate number of rare, threatened or 
endangered plant species.9
It has been estimated that Minnesota contained more than 18 million acres of wetlands 
– an area amounting to one-third of the state – prior to non-Indian settlement.10 In 
Minnesota, as in other regions, agricultural interests spearheaded the assault on 
wetlands. In the mid-nineteenth-century, settlers moved into the region and began 
at once to drain wetlands in order to bring more land under cultivation. These early 
settlers, many of whom were immigrants from Germany, Ireland, Scandinavia and 
other European countries, soon obtained active support of the state government, which 
saw the large-scale conversion of wetlands as a public good. The state government 
was abetted by the Federal Swamp Lands Acts of 1849-50, which granted inundated 
lands to states. In 1861, Governor Alexander Ramsey of Minnesota addressed the 
state legislature on wetlands: “From their nature and situation they are capable of 
easy reclamation. In a climate so dry as ours, we may naturally expect that lands of 
this class will eventually be the most valuable in the state.”11 Minnesota state laws 
promoted the formation of corporations for the purpose of draining lands. A state 
drainage commission oversaw all drainage ditch construction. Although the drought 
and economic depression of the 1930s temporarily halted wide-scale drainage efforts, 
the destruction of wetlands resumed in the 1940s and 1950s. While the state legislature 
of Minnesota began to enact laws for the conservation of wetlands – notably in response 
to the Pittman-Robertson Act of 1937, which offered federal funds to participating states 
for wildlife restoration projects – these measures were largely confi ned to public or 
navigable waters. It was not until 1973 that the Minnesota state legislature enacted a 
law that expanded the defi nition of public waters to include “all waters which serve a 
benefi cial public purpose, thereby including wetlands.”12 By this time, the total extent of 
Minnesota’s wetlands had been reduced by about half. In the prairie pothole region the 
loss of wetlands was much higher.
Conservation of wetlands in Minnesota and Wisconsin, as elsewhere, initially focused 
on their value as wildlife habitat. While wetlands generally drew public disdain because 
they inhibited most kinds of development, people appreciated the value of these 
forbidding landscapes as breeding grounds for ducks and other game birds. Beginning 
in the early twentieth century, the federal government began to set aside wetlands as 
bird refuges or wildlife refuges. The Fish and Wildlife Service sought to raise public 
awareness of the plight of duck populations whose breeding areas were drying up. At 
that time, both the prairie pothole region and the many sloughs along the Mississippi 
River gained national attention for their signifi cance to waterfowl. During the 1930s and 
after, Congress enacted numerous laws aimed at coordinating protection of wetlands 
and other wildlife habitat with other land uses. Yet as long as wetlands protection 
remained narrowly focused on the conservation of wildlife, it could not withstand other 
social forces working toward the destruction of wetlands. In particular, the American 
belief in the sanctity of private property contributed to the demise of this resource, 
because wetlands almost invariably became more economically productive when they 
were drained. With the rise of environmental awareness in the 1960s, public policy 
The Regulatory M
ission
5
119
toward wetlands began to change. Perhaps no other type of environment in the United 
States underwent such dramatic change in land use and public policy as wetlands.
Origins of the Section 404 Program
The Corps’ authority to regulate use of the navigable waters of the United States 
dates from the early years of the Republic and derives from the federal government’s 
constitutional power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The Corps’ 
regulatory program took more specifi c form in the River and Harbor Act of 1899, which 
prohibited obstructions to navigability of waters of the United States. Section 10 of 
the act required the Department of the Army to issue a permit for any work involving 
navigable waters, including dredge and fi ll operations. Section 13 required a federal 
permit for any discharge of refuse matter except liquid sewage into navigable waters or 
their tributaries. Although the law extended the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction to areas 
upstream from navigable waters, in practice the regulatory function was limited to 
protection of navigation. Consequently, the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers 
used their authority judiciously on activities affecting navigation, rarely addressing 
matters concerning the environment.13 
Decades later, in response to growing public concern for the environment, the Corps 
enlarged the scope of its regulatory function in 1968 to include not just the effect of a 
proposed action on navigation but also its effects on fi sh and wildlife, water quality, 
ecology and the general public interest. The following year, Congress passed the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, or NEPA, which required all federal 
agencies with regulatory functions to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact 
Statement for permit actions that would signifi cantly affect the quality of the human 
environment. NEPA specifi cally mandated that the review process involve public input 
and that it take an interdisciplinary approach by considering ecological, social and 
economic impacts. In response to NEPA, the Corps expanded its regulatory program to 
include interdisciplinary teams engaged in a general public interest review process, but 
its main focus remained on navigable waterways. This changed with the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or 
Clean Water Act.14 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act established a national goal of eliminating 
discharge of pollution into waters by 1985. The law placed the Environmental 
Protection Agency in charge of a permitting program aimed at stopping pollution at 
its source.15 While the Environmental Protection Agency had primary responsibility 
for the program, Section 404 of the act required the Corps assist the Environmental 
Protection Agency in its mission, stating in part: “The Secretary of the Army, acting 
through the Chief of Engineers, may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for 
public hearings[,] for the discharge of dredged or fi ll material into the navigable waters 
at specifi ed disposal sites.” The Federal Water Pollution Control Act defi ned navigable 
waters as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Given the 
law’s ambitious goal to eliminate water pollution by 1985, Environmental Protection 
Agency interpreted the law liberally to include tributaries of navigable waters. The 
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Corps initially insisted upon a narrow interpretation of “waters of the United States” 
based on navigation, but environmentalists pressed the Corps through court action to 
take a more expansive view of its Section 404 authority.
In 1975, environmentalists won a landmark decision in Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Callaway. District Judge Aubrey Robinson held that the Corps’ defi nition of 
“waters of the United States” was too narrow and must be revised in accordance with 
Congress’s intent in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. In the court’s opinion, 
Congress had intended that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act provide for 
the exercise of “federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent 
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.” As a result of this 
decision, the Corps, in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency and 
with input from environmental organizations, prepared four alternative regulations for 
publication in the Federal Register.16
While this effort was underway, however, Corps’ leadership continued to argue that 
a broad construal of its Section 404 authority to include wetlands would create a 
public outcry and a political backlash against the federal program. Although Corps’ 
leaders obtained support for their position from the Department of Agriculture and 
the Department of Commerce, they failed to convince either the Department of the 
Interior or the Department of Justice, which refused to appeal the Callaway decision. 
Nor could Corps’ offi cials get any policy guidance on Section 404 from the White 
House. As a result, senior offi cials in the Offi ce of the Chief of Engineers determined 
to state their case directly to the American people through a press release. In so 
doing, they hoped to prompt congressional review of the Section 404 program and 
clarify congressional intent. To elicit a public response, offi cials directed the Public 
Affairs Offi ce to craft a press release that would grab media attention and provoke 
widespread public opposition to the permit program. Released on the same day that the 
alternative regulations were published in the Federal Register, the press release warned 
that “millions of people may be presently violating the law” and stated that convicted 
offenders could be “subject to fi nes up to $25,000 a day and one year imprisonment.” 
The St. Paul District, together with other districts, helped disseminate the information.17
The press release succeeded in provoking a public outcry. Thousands of protests 
poured into congressional offi ces. The New York Times accused the Corps of attempting 
a power grab. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz condemned the proposed regulation 
as a “dangerous extension of the long hand of the federal government into the affairs of 
private citizens.” One offi cial was quoted as stating that the Corps, lacking other means, 
would rely on farmers to snitch on one another in order to ensure compliance with 
its Section 404 permits. Environmental groups, meanwhile, lambasted the Corps for 
misrepresenting the facts and for attempting to sabotage the court ruling in Callaway.18
While the press release earned notoriety, it drew thousands of comments on the 
proposed regulations in the Federal Register. The Washington, D.C., offi ce received more 
than 4,500 written comments from governors, congressmen, federal, state and local 
agencies, as well as organizations and individuals in the private sector. Working with 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps issued an interim draft of revised 
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regulations on July 25, 1975. The Corps then developed a public relations plan to sell 
its wetlands protection program, which it launched on September 4, 1975. District 
engineers were to inform the public that the “Corps of Engineers will be reasonable, 
moderate, objective and practical in administering the program.” Brigadier General 
Kenneth McIntyre, Acting Director of Civil Works, explained the Section 404 program 
to state administrators. “The farming, ranching, and lumbering industries can rest 
assured that plowing, cultivating, seeding and harvesting will continue to be permitted 
without regulation,” he said.19
During the next two years, Congress held hearings on the controversial Section 404. 
Various bills were introduced to modify or clarify the Corps’ regulatory authority. 
Early in 1977, Congressman John Breaux (D-Louisiana) introduced a bill that would 
dramatically curtail the Corps’ Section 404 jurisdiction, eliminating federal safeguards 
for about seventy- fi ve percent of the nation’s wetlands. Breaux had strong ties to 
development interests on the Lower Mississippi. With backing from House Majority 
Leader Jim Wright of Texas, the measure passed in the House by a wide margin. The 
Senate voted down the bill, but in joint conference later that year, the measure was used 
as a bargaining chip to extract concessions in a further set of amendments to the law. 
Congress passed the amendments on December 15, 1977, and President Carter signed 
them into law thirteen days later. The amended law was called the Clean Water Act of 
1977. Environmentalists claimed victory insofar as the law affi rmed the Corps’ Section 
404 jurisdiction as established by Callaway. But opponents won key exemptions from 
the permit process for normal farming, ranching, and silviculture activities, including 
minor ditch and road construction. In another key concession, states were allowed to 
administer portions of the permit program as soon as they would adopt regulatory 
standards deemed acceptable by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Corps – 
a prerogative that Minnesota and Wisconsin would both exercise about a decade later.20
The Clean Water Act of 1977 was a turning point in wetlands protection. From 
1972 to 1977, the main issue surrounding Section 404 was whether Congress would 
repeal Section 404 (or amend it so drastically as to make it ineffective). After 1977, 
congressional support for Section 404 was no longer in doubt and the program acquired 
legitimacy. In the years ahead, the program would continue to be controversial, but 
environmentalists and developers would debate how to make it function better rather 
than argue over whether to implement or scrap the program.21 During these formative 
years from 1972 to 1977, the Corps improved its relationship with environmental 
organizations – at least with regard to its regulatory mission. Historian Jeffrey K. 
Stine investigated the origins of the Section 404 program and concluded that the 
Corps’ performance after 1975 won the respect of the environmental community. 
“Throughout the controversy over the extent of the Corps’ jurisdiction under Section 
404, environmental groups rarely tried to reduce the power of the Corps or to slow it 
down, as they had done repeatedly in the area of civil works,” Stine wrote. “Despite 
occasional disagreements over individual permit decisions, a new basis for cooperation 
was clearly established.”22
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Establishing a Section 404 Program in the St. Paul District
The St. Paul District faced an overwhelming task in assuming its Section 404 
responsibilities in the 1970s. With some ten million acres of wetlands in Minnesota and 
fi ve million acres in Wisconsin, no other Corps’ district outside of Alaska contained 
so many wetlands, and few Corps’ districts would process as many Section 404 
permit applications. Moreover, the political landscape within the St. Paul District was 
challenging. Farmers in Minnesota and Wisconsin (and North Dakota, which remained 
within the district’s regulatory purview in the 1970s) were highly suspicious of the 
program. Many county governments refl ected the farmers’ concerns. On the other hand, 
the large urban populaces of Minnesota and Wisconsin generally supported strong 
environmental regulations for protecting water quality. Refl ecting these urban-based 
values, the Minnesota and Wisconsin state governments demanded higher standards 
for wetlands protection than most other states in the nation, while the North Dakota 
state government gave priority to protecting the state’s farm-based economy.23
The St. Paul District phased in the Section 404 program over a two-year period, 
gradually applying the permitting requirements to wider geographic areas. In the fi rst 
phase, from July 1975 to September 1976, the Corps required permits for discharges 
into the tributaries of navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. In 
the second phase, from September 1976 to July 1977, it required permits for discharges 
into tributaries of navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to those tributaries. Finally, 
beginning in July 1977, the program was extended to all water bodies in the district 
including mud holes, ponds, backwaters, lakes, rivers and streams.24
Initially, the Regulatory Branch had two sections. The permit evaluation section did 
all the preliminary work on each permit application. After establishing a permit fi le, 
making the public notice and receiving comments from other agencies and interested 
parties, the permit evaluation section turned over each permit application to the 
research and analysis section for an environmental assessment. The latter section 
was composed of biologists. After the biologists completed their work, the permit 
evaluation section could issue the permit – usually under certain conditions to protect 
the environment. By 1977, it had become clear that the Corps needed to track whether 
the permit holder complied with the terms of the permit, so it formed a third section, 
the surveillance and enforcement section. In time, the St. Paul District had about eight 
or nine investigators working in the surveillance and enforcement section.25
Ben Wopat, a long-time senior offi cial in the St. Paul District offi ce, joined the Corps 
in April 1976 when the district’s Regulatory Branch was beginning to increase staff. 
Initially, Wopat was one of just four personnel in the unit. As the program expanded, 
the surveillance and enforcement section quickly outgrew its offi ce space on the 
eleventh fl oor of the old Post Offi ce building and had to relocate two fl oors below. 
There was no formal change in the organizational structure, but the staff group was 
physically set apart and was informally perceived within the organization as “the 
investigators down on the 9th fl oor.” The staff came from a variety of academic 
disciplines other than engineering. Wopat, for example, had a law degree, as well as 
a master’s degree in history. While the rest of the organization was providing public 
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services and building fl ood control projects, the Regulatory Branch was busy controlling 
development. “We were the guys with the black hats,” Wopat wryly recalled in a recent 
interview. “Here we were down here telling people what they could not do with their 
own property. It was heathen and communistic.”26
The demands on the Regulatory Branch were enormous. By the time the Section 404 
program was fully operational in 1977, the St. Paul District covered an estimated 9 
million acres of wetlands in Minnesota, Wisconsin and North Dakota. After two-and-
a-half years, the staff processed some six hundred twenty permits involving 10,040 
acres of wetlands. Approximately two-thirds of the applications resulted in permits, 
while the Corps and the applicants resolved most of the remainder by modifying the 
proposed action so that it did not require a permit. Only a handful of applications were 
rejected without some kind of alternative resolution for the applicant. During the same 
period, the Regulatory Branch authorized another 300 projects under general permits 
and issued nearly three hundred permits under Section 10 of the River and Harbor 
Act of 1899. The latter, so-called Section 10 permits, allowed placement of structures in 
navigable waters.
Despite this effort, the St. Paul District’s regulatory staff cautioned that a huge amount 
of activity was occurring without regulation. Using information obtained from state 
programs, the Corps estimated that unauthorized actions during the same two-and-
a-half-year period covered a whopping 1.8 million acres. Most of the noncompliance 
Wetlands
Original Minnesota wetlands (left). Existing Minnesota wetlands (right). 
(Map courtesy of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)
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resulted from public ignorance of the law. To tackle this problem, Corps’ personnel 
joined state offi cials on various speaking tours. As public awareness of the Clean 
Water Act requirements spread, the ratio of unauthorized versus authorized projects 
diminished. St. Paul District offi cials believed that as of December 1977, the Section 404 
program covered most major projects that posed signifi cant threats to wetlands.27
Public ignorance of the law was not the only problem, however. Sometimes developers 
purposely skirted the Corps’ regulatory authority or opposed it in court. In 1978, Ron 
McDaniels applied for a permit to build a Toyota car dealership in Maplewood, a 
suburb of St. Paul. The Ramsey County Soil and Water Conservation District found the 
proposed development site, which bordered a county drainage ditch, to be “critical” for 
fi ltering pollutants and sediments that would otherwise run into nearby Kohlman Lake. 
Moreover, if the site were blacktopped to accommodate the car lot, area homes would 
be prone to fl ood damage. Both the Ramsey-Washington Metro Watershed District 
Board and the Corps found the site to be a wetland, and the Corps fi nally denied 
McDaniels’ federal permit application in the summer of 1979. McDaniels then sued 
the Corps, arguing that the site was not a wetland. Soon, the Maplewood City Council 
aligned itself with McDaniels, while a homeowners association opposed the developer. 
In the spring of 1980, District Court Judge Miles Lord ruled in McDaniels’ favor: 
according to the judge, the site was not a wetland. But this did not end the matter. Four 
days after the court ruling, the Minnesota state legislature passed a law that placed 
the proposed development site under the jurisdiction of the Minnesota Department of 
Natural Resources. This extraordinary action by the state legislature forced McDaniels 
to work with the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and the Corps after all.28
As the St. Paul District’s regulatory staff tried 
to raise public awareness of the Clean Water 
Act permitting requirements, they sometimes 
encountered frustration from members of the 
public who did not know who to contact for 
permit applications. In most cases, a developer 
such as Ron McDaniels had to satisfy three 
levels of government: federal, state and county. 
Sometimes, the situation demanded a permit 
from a municipality as well. The St. Paul District 
regulatory staff developed a single application 
form that could be fi lled out by the applicant and 
supplied to all four offi ces – federal, state, county 
and municipal. As a result, instead of going 
through a series of permit application processes, 
the applicant could initiate one process and all 
four offi ces would proceed simultaneously. Some 
state offi cials resisted the uniform application 
form but eventually became convinced that a 
joint federal-state application form best served 
the public.29
Ben Wopat, December 1981. 
(Photo by Lyle Nicklay, courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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Just as Wopat had to work with multiple state offi ces on this issue, so too did state 
offi cials have to work with more than one district of the Corps of Engineers. Because 
of the need for public outreach and coordination with multiple levels of government, 
Wopat argued that the Section 404 program would be strengthened if the St. Paul 
District’s jurisdiction followed political rather than watershed boundaries. With the 
support of his district engineer, and eventually under orders from Corps’ headquarters, 
Wopat negotiated with his counterparts in neighboring districts to achieve a 
realignment of St. Paul District boundaries for purposes of the Section 404 regulatory 
program. First, by mutual agreement, the St. Paul District relinquished its small portion 
of Iowa in exchange for the Rock Island District’s little piece of Minnesota and the Rock 
River watershed in Wisconsin. Next, the St. Paul District gave up its portion of North 
Dakota to the Omaha District. Then it exchanged the Upper Peninsula of Michigan 
for the Detroit District’s Fox River watershed and its Lake Michigan watershed in 
Wisconsin. Finally, it obtained from the Chicago District the southeastern corner of 
Wisconsin. By this series of mutual agreements, the St. Paul District’s Section 404 
program came to serve all of Minnesota and Wisconsin and no parts of other states. In 
some other parts of the nation, districts followed this lead so that Section 404 permitting 
conformed to state lines rather than watershed boundaries.30
Nationwide Permit 26 and the Rise of State Programs
In order to process tens of thousands of Section 404 permit applications annually, 
the Corps developed a two-tiered approach using individual and general permits. 
Individual permits involved large or unusual actions that required a full public 
interest review. General permits involved small, routine actions that were believed 
to have minimal environmental impact. Once the Corps determined an action could 
be handled under a general permit, the action was essentially pre-approved and did 
not need to undergo the same level of public notice and review. For example, Corps’ 
headquarters developed a general permit for bank stabilization projects. If a proposed 
bank stabilization project could be designed to meet the environmental conditions 
specifi ed by the general permit, the permitting process was considerably expedited. 
Although the general permits dealt with relatively benign actions, they were signifi cant 
because of the cumulative environmental impact of so many similar but separate 
actions going forward under one set of standards. At best, the two tiered approach 
facilitated an appropriate scaling of effort that discouraged excessive regulation. At 
worst, it was no more than a form of triage for dealing with loss of wetlands on many 
fronts. Environmentalists viewed the Corps’ approach in this negative light and focused 
on general permits as the weak link in the Section 404 program. In time, state agencies 
responsible for wetlands protection began to share environmentalists’ concerns. 
The two-tiered approach to Section 404 permitting won congressional approval in the 
Clean Water Act amendments of 1977. Immediately, the Corps began to develop a 
number of “nationwide” (general) permits to address various activities. One of these 
permits, Nationwide Permit 26 (NWP 26), covered actions that involved discharges of 
dredged material above headwaters and in isolated waters (such as prairie potholes). 
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NWP 26 provided a vehicle for the Corps to handle the vast geographic scope of 
Section 404. As such, it was the only nationwide permit to deal with a type of wetland 
environment rather than a type of construction activity.31 For thousands of farmers in 
Minnesota and Wisconsin whose property included wetland, NWP 26 offered a fast 
track through the Section 404 process.
With the advent of the Reagan Administration in 1981, Corps’ leadership anticipated 
a rollback in the Section 404 program. Ronald Reagan had campaigned for president 
on a platform of smaller government. He fervently believed in reducing government 
red tape. In particular, he wanted to ease the burden of environmental protection for 
agriculture and industry. His primary tactic in bringing about regulatory reform, it soon 
became clear, was to starve selected regulatory programs of funds. As Secretary of the 
Interior James Watt explained, “We will use the budget system [as] the excuse to make 
major policy decisions.”32 Reagan’s appointee to oversee the Army Corps, Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Civil Works William R. Gianelli, immediately began to study 
alternatives for shrinking the Section 404 program. Broader use of nationwide permits – 
with the reduction in federal oversight that that shift entailed – was central to his plan.
In July 1982, the Corps published a revision of Section 404 regulations. The new 
rules included a broadening of NWP 26 authority.33 A coalition of environmental 
organizations fi led suit in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., charging that the 
new rules would exempt millions of acres of wetlands from the requirement to obtain 
individual permits to dispose of dredged material, violating the intent of the Clean 
Water Act. While administration offi cials defended the new rules as necessary in the 
face of limited funding, environmentalists accused the administration of “abandoning 
the nation’s wetlands under the guise of regulatory reform.”34
State agencies in Minnesota and Wisconsin also criticized the new rules. The Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency citizens’ board voted unanimously to sue the Corps on the 
basis that the NWP-26 permit would not require state review of the proposed action. 
According to one Minnesota Pollution Control Agency offi cial, the new rules would 
lift state authority over vast peat bogs in northern Minnesota, as well as several million 
acres of waterfowl-rich marshes in the prairie pothole region.35
St. Paul District Engineer Colonel William W. Badger supported the rollback of Section 
404 regulations in principle. He responded favorably to the Reagan Administration’s 
emphasis on cutting red tape and pushing economic development. He was impatient 
with those whom he called “termites” in the agency, the low-level technocrats who 
eschewed action in favor of further study and deliberation. However, he was also 
mindful that the people of Minnesota and Wisconsin were more supportive of 
environmental regulations than the nation as a whole. “We in the St. Paul District are in 
a very environmentally sensitive region,” he told an interviewer in July 1981. “We have 
the potholes, the wetlands, and the 10,000 lakes and the people that we serve are locked 
in step to preserve these wetlands.” Consequently, Colonel Badger wanted to work with 
the Minnesota and Wisconsin Departments of Natural Resources and adapt Section 404 
The Regulatory M
ission
5
127
regulations to meet their requirements. The St. Paul District ought to “fi ne-tune” and 
“retain” the Section 404 program, Badger held, rather than “roll it back.”36
Badger encouraged Ben Wopat and others in the regulatory branch to negotiate with 
state offi cials in the Minnesota and Wisconsin DNRs over adjustments to NWP 26 
and other nationwide permits. The idea was to modify the rules to refl ect regional 
conditions – both environmental and political. As a result of these discussions, the 
Wisconsin DNR published state guidelines in November 1982. The Minnesota DNR 
completed its guidelines in April 1984. These efforts laid the groundwork for a more 
comprehensive effort to coordinate wetlands protection at the federal and state levels 
through the development of programmatic general permits with each state. The 
programmatic general permit defi ned various actions affecting wetlands that fell 
within both federal and state jurisdiction. Any action that required an application for 
a programmatic general permit would be reviewed by federal and state agencies. The 
arrangement satisfi ed state offi cials that they would not be bypassed in the federal 
permitting process, especially where NWP 26 was employed. Federal offi cials, for 
their part, received assurance that the review process would not become bogged 
down; both the Corps and the DNRs were committed to respond to programmatic 
general permits applications within ten days. In addition, the district engineer had 
discretionary authority to require an individual permit for any area outside the purview 
of the programmatic general permit that he considered to be sensitive. The district 
engineer invoked this authority to protect those rare and minuscule wetlands known 
as calcareous fens.37 By the mid-1980s, the St. Paul District was a leader in developing 
coordinated federal and state procedures to fulfi ll the purposes of Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act.
In the meantime, the lawsuit brought by environmental groups over NWP 26 was 
settled out of court. According to the settlement terms, NWP 26 was rewritten so it 
was limited to projects that would impact up to ten acres of wetlands in headwaters or 
isolated waters. Any project that would impact more than ten acres would no longer be 
authorized under the nationwide permit. Moreover, the Corps would take a closer look 
at projects that would impact one to ten acres. Any project that would impact more than 
one acre would require public notice. The Corps issued the new regulations, including 
modifi cation of NWP 26, in October 1984.
Environmentalists still distrusted the intent of NWP 26. In the 1990s, they attacked the 
ten-acre limit as too lenient; however, for the time being it was allowed to stand.
Wetlands Delineation
One of the most controversial aspects of wetlands protection was how to defi ne a 
wetland. Even after Congress and the courts resolved the issue of whether the “waters 
of the United States” extended to wetlands, the problem remained of establishing 
guidelines so that people could agree on where wetlands ended and uplands began. In 
general, wetlands were defi ned as areas inundated or saturated by water at a frequency 
and duration suffi cient to support plants that were adapted to saturated soil conditions. 
Ecologists recognized wetlands by the vegetation that grew on them. Experts could 
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not agree on specifi c guidelines, however, and the public remained befuddled about 
what constituted a wetland. Gradually, it became apparent that the Corps needed a 
scientifi cally sound and workable defi nition – one that could be applied in the fi eld with 
consistency so that the jurisdictional boundaries of Section 404 were made clear.
The Corps’ generous use of NWP 26 in the early 1980s fueled the controversy 
over wetlands delineation. Environmentalists argued that many thousands of 
acres of wetlands were being destroyed each year under NWP 26 authorizations. 
Regulators noted that without uniform standards as to what constituted a wetland, 
environmentalists’ estimates concerning the total extent and rate of loss of wetlands 
had to be treated circumspectly. Farmers, for their part, were leery of any defi nition of 
wetlands that could bring previously converted wetlands – croplands that were lying 
fallow, for example – under the Clean Water Act’s purview. In short, environmentalists, 
regulators and farmers all had their own agendas for wetlands delineation. The 
question of what is a wetland, though posed to science, stemmed from politics.
Nowhere, perhaps, was wetland delineation more controversial than in Minnesota, 
where county drainage ditches crisscrossed the countryside, forming a peculiar network 
of man-made wetlands. The ditches had been constructed in the early decades of the 
twentieth century to drain wetlands and render adjoining areas suitable for agriculture. 
Often, they ran parallel to county roads. The ditches gradually fi lled with debris, 
which interrupted the fl ow of water, so that they had to be periodically cleaned to 
keep them functional. For decades, county ditch boards oversaw the maintenance of 
ditches on a public need basis, but many ditches had been abandoned and the county 
ditch boards had ceased to exist. As counties fell behind on maintenance, the process 
of land conversion was reversed. The ditches clogged, the water ceased to fl ow and the 
surrounding area returned to wetlands. As these clogged ditches became less effective 
in draining surrounding agricultural fi elds, the resulting wetlands performed a new 
function: they acted as fi lters to absorb farm chemicals and other pollutants that would 
otherwise fl ow into natural streams and rivers. Moreover, they provided habitat for 
wildlife. The Corps was bound by the Clean Water Act to protect these linear wetlands, 
but rural county governments saw the Corps’ responsibility as an intrusion into local 
affairs. Speaking on behalf of the public need for a particular ditch repair, Meeker 
Wetlands:  This cartoon 
depicts farmers’ 
frustration with federal 
wetlands policy. 
Farmers saw wetlands 
(with accompanying 
federal regulations) 
encroaching upon their 
farms, especially where 
abandoned agricultural 
drainage ditches 
bordered farmsteads.
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County Commissioner Steve Dille expressed a concern common to many rural residents 
when he remarked, “The thing that bothers me is the loss of local control and the need 
to contact Washington for permission.”38
As public awareness of wetlands increased, ditch improvement proposals often 
proved divisive among area residents. Farmers might desire ditch maintenance to 
get waterlogged fi elds back into production, while nearby townspeople preferred to 
protect downstream water quality. When controversy arose, the St. Paul District held 
public hearings to gather information that would assist in its determination of whether 
a permit served the public interest. In a notable example, the Corps scheduled a public 
hearing in Stevens County to garner testimony on a proposed ditch project. Proponents 
wanted to improve County Ditch 6 for drainage and fl ood control. Opponents claimed 
the ditch improvement would pollute the waters of Page Lake, harming its recreational 
and economic value. Twice the meeting was postponed at the request of county 
offi cials. An editorial in the Hancock Record admonished readers to participate: “The 
upcoming public hearing concerning the proposed alteration of County Ditch 6 and 
Page Lake is perhaps the single most important hearing that the citizens of Hancock 
and surrounding area can ever attend.” When the hearing fi nally occurred in December 
1981 in the town of Morris, Minnesota, population fi ve thousand, some two hundred 
people packed the courthouse hearing room.39 Evidently the public response served to 
kill the project.
Rural county governments often bristled at involvement by the Corps, even when the 
Corps sought to facilitate public review of project proposals. In 1986, the Corps denied 
a permit application to improve Ditch 5 in McLeod County, which lies in Minnesota’s 
prairie pothole region. Later that year, the Board of Commissioners of McLeod 
County narrowly approved a resolution that effectively barred future expansion 
of Ditch 5. The resolution, drafted by attorneys in the St. Paul District offi ce for the 
county commissioners, sought to clear the way for Corps’ approval of a county permit 
application involving two other ditches. Two of the fi ve commissioners opposed the 
resolution on the grounds that it smacked of “arm twisting” by the Corps.40
The problematic relationship between agricultural drainage ditches and wetlands was 
not unique to the St. Paul District, but the connection was perhaps more complex there 
than in any other part of the nation. Beginning about 1984, a wet cycle in the region’s 
climate caused water tables to rise, spurring counties to initiate ditch repair projects for 
the fi rst time in many years. As with Ditch 5 in McLeod County, most of these projects 
went beyond maintenance, thereby threatening destruction not only of wetlands that 
had become reestablished along the ditch corridor itself, but wetlands in adjoining areas 
as well.41 Insofar as regulators sought to distinguish between existing versus previously 
converted wetlands, ditch projects were particularly confounding.
The problem of defi ning wetlands undoubtedly perplexed rural residents more than 
it did urban residents, but it could turn up anywhere. In 1986, district ecologist Steve 
Eggers discovered a calcareous fen in Savage, a Minneapolis suburb. This rare type of 
wetland, blooming with plants and grasses that the state had classifi ed as threatened 
species, was found at the end of a gravel road behind a concrete-panel casting 
factory. To the newspaper reporter who accompanied Eggers to the Savage fen site, 
Th
e 
Re
gu
la
to
ry
 M
iss
io
n
5 130
the small spring-fed wetland looked like nothing but a “patch of weeds.” According 
to Eggers, the Corps was aware of three other calcareous fens in the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area.42
Eggers, like other Corps’ ecologists, recognized a wetland by the composition of 
wetland plant species. In theory, only certain species of plants could grow in water-
saturated soils, and these plant species were then indicators of a wetland. Eggers’ 
fi eld guide presented a classifi cation scheme for wetland types. However, Eggers and 
other ecologists in the Corps increasingly saw the need for a more precise and legally 
defensible method for delineating wetlands. In 1987, the Corps accordingly produced 
a manual. Based on seven years of research and testing, it offered numerical standards 
for the three basic attributes of wetlands – water, soil and vegetation. For example, the 
hydrology (water) standard included this requirement: to qualify as wetland, the soil 
must be inundated or saturated within major portions of the root zone (within twelve 
inches of the surface) during at least fi ve percent of the growing season.43
However, the manual did not satisfy critics. The Reagan Administration directed four 
agencies, the EPA, the Corps, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Soil Conservation 
Service, to develop standards that all four could agree upon; and in 1989, the agencies 
produced the “Joint Four-Agency Wetland Delineation Manual.” It was similar in most 
respects to the Corps’ 1987 manual. On the specifi c hydrology standard noted above, 
however, the 1989 manual stated soil must be inundated or saturated to a depth of 
six to eight inches for at least seven consecutive days during the growing season. This 
seemingly subtle difference marked the 1989 manual as more inclusive in its defi nition 
of a wetland.44
Pro-development critics blasted the 1989 manual primarily on the grounds that it would 
redefi ne millions of acres of farmland as wetland. Apparently by mistake, the 1989 
manual included an estimated 53 million acres of farmland that had been exempted 
from Section 404 regulations under provisions of the Food Security Act of 1985. Also, 
critics complained that the hydrological defi nition was too broad and that the 1989 
manual had not undergone a public review process.45
With wetland policy in the national limelight, newly elected President George H.W. 
Bush announced his administration’s goal of “no net loss of wetlands.” Bush called for 
a review and revision of the 1989 manual and appointed a panel of experts, the Federal 
Interagency Committee for Wetland Delineation, to accomplish this task. After a two-
year study, the committee announced its fi ndings. Taking a more restrictive view of 
wetlands than either the Corps’ 1987 manual or the four agencies’ 1989 manual, the 
committee’s draft revisions, if implemented, would have eliminated 50 million acres 
of widely recognized wetlands. Indeed, fi eld testing of the proposed criteria revealed 
that parts of the Everglades in Florida and the Great Dismal Swamp in North Carolina 
would be excluded from federal jurisdiction. Now it was the environmentalists’ turn to 
cry foul. Coming to the environmentalists’ support, both the EPA and the Corps found 
the committee’s revisions were unscientifi c and unusable in the fi eld.46
Congress responded to the uproar by requesting yet another study of wetlands 
delineation by the National Academy of Sciences. At the same time, Congress directed 
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the Corps to drop its use of the 1989 manual in favor of its earlier 1987 guidelines. 
Other agencies followed suit in adopting the Corps’ original criteria for wetlands 
delineation. By the time the National Academy of Sciences completed its study in 1995, 
the controversy had subsided. The National Academy of Sciences concluded that the 
existing federal wetlands regulatory program was scientifi cally sound and effective in 
most respects.47
Swampbuster
In the spring of 1985, the House Agriculture Committee introduced a provision in 
the farm bill that would deny agricultural subsidies to any farmer who planted crops 
on wetlands. Known as “Swampbuster,” the provision was modeled on a similar 
conservation measure, called “Sodbuster,” which aimed at discouraging farmers on the 
Great Plains from plowing up new sod. Like Sodbuster, the Swampbuster provision 
would reverse outmoded farm policy that actually gave farmers incentive to convert 
wetlands to agriculture even when this action undermined wetland policy. The 
concept of pushing a conservation measure by tying it to eligibility for farm subsidies 
appealed to a Congress searching for ways to cut federal subsidies. It also appealed 
to environmental groups, including conservation-oriented farm groups such as the 
National Association of Conservation Districts.48
President Ronald Reagan signed the Food Security Act into law on February 23, 1985. 
According to the Swampbuster provision, any farmer who planted crops on wetlands 
after the date of the act would lose eligibility for commodity price supports, disaster 
payments, Farm and Home Administration loans and crop insurance. The law used 
a defi nition of wetlands similar to that developed by the Corps in its Section 404 
regulations – based on soil, hydrology and vegetation. Drainage projects that were in 
progress could be completed if they had been initiated prior to February 23, 1985.49
Enforcement of Swampbuster fell primarily to the Soil Conservation Service in the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Soil Conservation Service and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service jointly developed guidelines and disseminated them through state and 
county offi ces in March 1986. Like the Corps a decade earlier, the Soil Conservation 
Service acquired the enormous task of identifying and monitoring wetlands throughout 
farm country. Although it had some seven thousand personnel in the fi eld, Soil 
Conservation Service agents were not trained to recognize wetlands nor were they 
anxious to do surveillance. Soil Conservation Service agents enjoyed the role of 
helping farmers negotiate the maze of federal programs, and they resisted assuming 
what amounted to a role reversal. “In small farm communities where everyone knew 
everyone and there was only one coffee shop to go to in the morning, the pressure not 
to enforce the provision was tremendous,” historian Ann Vileisis wrote.50 Reported 
violations were rare, and sanctions against violators were even rarer.
In theory, Swampbuster should have buttressed the Section 404 program because 
farmers who violated their Section 404 permits could face additional penalties from the 
Soil Conservation Service. Initially, the Corps received excellent cooperation from Soil 
Conservation Service offi cials in sharing information on their respective programs. As 
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Corps’ offi cials went from their Soil Conservation Service contacts in state offi ces to Soil 
Conservation Service agents in the fi eld, however, they found much less willingness on 
the part of the agents to assist with wetlands protection. Whereas the Soil Conservation 
Service agents had been “the guys in the white hats that were helping the farmers with 
programs,” Ben Wopat recalled, “all of a sudden here they were viewed as the bad guys 
who were now telling them what they couldn’t do rather than helping them do things 
that they wanted to do to improve or expand their agricultural production.”51
Farm groups objected to Swampbuster and vigorously lobbied for changes in the 
law when it came up for reauthorization in 1990. Congress made minor adjustments 
to Swampbuster in the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act, which was 
signed into law on November 28, 1990. One key change was the introduction of 
graduated penalties for unintentional violations. Farmers were allowed one violation 
in ten years, and they stood to lose benefi ts of $750 to $10,000, depending on the 
severity of the violation. The law also redefi ned the Swampbuster prohibition itself. 
Rather than prohibiting the planting of crops in wetlands, it prohibited any act of 
draining, dredging, fi lling, leveling or otherwise altering wetlands to produce an 
agricultural commodity.52
While these amendments removed some of the teeth from Swampbuster, the program’s 
main shortcoming continued to be weak enforcement by the Soil Conservation Service 
and other federal agencies. Soil Conservation Service agents were supposed to report 
violations to the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, which oversaw 
local committees of farmers that were tasked to assess penalties. The Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service committees proved highly recalcitrant, granting 
“good faith” exemptions to hundreds of violators. In 1991, the National Wildlife 
Federation sued the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service for granting 
exemptions to farmers who drained eighteen prairie potholes in the Yellow Medicine 
River watershed in Minnesota. The circuit court of appeals ruled that the farmers 
must restore the potholes or forfeit their farm subsidies. Despite this rebuke from 
the court, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service continued to issue 
exemptions. An audit of Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service actions in 
Nelson County, North Dakota, in 1993 revealed that the Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service granted exemptions in eleven of thirty randomly-selected cases. 
Other audits in 1993 disclosed $1.2 million in subsidies paid to six farmers who had 
violated Swampbuster. Total forfeiture of subsidies under Swampbuster amounted to 
just $12 million for the period 1986-1992. After the government subsequently restored 
a large portion of these subsidies, total penalties amounted to less than $3,000 per farm 
for some fi ve hundred forty-four violators.53
Critics also pointed out that the Soil Conservation Service was lax in mapping wetlands. 
In 1994, environmentalists compared Soil Conservation Service wetlands maps and Fish 
and Wildlife Service wetlands maps for twenty-one counties in Minnesota and found 
that the Soil Conservation Service identifi ed only fi fty-seven percent of the area that the 
Fish and Wildlife Service identifi ed as wetlands. Although offi cials in the two agencies 
refused to comment on the disparity, environmentalists charged that some 2,678 acres 
of wetland were “missing” from Soil Conservation Service maps in the twenty-one 
counties. Extrapolating from those counties to the rest of the state, environmentalists 
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observed that “approximately 875,000 acres of Minnesota wetlands could have been 
drained with Soil Conservation Service consent.”54
Swampbuster revealed how diffi cult it was to protect wetlands when responsibility for 
wetlands protection was divided between multiple federal agencies. As Corps’ offi cials 
continually reminded the public, Section 404 was extremely broad in its reference 
to “the nation’s waters,” but it was narrow in its concern only with dredged and fi ll 
material. While the Corps had shown some success in defi ning what a wetland is, it 
was not responsible for mapping or inventorying wetlands or monitoring losses, and 
most experts agreed that the total extent of wetlands continued to shrink despite federal 
policy to promote “no net loss.”
Defi ning the Section 404(f) Farming Exemption
As noted above, the Clean Water Act amendments of 1977 included a handful of 
exemptions, the most signifi cant one being for normal farming activity. The exemptions 
were part of a larger compromise to recognize property rights in the national Section 
404 program. When farmers faced the dual effects of Swampbuster and more restricted 
use of NWP 26, they countered by claiming exemption under Section 404(f) of the Clean 
Water Act. Like the Soil Conservation Service, the Corps did not want to engender 
widespread resistance to wetlands protection from the farm community, so it worked 
with farm groups to reach an understanding.
Agricultural drainage ditches once again forced the issue. In 1984 – an unusually wet 
year in Minnesota – a number of counties began taking steps to repair old drainage 
ditches. Since many of these ditches had been abandoned for several decades, it was 
questionable whether the ditch repairs should be defi ned as maintenance or new 
construction. The Corps initially chose to take all ditch repairs at their face value as 
maintenance, but environmental groups protested. After environmental groups sued 
the Corps in District Court in Washington, D.C., the Corps changed its position. The 
Corps published regulations on November 22, 1985, requiring permits for all drainage 
projects that would expand the original size of the ditch.55
One of the fi rst counties to respond to this change of policy was Stearns County, 
in central Minnesota, where several ditch improvement projects were underway. 
The county duly applied for Section 404 permits for each project, and then placed a 
moratorium on the work pending the Corps’ response. In the meantime, the Stearns 
County commissioners passed a resolution calling on the Association of Minnesota 
Counties and the U.S. Congress to prevail on the Corps to revise its policy to accord 
with the defi nition of ditch repairs used by the Minnesota DNR. According to the 
Minnesota DNR, all ditch repairs constituted maintenance. One such project in 
Becker County in northwest Minnesota called for restoring a ditch to its condition 
in 1920. The project was classifi ed as “repair” in the hope that the Corps would 
not require a permit. County commissioners recognized that defi ning the project 
as a “repair” was something of a charade, because in practical terms it did not 
make sense to restore ditches to their original shape. “Nobody wants to do that,” 
conceded Don Ogaard, president of the Wild Rice Watershed District, “because 
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that’s the reason they eroded in the fi rst place. They want to change the design and 
backslope and properly slope the sides.”56
During the next year, the St. Paul District denied numerous applications for ditch 
repairs on the grounds that they would drain surrounding wetlands. In particular, the 
Corps noted that most “repair” projects included construction of new lateral ditches 
and placement of new tile drain systems, not to mention enlargement of the original 
ditch.57 But with hundreds of thousands of dollars already invested in planning, county 
governments were stung by these permit denials. Moreover, farmers with standing 
water on their fi elds could not obtain relief. Resentment toward federal regulators 
grew.58 One newspaper headline announced with obvious irony: “Flooded county 
ditches create ‘wetlands’ in federal view.”59
In January 1987, the St. Paul District hosted a meeting of federal and state regulators to 
discuss differences of interpretation over ditch repairs. Ben Wopat headed the team of 
Corps’ staff, Doug Ehorn represented the Environmental Protection Agency and others 
attended from the Soil Conservation Service, the Minnesota DNR and the Minnesota   
Pollution Control Agency. Wopat explained that the Corps’ current interpretation of 
the exemption was that the project qualifi ed as “maintenance” if it returned the ditch 
to its original size and confi guration. There was a presumption that this would not 
bring a drained wetland into a new use but would restore earlier agricultural land use. 
Ehorn stated that the Environmental Protection Agency wondered whether “legitimate 
farming” had ever been done on lands that had long since returned to wetlands. They 
were also skeptical of ditches that dated back to the 1910s and 1920s that had never seen 
any maintenance. The meeting pointed to the need for interagency agreement on what 
constituted ditch maintenance.60
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At Wopat’s initiative, District Engineer Colonel Joseph Briggs detailed Wopat to work 
with Doug Ehorn of the Environmental Protection Agency’s Region 5 offi ce in Chicago. 
Their task was to develop an enforceable standard that would measure whether an area 
had been subjected to regular if not continuous farming use. Only then would their 
agencies certify that a project would not convert an area of wetland to a new use. The 
result of their deliberations was a joint policy for the St. Paul District known as the “51-
51 policy.” Colonel Briggs announced the policy on November 23, 1987.61
The policy called for a dual test that measured both the extent and duration of past 
farming in a given area. To qualify for the Section 404(f) exemption, it was necessary to 
show that 51 percent of the wetlands physically connected to a drainage ditch had been 
subject to the plowing, seeding and cultivating agricultural cycle for fi fty-one percent of 
the time for which credible agricultural records existed and were available. In addition 
to the “51-51 test,” the policy affi rmed the Corps’ requirement that the ditch must be 
returned to its original condition. It was the applicant’s responsibility to document the 
original size and confi guration of the ditch by providing such evidence as engineering 
plans, soil borings and contractor records. The record of past agricultural usage would 
be documented through aerial photos, crop histories, agricultural subsidy records and 
personal statements.62
As the 51-51 policy was implemented, the St. Paul District found the historical 
assessment to be a labor-intensive exercise, yet the results were illuminating. “We’d 
draw out the drainage basin, and take a look at the aerial maps – usually they went 
back to about 1936, ‘37, and we’d bring them up to the present,” Wopat recalled. “And 
we’d look at the span of fi fty or sixty years and we would look at how much wetland 
there was adjacent to that ditch and how much of it actually was refl ected as being 
cropped during those years.”63 In most cases, the project did not meet the 51-51 test. 
Indeed, during the next eighteen months, the St. Paul District evaluated twenty ditch 
maintenance permit applications, of which it granted three and denied seventeen.64
The 51-51 policy caused further dismay in the farm community and contributed to a 
sudden fl ap over another proposed rule change by the St. Paul District in the winter 
of 1988-1989. The controversial proposal pertained specifi cally to the prairie pothole 
region. It designated fi fty-one counties in western Minnesota – covering the prairie 
pothole region – as exempt from NWP 26. This nationwide permit applied to dredge 
and fi ll actions that would impact wetlands in headwaters or isolated waters. NWP 
26 required a predischarge notifi cation and evaluation process for proposed actions 
that would impact from one to ten acres. The purpose of the rule change, the Corps 
belatedly tried to explain to farmers, was simply to bypass the predischarge notifi cation 
and move applicants straight into the individual permit review process because 
experience had shown that most proposed actions in the fi fty-one western Minnesota 
counties did not meet the regional conditions attached to NWP 26 anyway. “The intent 
was to streamline the administrative burden posed by the predischarge notifi cation 
process,” one offi cial in the Corps later insisted. These subtleties were lost on the 
region’s farmers, however, who saw the suspension of NWP 26 as a ploy to tighten 
restrictions on use of lands bordering prairie potholes.65
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The reaction from the farm community surprised Corps’ offi cials. “Many of the 
comments received in response to the public notice for the proposed exercise of 
discretionary authority over the prairie pothole region refl ected widespread confusion 
and misunderstanding of the Corps’ regulatory program, especially as it applied to 
agricultural drainage projects,” one offi cial noted. “In addition, the public was virtually 
unaware of the regional conditions that apply to the nationwide permit for discharges 
of dredged or fi ll material into waters located above the headwaters of a stream or into 
isolated waters.” The regional conditions had been introduced several years earlier 
to comply with environmental standards developed by state agencies. In an effort to 
increase public understanding of Section 404 requirements, the Corps held fi ve public 
meetings in the prairie pothole region of Minnesota in February 1989. District Engineer 
Colonel Roger Baldwin also withdrew the proposed rulemaking that same month.66
Prairie Pothole Region:  Map of 51 counties in western and southern Minnesota 
that the Corps ruled ineligible for Nationwide Permit 26 because of sensitive 
prairie pothole wetlands. (Map courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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The controversies surrounding agricultural drainage ditches and NWP 26 prompted 
a congressional hearing in St. Cloud, Minnesota, in April 1989. In preparation for 
the hearing, Wopat prepared testimony for Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of the Army (Civil Works) John S. Doyle, Jr. The Corps hoped to get clarifi cation 
from Congress on the Section 404(f) exemption for farming activity. Congressman 
Arlan Stangeland (R-Minnesota), whose district included St. Cloud in Stearns 
County, conducted the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the congressional 
subcommittee went by helicopter to inspect Stearns County Ditch 29, a project the 
Corps determined could not be permitted. The congressional hearing in St. Cloud 
raised interest in the murky problems surrounding the Section 404(f) exemption for 
farming use, but Corps’ offi cials were disappointed that it did not result in amendatory 
legislation.67 Later, Stearns County went forward with Ditch 29, challenging the Corps’ 
Section 404 authority. The Corps sued Stearns County, hoping a court ruling would 
provide judicial guidance on whether ditch maintenance came under the Section 404(f) 
exemption. However, the Department of Justice settled the case out of court, so this, too, 
did not provide the desired clarifi cation.68
Having failed to obtain clarifi cation of the farming exemption from Congress or the 
courts, the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency found they had no choice 
but to adopt a more accommodating position on the issue. The two agencies issued a 
joint memorandum on May 4, 1990. Signed by Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 
Works Robert W. Page and Environmental Protection Agency Assistant Administrator 
Walter LaJuana S. Wilcher, the statement read: “The exemptions ... recognize that 
American agriculture fulfi lls the vitally important public need for supplying abundant 
and affordable food and fi ber, and it is our intent to assure that the exemptions are 
appropriately implemented.” The memorandum launched a broad effort on the part 
of the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency to rebuild trust with the farm 
community on issues involving wetlands.69 In September 1990, Major General Patrick 
J. Kelly, Director of Civil Works, issued a guidance letter to all Corps’ districts aimed 
at further placating farmers. Kelly’s statement held that “prior converted croplands” 
would not require Section 404 permits. In general, this applied to wetland that had 
been manipulated for agricultural production before December 23, 1985 – prior to 
Swampbuster. “This guidance,” the statement continued, “will allow the Corps to 
focus its limited regulatory resources on the nation’s truly important and signifi cant 
aquatic resources.”70
Cranberry Farms and Mitigation Banks
Cranberry farmers in Wisconsin raised another issue connected with wetland 
conversion. The Corps supported a conservation approach called “mitigation banking.” 
A mitigation bank was any private land area where wetlands were saved, restored 
or created and “sold” as credits to balance the loss of equivalent wetlands acreages 
elsewhere. When the cranberry industry began to expand sharply in Wisconsin in the 
1980s, the Corps took a permissive view of wetland conversion to cranberry farms. The 
reason for the Corps’ leniency was that cranberry farms arguably enhanced the value 
of existing wetlands, much like mitigation banks. The controversy over cranberry farms 
paralleled a wider debate over mitigation banks.
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Cranberry farmers situated their cranberry beds in acidic, sandy soils. During the 
growing season, cranberry farmers tried to keep the water table between nine and 
twelve inches below the surface elevation of the beds. Construction of reservoirs was 
typically integral to the operation, as large quantities of water had to be delivered to 
the beds to keep them saturated. The reservoirs created a more stable hydrology. “In 
many cases,” Tom Lochner, executive director of the Wisconsin Cranberry Growers 
Association remarked, “we end up with a higher quality wetlands system that 
attracts a tremendous diversity of wildlife.”71
Corps’ offi cials supported the industry position. “The cranberry growers are 
obviously attuned to a number of environmental concerns,” District Engineer 
Colonel Roger Baldwin stated during a tour of cranberry fi elds by members of 
Congress in 1989. Their growing practices, Baldwin said, demonstrated “tremendous 
environmental awareness.” Cranberry growers needed vast amounts of water in 
the surrounding area in order to maintain a high water table. For every acre that 
they put into cranberry beds, growers set aside about thirteen acres of woodland, 
fi elds and wetlands for the purpose of recharging groundwater and controlling 
storm water runoff. These surrounding lands also provided habitat for wildlife and 
plants.72
Environmentalists were not so sanguine. They noted cranberry operations involved 
stripping and leveling the land put into cultivation. Moreover, use of pesticides 
and fertilizers on cranberry beds impacted water quality in surrounding areas. 
Environmentalists wanted cranberry growers to expand into uplands, not wetlands – 
an alternative that growers claimed to be prohibitively expensive.73
In the early 1990s, the St. Paul District took steps to counter environmentalists’ 
concerns about the Wisconsin cranberry industry. First, it developed a general permit 
for expansion of existing cranberry operations where the total acreage of disturbance 
would not exceed ten acres of wetlands. The permit included construction of new 
cranberry beds adjacent to existing beds, as well as construction or extension of 
dikes for reservoir expansion. The ten-acre limit would be measured over a fi ve-
year period. The Corps noted that with approximately a hundred and fi fty cranberry 
farms in existence, the loss of wetlands over a fi ve-year period would be no greater 
than 1,500 acres – far less than what critics of the cranberry industry supposed. 
Moreover, mitigation measures (such as mitigation banking) would offset the losses. 
The Corps wanted the general permit so that growers would not have to obtain 
individual permits and the Corps would be able to divert resources away from 
these controversial actions to permitting actions that were, in the Corps’ view, more 
important.74
At the same time, the St. Paul District conducted a comprehensive study of cranberry 
operations in Wisconsin authorized under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. The 
point of the study was to rebut a Wisconsin DNR study, which found that cranberry 
operations were responsible for more than half of wetland losses in the state 
between 1981 and 1989. Whereas the state’s study indicated a loss of 9,247 acres, 
the Corps’ study showed a loss of 2,737 acres. Whereas the state’s study considered 
cranberry beds as a loss, the Corps classifi ed cranberry beds as modifi ed wetlands 
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with diminished function and values. In Ben Wopat’s view, the state’s study was 
motivated by the DNR’s desire to obtain regulatory control of the industry, which 
it could only accomplish by the repeal of a troublesome state statute of 1867. That 
statute exempted cranberry growers from permit requirements for damming, 
ditching and other activities that were normally regulated under Wisconsin laws. 
The Corps, for its part, sought to justify its approach to Section 404 permitting, with 
its emphasis on mitigation over prevention. The Corps’ study began with a more 
inclusive defi nition of wetlands, and it took a much different view of the mitigation 
process and results.75
The Corps was strengthened in its position by the course of debate over mitigation 
banks. When the concept was fi rst developed in the 1980s, critics argued that natural 
and man-made wetlands did not necessarily contain equivalent biological richness; 
therefore, acre-for-acre compensation did not protect environmental quality. Michael 
Bowen, a doctoral student in ecology and Corps’ scientist himself, argued that 
mitigation banking was no panacea for wetlands protection when it merely reduced 
wetlands to equivalent acres. Even when the equivalent acres of wetland habitat 
were located nearby the project site, there was no certainty that animal populations 
would move from one place to the other, or that the newly created wetland would 
be occupied by wetland species. “All we will build,” Bowen wrote, “are large, wet, 
‘dead’ areas containing fewer species than the original ‘protected’ wetland.”76
The Minnesota and Wisconsin DNRs also doubted the effi cacy of mitigation banking 
in the 1980s. Without state support, the St. Paul District could make little use of 
mitigation banking, as mitigation credits were not at the disposal of developers 
in these two states. Unfortunately, the alternative – requiring the developer or 
landowner to mitigate wetland impacts on the site where the development activity 
was to occur – was generally more costly and less effective. As the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Robert H. Wayland III testifi ed before a congressional 
subcommittee, mitigation banks were “an innovative, market-based way for 
landowners to effectively and effi ciently compensate for unavoidable wetland 
impacts ... Through mitigation banking, the responsibility for providing mitigation 
is transferred to an entity that has the fi nancial resources, scientifi c expertise, and 
incentives necessary to ensure that the mitigation will be ecologically successful.”77
In the 1990s, improved techniques in wetland development led to greater support 
for mitigation banking. Minnesota and Wisconsin both sanctioned the approach. The 
Clinton Administration made efforts to increase scientifi c and technical knowledge 
that would enhance mitigation capabilities. The new administration’s announced 
policy on wetlands, “Protecting America’s Wetlands,” released in August 1993, 
contained a strong endorsement of the approach: “Mitigation banking provides for 
the restoration or creation of wetland functions in advance of development impacts 
reducing thereby the uncertainty of mitigation success. As such, mitigation banking 
may expedite the permit review process for projects that qualify. By consolidating 
compensation requirements, there may be ecological advantages accrued, as well as 
economies of scale relating to planning, monitoring, and management.”78
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In November 1995, the Corps and other federal agencies provided guidance to 
promote the establishment and use of mitigation banks under Section 404. The new 
mitigation banking policy provided for proper location and design of mitigation 
banks. It required that bank sponsors meet certain standards of fi nancial security 
and long-term commitment to monitoring and management of the wetlands. By 
1997, some two hundred mitigation banks had been approved or were under 
development nationwide.79
Statewide General Permits
As noted above, one important and long-standing goal of the Corps’ Section 404 
program was to assist the states in assuming greater responsibility for wetlands 
protection. Coordination of Section 404 regulations with state programs was important 
for two reasons: fi rst, to facilitate state control; and second, to avoid duplication of effort 
by the government that resulted in overly burdensome requirements for the public. The 
Corps was under constant pressure by Congress to streamline its Section 404 permitting 
process, and coordination with state programs was one area in which the Corps 
could signifi cantly improve effi ciency without sacrifi cing the Section 404 program’s 
effectiveness. Since Minnesota and Wisconsin both had relatively strong environmental 
laws, the St. Paul District was often a leader among Corps’ districts in coordinating the 
Corps’ regulatory program with state programs.
In 1991, the Minnesota Legislature passed the Wetland Conservation Act, one of the 
most comprehensive wetland laws in the nation. The law expressed a goal of no-net-
loss of wetlands and described a “sequencing” process similar to the Corps’ Section 404 
program for mitigating impacts. According to the law, anyone proposing to drain or fi ll 
a wetland was required fi rst to try avoiding the wetland; second, to try to minimize the 
impact; and, as a fi nal resort, to replace any lost wetland acres, functions, and values. 
The law was to take effect in stages, becoming fully operational in 1994.80
In 1995, the St. Paul District issued a new programmatic general permit, GP-17, on a 
trial basis. This permit covered certain activities regulated and approved under the 
Minnesota law. The state law exempted some activities and types of wetland covered 
by Section 404, so the programmatic general permit was not a “perfect overlay,” but it 
avoided duplication in most cases. This permit was later incorporated into the Corps’ 
existing programmatic general permit for Minnesota, GP-01-MN.81
The St. Paul District made refi nements to a similar programmatic general permit for 
Wisconsin. Although Wisconsin had no state law comparable to Minnesota’s Wetland 
Conservation Act, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources vigorously exercised 
its role in the Section 404 process through the state’s Section 401 certifi cation authority. 
Consequently, the public was urged to apply for the programmatic general permit in 
Wisconsin, GP-01-WI, through a joint application form addressed to both the Corps and 
the Wisconsin DNR. As in Minnesota, applicants were advised to submit the application 
to the DNR, which then forwarded the application, along with its recommendation, to 
the Corps.82
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In 2000, the St. Paul District issued three packages of general permits for Minnesota, 
Wisconsin and Indian reservations. Each package covered a variety of actions 
previously addressed by the Corps’ nationwide permits. A signifi cant innovation in 
these permits was that each permit had to be accompanied by a “letter of permission” 
from the appropriate local governing authority. Governing authorities varied and might 
involve city or county governments, watershed management organizations, soil and 
water conservation districts, townships or Indian tribal governments. As such, the new 
permits were designated GP/LOP-MN (for Minnesota), GP/LOP-WI (for Wisconsin) 
and GP/LOP-IR (for Indian reservations).
The St. Paul District developed an extensive training program to implement the GP/
LOP process. The district provided training to tribal environmental staff, as well 
as various other local government bodies. The Minnesota Wetland Conservation 
Act empowered more than four hundred local government units to implement the 
permitting system, few of which commanded any expertise in wetland protection. Most 
of the people assigned to administer the state program at the local level, Ben Wopat 
remarked, “could see standing water and cattails and not call it a wetland.” The Corps’ 
training sessions were normally one week in length and included classroom training as 
well as fi eld training.83
With the implementation of the GP/LOPs, the St. Paul District no longer dealt 
with nationwide permits, including the controversial NWP 26. By the late 1990s, 
the nationwide permits engendered so much scrutiny and protest by state natural 
resource offi cials and environmental groups in Minnesota and Wisconsin that they 
had become more hindrance than help. By abandoning use of the nationwide permits, 
the St. Paul District tailored its program more closely to the strong state wetland 
protection programs fi nally in place in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Still, both states 
stopped short of assuming control of the Section 404 program itself (as provided for 
under the Clean Water Act amendments of 1977), preferring to have the continued 
partnership with the Corps.84
The Crandon Mine Controversy
No environmental controversy tested the St. Paul District’s ability to exercise its 
regulatory function more publicly than the complicated proposal to develop the 
Crandon Mine. Located a few miles south of the town of Crandon in Forest County, 
northern Wisconsin, the proposed mine would have accessed a rich deposit of zinc 
and copper ore that was claimed to be one of the ten largest ore bodies of its type in 
North America. Discovered in 1976, the ore body stirred enormous economic interest 
and political opposition. Because any major mining operation would have involved 
the discharge of fi ll material into jurisdictional wetlands, the Corps was involved 
through the Section 404 process. The controversy over the potential development of 
the Crandon Mine involved the Corps with the ore body owners, the Wisconsin DNR 
and three separate Wisconsin Indian tribes. Other parties in the controversy included 
the governor, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
and local and national environmental groups. At the center of the controversy were the 
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evolving plans and environmental impact statements concerning how the mine would 
be developed. “Crandon Mine is the granddaddy of all EISs,” Ben Wopat remarked. 
“It’s a world-class EIS.”85
Exxon Coal and Minerals Company began mineral exploration in northern Wisconsin 
in 1969 and announced its discovery of the deposit south of Crandon in 1976. Exxon 
applied to the Wisconsin DNR and the Corps for the necessary permits to develop a 
mine in 1982, proposing a $540 million project that would involve daily production of 
about ten thousand tons of zinc and copper ore. While the DNR and the Corps reviewed 
the proposal, metal prices fell and Exxon withdrew its applications in 1986. Seven 
years later, Exxon formed a partnership with a Toronto-based company and created a 
subsidiary, Crandon Mining Company. The following year, in 1994, the new company 
again applied for permits to open the Crandon Mine, proposing to extract 55 million 
tons of ore at a rate of 5,500 tons per day. Although the scale of operations was reduced 
in the new proposal, environmental regulations had become more restrictive. No fewer 
than twenty permits were involved, including a Section 404 permit for discharge of fi ll 
material in wetlands.86
A further modifi cation of the Crandon Mining Company proposal in 1995 involved the 
Corps in another key issue. The proposed project was located in an area of extensive 
wetlands – the headwaters, in fact, of four separate watercourses: the Wolf, Brule, 
Peshtigo and Pine rivers. The waters of Forest County include some fi ve hundred miles 
of trout streams and a hundred and ninety named lakes. Mining engineers determined 
the mine operation would require discharge of an average of 42 thousand gallons an 
hour of treated wastewater, much of it from groundwater seepage into the mine. In the 
modifi ed proposal, the wastewater would fl ow through a thirty-eight-mile pipeline, 
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entering the Wisconsin River south of the town of Rhinelander in Oneida County. 
Previously, the proposal was to discharge the wastewater into the Wolf River. Since 
the surface waters in Forest County drain into Lake Michigan, while the Wisconsin 
River fl ows into the Mississippi River, the question arose whether this plan would have 
involved a diversion of water out of the Great Lakes Basin.87
The proposed decision had legal and political signifi cance because the Water Resources 
Development Act of 1986 prohibited any new diversion of Great Lakes water for use 
outside the Great Lakes Basin without approval by the governor of each of the Great 
Lakes states. The Wisconsin DNR held that the law only applied to surface waters 
and did not apply in the case of the Crandon Mine. Michigan’s Governor John Engler 
disagreed. In a letter to Wisconsin’s Governor Tommy Thompson in February 1998, 
Governor Engler argued that a draw down of the groundwater in Forest County could 
effectively tap Great Lakes water; therefore, a transfer of water from Forest County to 
the Wisconsin River was unacceptable to the state of Michigan.88
The issue was resolved when Exxon sold its interest in the mining venture to an 
Australian-based company, and the new subsidiary, Nicolet Minerals, once again 
modifi ed the proposal. In its revised proposal, Nicolet Minerals altered the milling 
process to remove purite from the tailings to be deposited on the surface and thereby 
reduce acid drainage. It also included a plan for the additional treatment of wastewater 
on site, discharging it into infi ltration fi elds from which it would seep back into the 
groundwater. Nicolet Minerals revised the proposal in response both to the Michigan 
governor’s challenge and to a new mining law passed by the state of Wisconsin. The 
Wisconsin state law, tagged the mining moratorium law, introduced stricter standards 
to protect the environment from acid mine drainage during the life of the mine and 
after its closure.89 The changes adopted by Nicolet Minerals ostensibly eliminated the 
need for pumping wastewater to the Wisconsin River.90
Each modifi cation of the mining proposal forced the Corps and the Wisconsin 
DNR to begin practically anew on environmental impact studies. Documentation 
submitted by the succession of mining concerns grew upwards of seventy 
thousand pages. The Corps was under strong pressure to fi nd effi ciencies in this 
lengthy and expensive process, such as combining efforts with the Wisconsin 
DNR, but it also faced demands from Indian tribes to give consideration to federal 
trust responsibilities that were outside the DNR’s scope. Legal counsel for the 
tribes argued that the Corps, representing the federal government, had fi duciary 
responsibilities to protect Indian trust resources both on and off the Indian 
reservations near the mine site. Moreover, legal counsel for the tribes contended 
that the Corps was not fulfi lling the Clinton Administration’s stated policy of 
implementing government-to-government relations with tribes. In response to 
these charges, the St. Paul District developed an issue paper about the Corps’ 
trust responsibilities toward Indian tribes in the regulatory permitting process. 
In 1999, the tribes responded with their own issue paper, insisting that the Corps’ 
commitment did not go far enough.91 The St. Paul District determined that the trust 
relationship between the federal government and the tribes required it prepare an 
independent EIS – although it would continue to share data with the DNRs and 
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other federal agencies. To assist in developing the EIS, the Corps contracted with an 
environmental engineering fi rm, Montgomery Watson Harza.92
As the mining proposal crept toward seeming fi nality, the Mole Lake Band moved to 
center stage among mine opponents. It established stringent water quality standards 
on the reservation two miles downstream from the mine site, requiring that the water 
entering the reservation be as pristine as though there were no mine. The Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources sued, contending the Environmental Protection 
Agency exceeded its authority in approving the water quality standards of the tribe. 
The court ruled in favor of the Environmental Protection Agency and the tribe. The 
DNR appealed the decision, and the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals again found 
in favor of the Environmental Protection Agency and the tribe. The DNR took the case 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the lower court’s decision in June 2002. In 
response to the high court’s ruling, Nicolet Minerals president Dale Alberts stated that 
the company could comply with the tribe’s “nondegradation standard.”93 Later that 
summer, a delegation of the Mole Lake Band traveled to Johannesburg, South Africa, 
to talk with members of the board of Nicolet Minerals’ parent corporation in an effort 
to get the company to sell the property to the state.94 With the company claiming it 
would have all necessary permits in hand by the fi rst quarter of 2004, negotiations got 
underway to purchase the mine property and fi nally lay the controversy to rest. A 
coalition of environmental organizations and local and tribal governments advanced 
a proposal for state acquisition of the property. The proposal would turn the site 
into a “conservation area dedicated to sustainable land management practices, tribal 
cultural values, and tourism suitable to this environmentally sensitive area.”95 When 
this initiative fi zzled, the Forest County Potawatomi and Mole Lake Band negotiated 
their own buyout of the mining interests. On October 28, 2003, the two Indian tribes 
purchased the property for $16.5 million. The tribes withdrew all permit requests, 
ending more than two decades of controversy.96
Conclusion
Since 1975, the heart of the St. Paul District’s regulatory mission has been the protection 
of wetlands. This resource is exceptionally signifi cant in the St. Paul District – owing 
both to its extensiveness and its vulnerability to agriculture. The district pioneered a 
major innovation in the Section 404 program when it revised regulatory boundaries 
to conform to state lines and focused on cooperation with state wetlands protection 
programs in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Through astute political decision-making, the 
district obtained the respect and cooperation of urban dwellers, as well as farmers, 
environmentalists and developers. However, as the Crandon Mine controversy 
demonstrated, it continued to face challenges in preventing the degradation of this 
vulnerable resource.
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Grand Portage proposed small boat harbor:  The Grand 
Portage project was cancelled when research indicated 
that the entire bay might qualify as a Traditional Cultural 
Property of the Grand Portage Band. (Illustration courtesy of 
St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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For most of its history, the Corps of Engineers has provided fl ood 
protection and facilitated navigation. Along with these and other 
important functions, the organization, in company with the rest of the 
federal government, initiated cultural resource management programs 
in the late twentieth century. Although still embryonic in the mid-1970s, 
this duty had matured by the twenty-fi rst century and had become 
vital to the Corps’ public interaction even though it was not one of the Corps’ defi ned 
missions. Mandated by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the cultural 
resource management function included assessing the effects of Corps’ undertakings 
on historic properties and interacting with Native American tribes to preserve their 
resources. Along with its cultural resource management responsibilities, the St. Paul 
District also implemented an active program to discover, protect and explain the Corps’ 
own history. Although the historical program is not considered part of the Corps’ 
cultural resource management responsibilities, both functions served a major role in 
“educat[ing] the public about Corps’ history and its mission.”1
Cultural Resources
The Bureau of Reclamation has defi ned cultural resources as “the physical remains of 
a people’s way of life that archaeologists and historians study to try to interpret how 
people lived.”2 The St. Paul District’s cultural resource management section, which 
included the position of district historian, described the term more expansively, stating 
that cultural resources consisted of “everything from prehistoric archeological sites 
to historic buildings, from historic engineering structures to historic documents and 
oral records of past events.”3 Because of the insight these materials provided to the 
past, they facilitated a comprehension of other cultures, as well as an understanding, 
of architecture and engineering.4 By preserving both prehistoric and historic cultural 
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resources and by providing means of interpreting them for the public, the St. Paul 
District’s archeologists and historians made the past come alive.
In the early 1900s, individuals in the United States became aware of the need to 
protect the unique cultural resources that the nation had. Accordingly, the 1906 
Antiquities Act and the 1935 Historic Sites Act provided a measure of protection for 
historic and prehistoric resources. The St. Paul District initially worked to excavate 
archeological resources by cooperating with the 
National Park Service under the Inter-Agency 
Archaeological Salvage Program. By the 1960s, 
the recreation section in the Planning Branch 
coordinated these activities, which were almost 
always subcontracted to private organizations.5 
In 1966, the passage of the National Historic 
Preservation Act ushered in a new era of 
preservation by making the federal government 
an active participant. The law created three major 
elements to help government agencies implement 
preservation practices. First, it established the 
National Register of Historic Places to list all 
“districts, sites, buildings, structures and objects 
signifi cant in American history, architecture, 
archaeology, engineering and culture.” Second, 
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation 
Act required  the heads of any federal or federally 
assisted project to “take into account” the effects 
of undertakings “on any district, site, building, 
structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.” 
Third, it created the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and authorized it and 
State Historic Preservation Offi ces to oversee the Section 106 process and the National 
Register in a federal-state partnership.6 These provisions meant that whenever the 
Corps began an undertaking, it had to investigate what prehistoric or historic resources 
would be affected, and then consult with State Historic Preservation Offi ces, or SHPOs, 
and the Advisory Council on how to avoid or mitigate the consequences.
Preserving Cultural Resources
In order to comply with the National Historic Preservation Act, Corps’ districts began 
hiring archeologists to conduct the necessary research. In 1970, Tulsa District became 
one of the fi rst districts with a full-time archeologist; and in the mid-1970s, the St. Paul 
District followed Tulsa’s lead by hiring Dan Bowman as its fi rst full-time, permanent 
archeologist.7 Bowman only stayed a couple of years; and in 1978, the district hired 
David Berwick as archeologist. Berwick, together with John O. Anfi nson, a historian fi rst 
employed by the district in 1980, became the backbone of St. Paul’s cultural resource 
management program, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Resources 
Branch. As Robert F. Post, chief of the branch from 1974 to 1982 related, Berwick and 
Upper and Lower Locks at St. 
Anthony Falls, Minneapolis:  The 
falls were the highest point of 
navigation on the Mississippi 
River when the Corps of 
Engineers opened an offi ce in St. 
Paul in 1866. (Photo courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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Anfi nson “were largely responsible for establishing the outstanding foundation of the 
CRM [cultural resource management] program the district has today.”8 
From the beginning, the main responsibility of 
the cultural resource management unit was the 
coordination of the Section 106 process with 
civil works projects. To streamline Section 106 
implementation, the Advisory Council developed 
regulations explaining what agencies had to do to 
comply with the law. Under these regulations (36 CFR 
Part 800), the council mandated that when a federal 
undertaking occurred, the responsible agency had to 
consult with the SHPO to determine what properties 
listed in or eligible for the National Register would 
be affected. The agency also had to confer with 
public and private organizations, local governments, 
Native Americans and others who might know 
about potential resources and would have to conduct 
literature searches and fi eld surveys as well. Once 
the resources had been identifi ed, the agency and the 
SHPO determined the undertaking’s effects. If the two 
agreed there were no adverse effects, the project could 
continue. If adverse effects existed, the two had to 
develop ways to avoid or mitigate them and then sign a memorandum of agreement or 
a programmatic agreement, depending on the complexity of the project, outlining these 
methods. In cases of dispute between the agency and the SHPO, the council mediated.9 
In order to fund these necessary functions, Congress passed the Archeological and 
Historic Preservation Act in May 1974 (also known as the Moss-Bennett Act), permitting 
federal agencies to spend up to one percent of project funding to recover historic and 
archeological resources. Robert M. Vogel, the head of the Smithsonian Institution’s 
Science and Technology Department, believed this law allowed the Corps to expand its 
cultural resource management efforts, transforming its historic preservation reputation 
from one “so rotten it had no way to go but up” to one “ever so much better.”10 
With Moss-Bennett funds in place, Corps’ cultural resource management units 
followed the Section 106 regulations. According to Berwick, the St. Paul District used 
several factors to determine a site’s signifi cance, including the potential for scientifi c 
information and “engineering features, architectural styles, or an association with 
an important event, era, or person.” If the Corps and the SHPO determined that 
resources were eligible for the National Register and that the project would adversely 
affect them, the cultural resource management staff took efforts to diminish the 
effects. With archeological sites, such mitigation usually took the form of excavation. 
Fortunately, Berwick explained, “The St. Paul District does not do a lot of excavation 
work, because we have a good track record in avoiding as many sites as possible.”11 
Such avoidance was not easy, however, especially since humans naturally tend to 
live near water, meaning that some areas under the district’s jurisdiction had had 
human habitation for at least twelve thousand years.12 At Lake Ashtabula, a reservoir 
Brad Johnson, 
archaeologist, displays a 
prehistoric pottery shard 
from a site at Sandy Lake 
Recreation Area. (Photo by 
Mark Davidson, courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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created by the Corps’ construction of Baldhill Dam a few miles north of Valley City, 
North Dakota, surveys recorded thirty-seven prehistoric and historic archeological 
sites ranging from burial mounds and bison processing areas to homestead dugouts.13 
Likewise, investigations in the 1990s at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand 
Forks, Minnesota, located nine historic or prehistoric archeological sites in the Red 
River Valley.14
When large acreage surveys or site excavations were necessary, the cultural resources 
management staff hired archeological contractors to perform the work. Prior to the 
passage of a federal regulation in 1990 entitled “Curation of Federally Owned and 
Administered Archeological Collections” (36 CFR Part 79), these contractors would 
often curate the artifacts recovered from the fi eldwork. In 1994, the Corps designated 
the St. Louis District as the Mandatory Center of Expertise for the Curation and 
Management of Archaeological Collections to help districts establish formal curation 
agreements with state historical societies and universities whose storage facilities met 
the requirements of regulations. However, the curation center mainly concentrated 
on complying with the Native American Graves and Repatriation Act (see below) 
and provided little help or funding for curation. This forced the St. Paul District to 
continue to rely on contractor storage of artifacts from pre-1990 fi eldwork.15 This 
method of curation created some problems, including the scattering of collections 
across North Dakota, Minnesota and Wisconsin. In addition, small cultural resources 
management contractors sometimes went out of business before artifacts were curated 
at appropriate facilities, and a backlog of material began to accumulate in boxes outside 
of the district’s cultural resource management cubicles. Because of these problems, 
Virginia Gnabasik, a senior archeologist for the district, considered effective storage and 
curation of archeological collections as one of the crucial funding issues that the Corps 
needed to address.16
If the affected resources were historical rather than 
archeological, such as individual buildings, housing 
districts or other edifi ces, the Corps implemented other 
methods to avoid harm. In 1998, for example, the St. Paul 
District determined that the area of the fl ood control 
project at Grand Forks/East Grand Forks contained more 
than a hundred properties either listed on or eligible 
for the National Register of Historic Places. In order 
to alleviate the effects on these structures, the district 
entered into a programmatic agreement with the Advisory 
Council, the North Dakota SHPO and the Minnesota 
SHPO, stating that the Corps would “to the extent 
feasible, avoid historic properties either through project 
design changes, use of temporary fences or barricades 
during construction, realignments, landscaping, or other 
measures.”17 In accordance with the agreement, the district 
employed innovations, such as mechanically stabilized 
earthwalls and invisible fl ood was, which, in the words of 
Lake Ashtabula and 
Balhill Dam:  The Corps 
excavated thirty-seven 
prehistoric sites prior 
to fi lling the reservoir. 
(Photo courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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technical manager Edward McNally, “save[d] a number of areas that probably would 
have been impacted with our initial alignments.”18
In other cases, the Corps could not preserve the structures. In 1983, the St. Paul District 
confronted fi ve dangerous bridges on the Kickapoo River between Rockton, Wisconsin, 
and La Farge, Wisconsin, on State Highway 131. Two of the bridges were eligible for 
the National Register because they were the only two pre-1936 Warren Through Truss 
bridges left in Wisconsin, but safety issues forced the Corps to take drastic measures. 
Initially, the district tried to close off the bridges through gates and dirt mounds, but 
people used cutting torches to remove the gates and maneuvered around the dirt, 
forcing the district to remove the structures. In order to alleviate the effects of removal, 
the district documented and photographed the structures. In this case, public safety 
took precedence over historical value.19
Because of the numerous historic and archeological resources in the St. Paul District, the 
cultural resource management unit and the Corps implemented additional preservation 
policies. Several operational management plans counseled Corps’ resource managers, 
rangers and project personnel to “be aware of the documented archeological and 
historic/architectural sites around the project” and to report “any suspicious activities 
near or acts of vandalism at recorded sites.” The Archeological Resources Protection Act 
of 1979 levied fi nes of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to one year for illegally 
removing artifacts from federal lands, and the cultural resource management staff 
asked Corps’ personnel to enforce this law at all times. In accordance with the National 
Historic Preservation Act, the Corps also restricted information regarding the location 
and character of signifi cant cultural resources to prevent vandalism and removal.20
Native American Relations
Congress amended the National Historic 
Preservation Act in 1992 to provide more 
fully for the preservation of Native American 
sites and properties. Among the amendments 
were provisions clarifying that properties 
containing religious or cultural signifi cance 
to Indian tribes or Native Hawaiians were 
eligible for the National Register. The 
amendments also granted “consulting party” 
status to tribes in the Section 106 process 
by authorizing them to assume SHPO 
responsibilities if they developed their own 
cultural resource management programs.21 
According to Virginia Gnabasik, these 
amendments increased district interaction with 
tribes, especially after fi ve groups – the Leech 
Lake Band and Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe 
in Minnesota, the Turtle Mountain Band of 
Archaeological site: (Left to 
right) Allen Westover, Corps’ 
archaeologist; Jim Zorn, Great Lakes 
Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission 
attorney; Christine Harrison, principal 
investigator, Archaeological 
Resource Services; Jeff Steere, 
Sandy Lake operations manager; 
and Terry Ladd, Sandy Lake park 
ranger. (Photo courtesy of Brad Johnson, 
St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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Chippewa in North Dakota and the Ho-Chunk and Menominee in Wisconsin – assumed 
the Section 106 functions of the SHPO and appointed tribal historic preservation 
offi cers. In most cases, Section 106 coordination with tribes started with sending a 
formal letter notifying each tribe of possible religious and cultural resources in a 
project area and then consulting with the tribe if it expressed an interest. Although the 
Corps had to contact every affected tribe, regardless of whether or not it had a cultural 
resource management component, tribes with cultural resource management programs, 
Gnabasik explained, were “easier to work with” because they had “a point of contact” 
with a knowledge of the Section 106 process. These developments enabled the St. Paul 
district to develop good working relationships with the tribes.22
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
Another law, passed in 1990, mandated Corps’ interaction with tribes. For many years, 
removing Native American remains and funerary objects from the earth was a common 
practice in the United States, and many of these objects made their way to museums 
and other repositories. In the 1980s, numerous tribes and other organizations lobbied 
Congress to stop this desecration and to return collected remains to their rightful 
owners. In response, Congress passed the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act on November 16, 1990. The act provided that, when Native American 
human remains or funerary objects were found on federal or tribal lands, they be 
returned to the tribe that had the “closest cultural affi liation with such remains or 
objects.” In addition, the law established penalties for violations and required federal 
agencies and museums to inventory their collections and return any remains or objects 
to pertinent tribes.23 This meant the St. Paul District had to examine any human remains 
or funerary items excavated under the Corps’ authority and make the necessary returns. 
Sissel Johannessen, a district archeologist, took charge of this effort, which was 
funded by the center of expertise in St. Louis. According to Johannessen, the district 
followed certain steps in its Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
compliance. First, district staff mapped the boundaries of fee title land for each water 
resource project. Second, they examined all of the cultural resource investigations 
that had taken place on that land, scrutinizing the reports for any artifacts that 
could possibly fi t Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act criteria. 
Third, the staff contacted whatever curation facilities housed the relevant items in 
order to inspect them and also collected additional information about the materials. 
Fourth, archeologists developed arguments about the probable cultural affi liation of 
each artifact (or its lack of one) and sent a letter to each tribe with an interest in the 
area, explaining the fi ndings. From all of these investigations, there were only a few 
instances where materials had to be returned or reburied. For example, the district 
gave the remains of three individuals found in eroding banks at Lake Ashtabula, North 
Dakota, to the North Dakota Intertribal Reinternment Committee in 1992. Likewise, 
items excavated in 1969 from Gull Lake in the Mississippi Headwaters, including the 
skeletal remains of eighteen individuals and associated funerary items, such as ceramic 
vessels, potsherds and stone tools, were returned to Eastern Dakota tribes in 
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1998. By 1999, Johannessen had fi nished inventorying all of the district’s collections, and 
the surrounding tribes seemed satisfi ed with the district’s work.24
Traditional Cultural Properties
Another area that stimulated involvement with American 
Indians evolved in the 1990s from the concern of some 
historians, anthropologists and indigenous groups that 
properties important to a community’s religious beliefs or 
culture were not receiving adequate protection. In 1990, the 
National Park Service published National Register Bulletin 
38, which stated that a cultural resource could be eligible 
for the National Register if it had “traditional cultural 
signifi cance.” According to the bulletin, such resources, 
called Traditional Cultural Properties, or TCPs, consisted 
of any item – whether a building, a structure or a natural 
location – eligible for the National Register “because of 
its association with cultural practices or beliefs of a living 
community that (a) are rooted in that community’s history, 
and (b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural 
identity of the community.”25
Most TCPs the Corps and other federal agencies 
encountered belonged to Native Americans. Because of 
the different world views of Indians and Euro-Americans 
about these objects, tribal TCP claims sometimes led to 
confusion and outright disbelief on the part of the federal 
government. As archeologist David W. Cushman explained, 
“What one group sees as vital to its cultural identity, the 
other often does not even recognize.” When a tribe claimed 
that portions of Lake Superior were important as places of 
religious and cultural awakening, for example, many Euro-
Americans failed to understand the signifi cance. Other 
problems resulted from taboos existing in many tribes to 
discourage the revelation of information about places of 
traditional cultural value, especially to outsiders. These 
taboos sometimes made it diffi cult for cultural resources 
management personnel to obtain the information necessary 
to evaluate a site’s eligibility.26
Such problems confronted district historian John Anfi nson in his dealings with 
TCPs. In 1994, Anfi nson became involved with deliberations on whether or not to 
approve a permit to place a 700-foot-long dock on Grand Portage Bay, located at the 
northeastern tip of Minnesota. The Grand Portage Band of the Chippewa Indians’ 
reservation surrounded the entire bay, and the tribe complained to the Corps that the 
dock and the accompanying boat traffi c would harm the bay, which was important 
Grand Portage 
proposed small boat 
harbor: The Grand 
Portage project was 
cancelled when 
research indicated that 
the entire bay might 
qualify as a Traditional 
Cultural Property of the 
Grand Portage Band. 
(Illustration courtesy of Brad 
Johnson, St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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to the tribe’s religion and culture. According to Anfi nson, “People within the district 
found that a hard argument to accept,” so he investigated the bay’s status as a TCP.27 
Anfi nson interviewed seven residents of Grand Portage, both Indian and non-Indian, to 
explain further Chippewa’ beliefs. These discussions convinced Anfi nson that the bay 
was “the focal point or heart of the Grand Portage Reservation.” Many of the Grand 
Portage Chippewa believed the bay had spirits and that a marina would force the 
spirits to move. “One person noted that a mountain near the bay had been inhabited 
by a thunderbird spirit,” Anfi nson related. “So many people had started going to the 
mountain that the spirit had left. This, they worry, could happen with the spirits of the 
bay.” Others believed the bay was a part of their soul: “to mistreat [it] could make them 
ill individually and as a people.”28 Anfi nson’s research led district offi cials to deny the 
permit; he had effectively indicated that tribal claims about the bay were not “just some 
spurious thing.”29
Another TCP encounter presented different problems. In 1992, a company began 
pulling logs off the bottom of Lake Superior at Chequamegon Bay for salvage. These 
logs had sunk in the 1800s on their way to sawmills during the early logging era of 
the Great Lakes. Because of the lake’s low oxygen content and cold temperatures, the 
submerged logs remained in their original condition, meaning they could be sold for 
as much as $10,000 apiece. By 1997, the St. Paul District received approximately two 
hundred applications for permits to obtain these logs, but the Red Cliff and Bad River 
bands of Chippewa Indians registered their objections, stating that both the lake and 
the logs themselves were sacred. In this instance, Anfi nson was not convinced of the 
tribes’ claims, mainly because many members of both bands were either Catholic or 
Lutheran and did not attribute any special signifi cance to the logs. But Thomas King, 
an archeology and historic preservation consultant to the Advisory Council, claimed 
that the logs were TCPs, a conclusion Anfi nsen believed was “extremely weak.”30 
Ultimately, the Council decided the bay itself was a TCP, but that the sunken wood 
was not, although the individual logs could be part of submerged logging complexes 
eligible for the National Register. The district circulated this determination, stating that 
individuals or companies interested in logging would thereafter have to comply with 
special conditions in order to avoid adverse effects to the bay. According to project 
manager Maria T. Valencia, “This seemed to dissuade potential applicants because no 
further permit requests” were received after that time.31 Anfi nson saw this incident 
as “one of the classic examples of the problems of TCPs in trying to fi gure out what’s 
signifi cant ... in a way that’s fair and true.”32
Appendix C and Section 106 Compliance
TCP designations were not the only issues leading to Corps’ clashes with the 
Advisory Council. In 1990, a confl ict developed between the two over the 
implementation of the Section 106 process as it applies to the Corps’ Regulatory 
Program. Under Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 
as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, the Corps had the responsibility of 
issuing permits for any undertaking on navigable bodies of water in the United 
States. Because the Corps was the permitting entity, any project that required a 
permit became subject to the Section 106 process. Since the Corps was only serving a 
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regulatory function and not performing the actual work, complying with Section 106 
assumed different features for the regulatory branch than it did for civil works.33
These differences led the Corps to develop its own guidelines for Section 106 compliance 
in the permitting process. When the Advisory Council produced 36 CFR Part 800 
regulations implementing Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, it 
provided that agencies could develop “alternate procedures” in place of portions of 
Part 800 if the procedures were consistent with the Council’s regulations. If the Council 
approved the “alternate procedures,” they defi ned the Section 106 process for the 
agency.34 On June 29, 1990, the Corps issued its alternative as Appendix C to 33 CFR Part 
325. According to one summary, Appendix C explained, “The steps the Corps follows 
to fulfi ll the requirements set forth in the National Historic Preservation Act, other 
applicable historic preservation laws, and the Presidential directives as they relate to the 
regulatory program.”35 The Advisory Council did not approve the substitute; regardless, 
the Corps used Appendix C after 1990 to govern its compliance with Section 106.
Few disparities existed between the Advisory Council’s regulations and Appendix C, 
but the discrepancies were signifi cant. The main area of contention revolved around 
the differences between “Permit Area” as defi ned in Appendix C and the “Area of 
Potential Effect” as defi ned in 36 CFR Part 800. The “Permit Area” was the geographic 
area in which the project’s activities were dependent on the work or structures 
authorized by the Corps’ permit, including waters of the United States and upland 
areas.36 The Council’s “Area of Potential Effect,” meanwhile, was the “geographic 
area or areas within which an undertaking may directly or indirectly cause alterations 
in the character or use of historic properties.”37
Central to this problem was the defi nition of undertaking and the SHPO’s perception 
that Corps’ regulatory involvement “federalized” an entire project. The Corps defi ned 
“undertaking” as the authorization of work or structures in the waters of the United 
States and not the larger project. Upland project areas could be included in the Corps’ 
scope of analysis if the project activities in those locations would not occur but for the 
authorization of the work or structures or if those upland activities were an integral 
part or directly related to the work or structures. If these criteria were not met, the 
Corps believed it lacked suffi cient control over the project features to avoid their 
potential effects on historic properties. SHPOs generally saw this interpretation as too 
narrow. Regardless of the situation, both sides adhered to their different positions.38
In some circumstances, confl icts over the “Permit Area” and the Area of Potential 
Effect could only be resolved by litigation, but in the St. Paul District, the differences 
merely led to expressions of discontent. Dennis Gimmestad, the compliance offi cer 
for the Minnesota SHPO, stated that Appendix C was the biggest frustration he had 
with the district, especially when he had to declare the Corps out of compliance with 
Section 106. “It doesn’t mean necessarily I don’t think they’re doing their job,” he 
explained. “It’s just that I can’t concur in good conscience with what I’ve been told 
that I need to follow.” District personnel might believe that Gimmestad was taking 
a hard line, but he was only following the guidelines laid out by the Council “I can’t 
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just throw [the Council’s regulations] out and go by [Appendix C] because I would not 
be doing my job,” he related.39 Scott Anfi nson, John Anfi nson’s brother and a National 
Register archeologist with Minnesota’s SHPO, agreed, but believed that district 
employees were caught in the same bind – if they did not interpret the permit area 
according to Appendix C, they were defi cient in their own positions. “I think a lot of the 
staff over at the Corps in the cultural resources management wing is sympathetic and 
they want to preserve sites,” Anfi nson stated, but “when orders come down you obey 
those orders.”40
In an effort to improve coordination with SHPOs, the St. Paul District assigned Brad 
Johnson, a district archeologist, to work with the Regulatory Branch on a one-year 
assignment. One important result of this endeavor was an understanding that was 
reached on the Permit Area/Area of Potential Effect controversy between the council, 
the Minnesota SHPO and the Corps during consultations pertaining to the effects of 
a housing development on the Rose McAllister farmstead in Chanhassen, Minnesota. 
In November 2002, the council essentially agreed that the Area of Potential Effect for 
a regulatory undertaking should be based on the effects of project activities in the 
permit area and that the undertaking was the authorization of the work or structures 
in the waters of the United States and not the larger project. The Council and the SHPO 
concurred that the effects to the McAllister farmstead were not the result of wetland 
fi ll or the townhouse lots dependent on that fi ll but resulted from the larger project 
development over which the Corps had little control.41 Whether the council continued 
to interpret permit areas in this way remained to be seen, but as the McAllister 
farmstead incident indicates, Johnson’s temporary appointment to the Regulatory 
Branch helped to further the working relationships between the district, the SHPO and 
the Advisory Council.
Historical Activities
Along with its cultural resources management program, the St. Paul District also 
actively implemented historical activities in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
Led mostly by John Anfi nson, district historian from 1980 to 2000, the district 
worked to preserve its own past, complete environmental site histories and develop 
interpretive materials at district visitor centers. Although Anfi nson periodically had to 
justify his own position and responsibilities to district offi cials, St. Paul established a 
strong historical program that effectively portrayed its past.
The district saw the value of its history even before it hired Anfi nson in 1980. In the 
1970s, the Corps contracted with Raymond H. Merritt, a professor at the University 
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, to compose a history of the St. Paul District from its 
beginnings to 1978. District personnel embraced the book after its 1979 publication, 
with District Engineer Colonel William W. Badger claiming that it “did a very good 
job of showing what the Corps does.”42 Despite their enthusiasm, district leaders 
were still uncertain about hiring a full-time historian, questioning whether or not 
such a position was justifi ed. When the district engaged Anfi nson’s services in 1980, 
it actually hired him as an archeologist because he had a double major in history and 
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anthropology. Not until 1985 did the district change his job title to historian and, even 
then, it did so reluctantly.43
Throughout Anfi nson’s tenure as a district historian, however, he gradually built up 
the historical program, aided by Corps’ headquarters in Washington, D.C., which 
had a strong contingent of historians. In the 1980s, headquarters issued ER 870-1-1, 
outlining the responsibilities of district historical programs. According to this directive, 
historians should “develop in Corps’ personnel knowledgeable interest and pride in 
the history of the Corps of Engineers,” publish histories of individual district activities, 
prepare policy-study reports, compile research materials, preserve records, conduct 
oral history interviews, collect historic artifacts, support public affairs activities and 
provide information for visitor centers.44 As part of these obligations, the St. Paul 
District implemented an oral history program in the 1980s, consisting of end-of-tour 
interviews with district engineers to provide perspectives and “lessons learned” for 
future commanders.45 Frank “Mickey” Schubert, a member of the Corps’ headquarters 
Offi ce of History staff, carried out annual interviews with Colonel William W. Badger 
and Colonel Edward Rapp, both district engineers in St. Paul, in the early 1980s, and 
Anfi nson assumed the responsibility thereafter, conducting end-of-tour interviews with 
North Central Division commanders as well.46 These histories became valuable sources 
for information about the St. Paul District and the Corps in general. A 1991 interview 
with outgoing District Engineer Colonel Roger L. Baldwin, for instance, covered a 
“typical” day in his life, his leadership philosophies, information about Life-Cycle 
Project Management and explanations about cost-sharing, the drought of 1988, civil 
works projects, regulatory issues, the International Joint Commission, congressional 
relations and the Corps’ reorganization.47
Along with these end-of-tour interviews, 
the district began other projects in 
response to Corps’ headquarters request 
that districts “conduct interviews with as 
broad a spectrum of the [district’s] active 
and retired personnel as possible.”48 In 
1986, the cultural resources management 
staff interviewed former Mississippi 
River headwaters employees, including 
dam tenders. According to Anfi nson, these interviews 
were intended to show “how the headwater’s [sic] 
staff perceived what the district offi ce was saying 
and how they carried it out.”49 Another project 
involved interviewing individuals who had helped 
construct and operate Mississippi River Locks and 
Dams 3, 4, 5, 5A, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The report on these 
interviews explained that they “preserve[d] important 
information not contained or poorly detailed in 
written documents.”50 According to Berwick, these 
interviews helped make “present employees proud of 
what the district has done in the past.”51
Henry P. Bosse’s photo 
of wingdams on the 
Mississippi River: The 
Bosse collection of 136 
photographs, found by 
the district, is a historical 
treasure. (Courtesy of  
St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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In the 1990s, the cultural resources management unit assumed the function of 
completing environmental site histories, performed mostly by Jane Carroll, who 
worked as a second historian for the district during that decade. These studies, which 
included archival research, as well as site visitation, eliminated delays in civil works 
projects, especially the construction of urban levees. Frequently industries had operated 
on sites where the Corps wanted to construct a levee, and sometimes these businesses 
left behind contaminated soil. If the Corps did not discover the polluted areas until 
late in the project, it could, in the words of Anfi nson, “signifi cantly delay a project or 
cause an increase of costs.” Carroll and Anfi nson thus conducted environmental site 
histories in the planning process to determine where potential contaminated soils were 
in order to forestall any late discoveries. After Carroll left the district, Anfi nson and 
his successor, Matthew Pearcy, had little time to continue such studies because of the 
pressing demands of other projects, so they became the responsibility of the district’s 
Geotechnical and Geology Section.52
In addition to these responsibilities, Anfi nson focused on preserving the Corps’ own 
historic resources. In the early 1990s, the district discovered a book of rare photographs 
of the Mississippi River taken by Henry P. Bosse, who worked for the Corps in the 
late 1800s. The album, entitled Views on the Mississippi River, contained a hundred 
and thirty-six photographs showing some of the Corps’ initial work on the waterway. 
One copy of the rare album had retrieved $217,000 at a 1990 auction. Many believed 
the district’s copy was worth as much as $1.5 million.53 In order to promote these 
photographs, Anfi nson composed a brochure about them and made presentations to 
interested public audiences. The photographs proved to be tremendously popular, 
and Anfi nson estimated that he lectured at least thirty times about them. In addition, 
the Corps itself embraced the photographs as an important resource, with offi cials at 
Corps’ headquarters calling it a great treasure.54 In 2003, prints of the photographs still 
lined the second fl oor corridor of the St. Paul District offi ce, showing the importance the 
district placed on them.
Other Corps’ resources were equally signifi cant, especially the locks and dams under the 
district’s jurisdiction. In the early 1980s, the district undertook an examination of each of 
its locks and dams to determine their hydropower potential, and, at the same time, began 
a major rehabilitation of these complexes, including repairing structures, installing new 
wiring and building new central control stations. As with all federal undertakings, these 
projects had to go through the Section 106 process, and the State Historic Preservation 
Offi ces in the various Upper Mississippi River states asked the Corps to determine 
whether the locks and dams themselves were eligible for the National Register. The 
district hired historian Jon Gjerde in 1983 to study the edifi ces, which had been built 
between 1932 and 1938, and Gjerde and Anfi nson together determined that Locks and 
Dams 3 through 10 were eligible. According to Anfi nson, they represented the orderly 
“spirit of the Progressive Era” and “the public works associated with the New Deal and 
Keynesian economics of Franklin D. Roosevelt.” Their design also showed “both the 
infl uence of the Art Moderne movement and the austerity of the Great Depression.”55 
But a study commissioned by the Rock Island District in the mid-1980s to evaluate Locks 
and Dams 11 through 22 disagreed with Gjerde’s and Anfi nson’s assessments, stating 
that the structures might have local and regional signifi cance, but they had no national 
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importance. The study recommended that only one of the complexes be determined 
eligible as a representative example. After reviewing both reports, the various SHPOs 
agreed with Gjerde’s and Anfi nson’s arguments and declared the locks and dams eligible 
for the National Register.56
When Corps’ offi cers learned about the determination, they were not pleased, believing 
that eligibility would just make it harder for the agency to maintain and operate 
the dams. Fearing that Section 106 requirements would adversely impact operation 
and maintenance, the Corps, especially Rock Island and St. Louis districts, balked 
at complying with the decision. As Anfi nson related, the determination did not “fi t 
well with the construction-operations mentality” of the Corps.57 The St. Paul District, 
however, was less reluctant to accept the decision, perhaps because it recognized the 
importance of preserving the engineering history of the locks and dams. To that end, 
the district entered into a contract with the National Park Service in 1986 to produce 
Historic American Engineering Record documentation for Locks and Dams 3 through 
10. In 1990, Rock Island and St. Louis followed St. Paul’s lead; and in 1992, the National 
Park Service issued a report on the locks and dams entitled Gateway to Commerce: The 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 9 Foot Channel Project on the Upper Mississippi River which 
specifi cally explored the structures’ engineering aspects. All of the documentation, 
including photographs, manuscripts and inventories, were stored in the Library of 
Congress in the Historic American Engineering Record archives, thereby preserving the 
historical record of the Nine-Foot Channel Project.58
Ultimately, the eligibility determination did increase the diffi culty of lock and dam 
operation and maintenance. In order to preserve the structures’ integrity, the Corps 
had to remove any “features inconsistent with the historic character of the locks and 
dams” when possible, in addition to consulting frequently with SHPOs to mitigate any 
effects that major rehabilitation efforts might have.59 To ease the implementation of this 
increased bureaucracy, Anfi nson, as head of the cultural resources management unit, 
argued for its “early involvement ... in all construction and maintenance projects that 
may potentially affect eligible properties.”60 Although the determination hindered and 
delayed some structure rehabilitation, it helped to preserve a vital part of the Corps’ 
history, however reluctantly the organization agreed to this protection.
Another way the St. Paul District tried to maintain the history of the district’s locks and 
dams was through the establishment of visitor centers. In the 1970s, Lieutenant General 
John W. Morris, Chief of Engineers, initiated a program instituting local, regional and 
national visitor centers. Corps’ headquarters reiterated the importance of these units in 
the 1990s with a regulation stating that it was Corps’ policy to operate centers at water 
resource development projects in order to “educate and inform the public with regard 
to the history and mission of the Corps, its role in water resources development, the 
project, its purpose, benefi ts and costs.”61 One of the earliest visitor centers in the St. 
Paul District was at Upper St. Anthony Falls Lock and Dam, completed in 1963 at the 
site of the only naturally occurring waterfall on the Mississippi. The center initially was 
only an open overlook structure on the top of the control building. In the late 1970s, 
the district proposed a renovation but funding for the construction was cut in 1978.62 It 
was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the Corps made a concerted effort to 
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St. Anthony Falls Visitor Center
(top) A commercial pleasure boat passes the visitors center. (below) A view of 
the river from inside St. Anthony Falls Visitor Center. (Photos by Frank Star, courtesy of 
St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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restructure St. Anthony Falls Visitor Center the overlook and establish fi rst-rate exhibits 
telling the story of Upper St. Anthony Falls and the Corps.
This push for an expanded visitor center occurred for a couple of reasons. First, the 
Corps itself requested that more time be spent on developing interpretive materials 
at visitor centers.63 Second, in 1988 the Minnesota State Legislature created the 
St. Anthony Falls Heritage Interpretive Zone in the area of the lock and dam and 
established a Heritage Board to administer it. As part of its plans for the region, the 
Heritage Board proposed the development of a trail system throughout the zone that 
would help interpret the historic riverfront. The board proposed making the district’s 
Upper St. Anthony Falls Visitor Center one of the primary features of the trail. If the 
board implemented the trail and other interpretive features, the Corps estimated that 
the center’s current visitation of 30 to 40 thousand visitors annually could triple. This 
would necessitate an expansion in order to manage the increased visitation.64
However, the center was located within the St. Anthony Falls Historic District. Because 
of this, as an offi cer at the Minnesota SHPO related, even though the lock and dam was 
not eligible for the National Register, the Corps still had to treat it as “a contributive 
element” to the historic district and prevent extensive modifi cations that “could have 
considerable impact.”65 Offi cials and citizens concerned with historic preservation 
worried about the effects of the Corps’ expansion, especially given its track record in the 
area. When it fi rst constructed the lock and dam in 1963, for example, the Corps altered 
Stone Arch Bridge 1962:  The Corps altering the 1880s Stone Arch Bridge in 
Minneapolis prior to building Upper St. Anthony Falls Lock and Dam in 1963. 
(Photo courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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the historic Stone Arch Bridge, built by railroad magnate James J. Hill in the 1880s, 
by replacing two arches and installing a steel truss bridge to accommodate barges.66 
Although the bridge had since been recognized as a National Civil Engineering 
Landmark, the damage had been done. In order to ensure changes to the visitor center 
did not likewise disrupt the historic character of the St. Anthony Falls District, Russel 
Snyder, a landscape architect for the St. Paul District, and Anfi nson met frequently 
with the St. Anthony Falls Heritage Board to receive their input on the renovation 
designs. Among other things, the board successfully convinced Snyder and Anfi nson 
not to block off the south windows of the observation deck for a display area, believing 
“the view from the observation deck was critical to interpretation of the area and the 
Corps’ role.”67
With the approval of the Heritage Board and the SHPO, the district completed the 
necessary renovations in the mid-1990s. These improvements included installing an 
elevator to the observation level and a rest room at the ground level to make the center 
more accessible for people with disabilities. At the same time, new exhibits told the 
story of Upper St. Anthony Falls and the Corps’ involvement there. The new displays, 
generated by Anfi nson and John Fisher of the district’s Engineering Division, explained 
the general history of the Corps and its missions, the general history of the St. Anthony 
Falls area, how the Corps preserved the falls from destruction in the late 1800s, the 
construction of Upper St. Anthony Falls Lock and Dam and how the lock and dam 
operated. In addition, an interactive kiosk allowed users to simulate the locking of a 
vessel and the dredging of a waterway. The Corps hoped such displays would teach 
the public more about the district and its activities, as well as about the history of the 
falls.68 These improvements generated increased visitation, but some interaction was 
lost in September 2001, following coordinated terrorist attacks against the United States. 
Because of the resulting security concerns, the Corps barred any public contact with 
its locks and dams and shut down the Upper St. Anthony Falls Visitor Center until the 
middle of 2002. When the center reopened, its hours were changed from 6 a.m. to 10 
p.m. to 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. The lock continued to follow these visitor hours in 2003, with 
no indication of when or if they would return to the longer hours.69
Conclusion
The Upper St. Anthony Falls Visitor Center was a good example of some of the ways 
the St. Paul District sought to provide information about the Corps and its structures 
to the general public. With such activities, coupled with existing programs in oral 
history and environmental site histories, Anfi nson built a strong district history 
program. Meanwhile, David Berwick and other archeologists implemented the 
district’s cultural resources management program, including the Section 106 process 
for Corps’ undertakings and the mediation between SHPOs and the Regulatory Branch 
over Appendix C. Both the history and cultural resources management components 
educated the public about the Corps’ past and the history of the region under the St. 
Paul District’s jurisdiction. As John Anfi nson related, those personnel comprising the 
cultural resources management section, be they archeologists or historians, successfully 
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explained history and prehistory to the public in a way that enabled citizens to “really 
use [cultural resources] and learn about them.”70
Chapter Six Endnotes
 1 John O. Anfi nson Memorandum for Robert F. Post, Chief, Engineering and 
Planning Division, 31 March 1994, copy provided by John O. Anfi nson, Cultural 
Resources Specialist, Mississippi National River and Recreation Area, National Park 
Service. Anfi nson worked as a historian within the St. Paul District’s CRM division from 
1980 to 2000.
 2 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, “Bureau of Reclamation Cultural Resources 
Management,” <http://www.usbr.gov/cultural> (6 June 2003).
 3 “Cultural Resources Input, Operational Management Plan, Upper Mississippi 
River, 19 March 1990,” File MR-HPP, Cultural Resources Management Administrative 
Files, St. Paul District of the Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul, Minnesota [CRM Files].
 4 “Bureau of Reclamation Cultural Resources Management,” <http://www.usbr.
gov/cultural> (6 June 2003).
 5 U.S. Conference of Mayors Special Committee on Historic Preservation, With Heritage 
So Rich (New York: Random House, 1966; reprint, Washington, D.C.: The Preservation 
Press, 1983), p. 191; Lisa S. Mighetto and William F. Willingham, Service – Tradition 
– Change: A History of the Fort Worth District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1975-1999 
(Fort Worth, TX.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District, 2000), pp. 33-36; 
David Berwick, personal communication with the authors, 31 October 2002; Robert F. 
Post, personal communication with the authors, 6 January 2003. Post was Chief of the 
Environmental Resources Branch from 1974 through 1982.
 6 Quotations from “National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended 
through 1992,” in U.S. Department of the Interior, Federal Historic Preservation Laws 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1993), pp. 7, 9-10, 22; see also Mike 
Wallace, Mickey Mouse History and Other Essays on American Memory (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1996), p. 190.
 7 Mighetto and Willingham, Service – Tradition – Change, pp. 33-36; Bob Post, 
personal communication with the authors, 6 January 2003.
 8 Quotation in Post, personal communication with the authors, 6 January 2003; 
see also “Cultural Resources Unit,” Crosscurrents 10 (June 1987): p. 7; Berwick, personal 
communication with the authors, 31 October 2002; John O. Anfi nson interview by 
Matthew Godfrey, St. Paul, MN, 25 October 2002, p. 1. The program was originally 
established as a unit under the Environmental Resources Branch, but became a section 
in 1989. “Cultural Resources Section Input, District Historical Report,” File Planning 
Division AR 89, Box 6412, St. Paul District administrative records, St. Paul, Minnesota 
[SPDAR].
C
ul
tu
ra
l R
es
ou
rc
es
 a
nd
 H
ist
or
y
6 168
 9 Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, “Section 106 Regulations (Effective 
11 January 2001),” 36 CFR Part 800, <http://www.achp.gov/regs.html> (6 June 2003); 
see also Adina W. Kanefi eld, Federal Historic Preservation Case Law, 1966-1996: Thirty 
Years of the National Historic Preservation Act (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation, 1996), pp. 11-12.
 10 Both quotations in James Kahn, “History Takes a Step Forward,” Water 
Spectrum 7 (Fall 1975): p. 40.
 11 “Cultural Resources Unit,” p. 7.
 12 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, “Native American History 
in the Mississippi Headwaters Region,” <http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/history/
native_am> (6 June 2003).
 13 “Lake Ashtabula Operational Management Plan,” File Baldhill Dam/Lake 
Ashtabula OMP, Homme Dam OMP, Lake Ashtabula/Homme Lake EA, CRM Files.
 14 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, “Final Environmental Impact 
Statement, Flood Control, East Grand Forks, Minnesota, Grand Forks, North Dakota,” 
p. 30, <http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/docs/projs/eisfi nal.pdf> (6 June 2003).
 15 Mighetto and Willingham, Service – Tradition – Change, p. 41; Virginia 
Gnabasik interview by Matthew Godfrey, St. Paul, MN, 22 October 2002, p. 9.
 16 Gnabasik Interview, p. 9.
 17 Quotation in “Programmatic Agreement Among the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, St. Paul District, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, the 
North Dakota State Historic Preservation Offi cer, and the Minnesota State Historic 
Preservation Offi cer Regarding Implementation of Flood Protection Measures for 
the Cities of Grand Forks, North Dakota and East Grand Forks, Minnesota,” Revised 
Draft – July 1998, p. 7, File 1110-2-1150a East Grand Forks Flood Control Programmatic 
Agreement (‘98), Box 8076, SPDAR; see also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul 
District, “Final Environmental Impact Statement, Flood Control, East Grand Forks, 
Minnesota, Grand Forks, North Dakota,” p. 34.
 18 Edward McNally interview by Matthew Godfrey, St. Paul, MN, 22 October 
2002, p. 7.
 19 “Draft, Environmental Assessment, LaFarge Bridges Removal/Relocation, 
Kickapoo River, Near La Farge, Wisconsin,” pp. 1-9, File 1501-07 Ref. Paper Files – 
La Farge – Tech. Drawings, Box 7932, SPDAR; Richard Otto interview by Matthew 
Godfrey, St. Paul, MN, 23 October 2002, pp. 11-12; John Anfi nson Interview, p. 8.
 20 Quotation in “Homme Dam Operational Management Plan,” File Baldhill 
Dam/Lake Ashtabula OMP, Homme Dam OMP, Lake Ashtabula/Homme Lake 
EA, CRM Files; see also “Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979,” in 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Federal Historic Preservation Laws, p. 55; Charles 
C
ultural Resources and
 History
6
169
P. Spitzack Memorandum for CENCS-DDPM (Crist), 9 April 1997, File La Farge 
Correspondence, Box 6407, SPDAR.
 21 “National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended through 1992,” in 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Federal Historic Preservation Laws, pp. 14-15.
 22 Gnabasik Interview, pp. 7-8. For an example of a Corps letter requesting tribal 
participation, see Kenneth S. Kasprisin, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, to Honorable 
Phillip “Skip” Longie, Jr., Chairman, Spirit Lake Tribal Council, 19 November 1999, File 
1110- 21150a Baldhill Dam Pool Raise (‘99), Box 6417, SPDAR.
 23 Quotation in “Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,” in 
U.S. Department of the Interior, Federal Historic Preservation Laws, p. 65, 67; see also 
U.S. Congress, 101st Cong., 2d sess., “Providing for the Protection of Native American 
Graves, and For Other Purposes,” House Report 101-877, 1990, pp. 13-17, <http://
www.cast.uark.edu/other/nps/nagpra/DOCS/lgm001.html> (6 June 2003).
 24 Sissel Johannessen, “Notes on NAGPRA,” 28 May 2003, document provided 
to the authors; Gnabasik Interview, pp. 6-7.
 25 Patricia L. Parker and Thomas F. King, “Guidelines for Evaluating and 
Documenting Traditional Cultural Properties,” National Register Bulletin 38, <http://www.
cr.nps.gov/nr /publications/bulletins/nrb38> (6 June 2003). For background on TCPs, 
see Antoinette J. Lee, “Recognizing Cultural Heritage in the National Historic Preservation 
Program,” CRM 16 (1993 Special Issue – Traditional Cultural Properties): pp. 7-8.
 26 David W. Cushman, “When Worlds Collide: Indians, Archeologists, and 
the Preservation of Traditional Cultural Properties,” CRM 16 (1993 Special Issue – 
Traditional Cultural Properties): pp. 49-51 (quotation on p. 50).
 27 John Anfi nson Interview, p. 11.
 28 “Oral Interviews: The Signifi cance of Grand Portage Bay to the Grand Portage 
Chippewa Band,” memorandum provided to the authors by John Anfi nson.
 29 John Anfi nson Interview, p. 11.
 30 Quotation in John Anfi nson Interview, p. 12; see also “Watery Logs Expand 
Wood Products Industry,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Fedgazette (July 1997) 
<http://minneapolisfed. org/pubs/fedgaz/97-07/wi.cfm> (6 June 2003).
 31 Maria T. Valencia to Ben A. Wopat, 17 December 2002, email message 
supplied to the authors by Ben A. Wopat.
 32 John Anfi nson Interview, p. 12.
 33 Dennis Gimmestad interview by Matthew Godfrey, St. Paul, MN, 23 
October 2002, p. 1; Scott Anfi nson interview by Matthew Godfrey, St. Paul, MN, 24 
October 2002, p. 5. Gimmestad served as the Minnesota State Historic Preservation 
Offi ce’s Compliance Offi cer, while Anfi nson was a National Register Archeologist for 
Minnesota’s SHPO.
C
ul
tu
ra
l R
es
ou
rc
es
 a
nd
 H
ist
or
y
6 170
 34 Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, “Section 106 Regulations 
(Effective 11 January 2001),” 36 CFR Part 800, Section 800.14, <http://www.achp.gov/
regs.html> (6 June 2003).
 35 “Department of the Army Regulatory Program – An Overview,” June 1997, in 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Executive Training Session Binder, 7-9 March 
2000, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers [HQUSACE] administrative records, 
Washington, D.C.
 36 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “33 CFR Part 325, Appendix C – Procedures 
for the Protection of Historic Properties,” <http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/
functions/cw/cecwo/reg/33cfr325.htm#appendixC> (6 June 2003).
 37 Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, “Section 106 Regulations 
(Effective 11 January 2001),” 36 CFR Part 800, Section 800.16 – Defi nitions, <http://
www.achp.gov/regs.html#800.16> (6 June 2003) (emphasis added).
 38 Gimmestad Interview, p. 7; Brad Johnson, personal communication with the 
authors, 15 March 2004.
 39 Gimmestad Interview, p. 6.
 40 Scott Anfi nson Interview, p. 5.
 41 SHPO No. 2000-1434, as related in Johnson, personal communication with the 
authors, 15 March 2004.
 42 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Offi ce of the Chief of Engineers, Engineer 
Profi les: The District Engineer, Interviews with Colonel William W. Badger, by Frank N. 
Schubert (Washington, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1983), pp. 37-38 [hereafter cited 
as Badger Interviews].
 43 John Anfi nson Interview, p. 1.
 44 Albert J. Genetti, Jr., Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Chief of Staff, “Historical 
Activities: Field Operating Activities Historical Programs,” Regulation No. 870-1-1, 30 
April 1990, p. 2, File Hist. Cmte. (1989-90), Box 6412, SPDAR.
 45 William A. Stofft, Brigadier General, Chief of Military History, Memorandum, 
2 July 1986, File Oral History – General, Box 7842, SPDAR; John Anfi nson Interview, p. 2.
 46 John O. Anfi nson, personal communication with the authors, 30 December 
2002; Paul K. Walker Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Army Engineer Division, 
North Central, 18 August 1989, File Oral History – General, Box 7842, SPDAR. Schubert 
had a summer cabin in Minnesota, giving him opportunities to implement the oral 
history program in the St. Paul District.
 47 Colonel Roger L. Baldwin interview by John O. Anfi nson, St. Paul, MN, 1 July 
1991, 3 July 1991, Oral History File, St. Paul District, St. Paul, Minnesota.
C
ultural Resources and
 History
6
171
 48 Genetti, “Historical Activities: Field Operating Activities Historical 
Programs,” p. 5.
 49 Quotation in “District Begins Oral History Program,” Crosscurrents 10 (August 
1987): p. 6.
 50 Jo Blatti, “Oral History of the Mississippi River Locks and Dams Nos. 3-10: 
Draft Final Report,” p. 3, File MR Oral History 2, Box 7842, SPDAR.
 51 Quotation in “District Begins Oral History Program,” p. 6.
 52 Quotation in John Anfi nson Interview, p. 4; see also Charles E. Crist, Chief, 
Planning Branch, Memorandum for Robert F. Post, Chief, Engineering and Planning 
Division, 31 March 1994, document provided to the authors by John Anfi nson; Berwick, 
personal communication with the authors, 31 October 2002; Matthew T. Pearcy, 
personal communication with the authors, 29 December 2002. The Geotechnical Section 
usually contracts these histories out to a private fi rm.
 53 John Anfi nson, “Detailed Overview: Henry P. Bosse Exhibit,” File 200 Cultural 
Resources, General Folder #1, Box 4338, SPDAR.
 54 John Anfi nson Interview, p. 5.
 55 John O. Anfi nson to Sverdrup, 6 December 1988, File Lock and Dam 4 – Major 
Rehab., CRM Files.
 56 John O. Anfi nson, “The Nine-Foot Channel: Eligibility and Protection,” File 
Lock and Dam 4 – Major Rehab., CRM Files.
 57 John Anfi nson Interview, p. 4.
 58 William Patrick O’Brien, Mary Yeater Rathbun, and Patrick O’Bannon, 
Gateways to Commerce: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 9-Foot Channel Project on the 
Upper Mississippi River, edited by Christine Whitacre (Denver: National Park Service, 
Rocky Mountain Region, 1992), p. 7; John Anfi nson Interview, p. 5. The Historic 
American Engineering Record is under the purview of the National Park Service.
 59 “Mississippi River – OMP,” pp. 7-9, File Locks and Dams – History, CRM Files.
 60 Joseph H. Mose, Acting Chief, Environmental & Economic Analysis Branch, 
Memorandum for MVP-CO/Ken Buck, n.d., File Section 106 and Con-Ops, CRM Files.
 61 Robert L. Herndon, Colonel, Corps of Engineers Chief of Staff, “Planning, 
Development, Management and Operation: Visitor Center Program,” ER 1130-2-401, 
15 February 1991, p. 2, File SAF Visitor’s Center, CRM Files; see also Raymond Merritt, 
“New Directions: Transitions in the St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers, 1976-1982,” 
unpublished manuscript, St. Paul District, p. 61.
 62 “Fact Sheet: Upper St. Anthony Falls Lock and Dam Visitor Center 
Improvements,” 20 August 1990, File SAF Visitor’s Center, CRM Files; see also Steven 
C
ul
tu
ra
l R
es
ou
rc
es
 a
nd
 H
ist
or
y
6 172
Lenhart interview by Matthew Godfrey, Minneapolis, MN, 21 October 2002, p. 19. 
Lenhart is the lockmaster at USAF Lock and Dam.
 63 See, for example, Herndon, “Planning, Development, Management and 
Operation: Visitor Center Program.”
 64 “Fact Sheet: Upper St. Anthony Falls Lock and Dam Visitor Center 
Improvements”; “Plan Summary Draft Text (13 November 1989),” pp. 4-5, File SAF 
History, CRM Files.
 65 Ted Lofstrom, Review and Compliance Offi cer, Minnesota State Historic 
Preservation Offi ce, to Mr. Robert J. Whiting, St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers, 
13April 1990, File SAF History, CRM Files.
 66 Minnesota Historical Society, “Railroad Properties: Stone Arch Bridge (in 
the St. Anthony Falls Historic District),” <http://nrhp.mnhs.org/property_overview.
cfm?propertyID=79> (6 June 2003).
 67 Russel Snyder, “Meeting with St. Anthony Falls Heritage Board Technical 
Advisory Committee, November 28, 1988: Memo for the Record,” 6 December 1988, File 
SAF Historic District, CRM Files.
 68 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, Interpretive Prospectus: Morgan 
J. Tschida Visitor Center, Upper St. Anthony Falls Lock and Dam (St. Paul, MN: U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, 1995), pp. 2, 6-8; John Anfi nson Interview, p. 3; 
Lenhart Interview, pp. 2, 15-16.
 69 Lenhart Interview, p. 12; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul District, 
“Corps of Engineers Opens Most Lock and Dam Visitor Centers Along the Mississippi 
River,” Press Release, 10 May 2002, <http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/pressroom/
default.asp?pageid=329> (6 June 2003).
 70 John Anfi nson Interview, p. 14.
C
ultural Resources and
 History
6
173
Ranger Kyle Curtiss, Pokegama Dam and Recreation 
Area, Grand Rapids, Minn., assists a camper in 
making a pinecone bird feeder. (Photo by Tammy Wick, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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In 1988, Colonel Joseph Briggs, outgoing district engineer of the St. 
Paul District, related that the Corps’ “recreational business is growing 
in leaps and bounds.”1 The Corps received the responsibility from the 
federal government to develop recreational opportunities in conjunction 
with its civil works projects in the mid-twentieth century. As Briggs 
explained, recreation had become an increasingly important function 
of the Corps as the century progressed, although it was never considered as important 
as the navigation and fl ood control missions. Emphasizing the value of recreation, 
however, a 1996 Corps’ engineering regulation declared that one of the primary goals 
of the Corps was “providing quality public outdoor recreation experiences to serve the 
needs of present and future generations.” By the twenty-fi rst century, the Corps had 
become one of the largest operators of recreation units on federal land.2 Yet the Corps 
sometimes shied away from fully developing recreational opportunities, in part because 
of environmental concerns and in part because of confl icts with other missions and 
federal agencies. An examination of the recreational function in the St. Paul District in 
the late twentieth century highlights some of these features.
Although Congress has never authorized the Corps to build a dam and reservoir solely 
for recreational purposes, the Corps obtained authority in the 1944 Flood Control Act 
to build recreation facilities. The 1965 Federal Water Project Recreation Act allowed 
the Corps to include recreation as a contributing factor to benefi t-cost ratios, while 
also mandating that non-federal sponsors bear at least fi fty percent of the construction 
costs.3 With these authorities, the Corps developed campgrounds, day-use areas, boat 
ramps and swimming beaches around the bodies of water it managed. As more and 
more Americans participated in outdoor recreation in the 1960s and 1970s, Corps’ 
resources became increasingly popular. The Corps estimated in 2003 that 360 million 
people annually visited the 2,500 recreation areas at the more than 450 projects that 
it operated, as well as the 1,800 other sites leased to state, local or private recreation 
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managers. However, the Corps’ responsibilities did not merely consist of providing 
areas of enjoyment. According to one manager, they also extended to “insur[ing] the 
public safety and health of the visiting public, ... protect[ing] natural resources for 
future generations, and ... charg[ing] fees where appropriate to offset operation and 
maintenance costs.” Because of these diverse duties, Corps’ regulations required that 
its Natural Resources Management Program staff be drawn from “personnel having 
expertise in areas such as forestry, wildlife management, recreation management, 
fi sheries management, parks management, landscape architecture, biology, soil science, 
interpretation, visitor assistance and contract administration.”4
In the St. Paul District, recreation management was a part of the Natural Resources 
section of the Construction-Operations Division. Project managers within the 
Construction-Operations Division administered project sites, and recreation personnel 
reported to the on-site supervisor. The main recreational attractions in the district 
included the Mississippi River, its headwaters and several other reservoirs and 
waterways scattered across North Dakota, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Essentially, the 
district’s recreational operations lay in four major areas: developing new opportunities 
on civil works projects; maintaining existing projects; conducting public outreach 
ventures, including safety programs; and assisting in natural resources management. 
Most of these functions could best be carried out at the projects themselves, meaning the 
district did not have a large recreation staff in its St. Paul offi ce. Instead, most recreation 
and natural resource employees were located in the fi eld, and these individuals labored 
to ensure the public had ample recreational opportunities and satisfactory experiences.5
Developing New Opportunities
One of the main functions of the district’s recreation staff included the development 
of recreational features as part of new civil works projects. After 1936, the Corps built 
numerous large dams for fl ood control, and the resulting reservoirs were some of the 
major attractions for the general public. Numerous factors, including the environmental 
movement and increasing costs, however, reduced the Corps’ dam/reservoir 
construction in the 1970s in favor of more non-structural solutions.6 Yet recreation 
opportunities still existed, and the Corps continued to develop these possibilities 
whenever feasible.
One of the major successes for the St. Paul District stemmed from the construction of 
the South Fork Zumbro River Flood Control Project in Rochester, Minnesota, completed 
in the 1990s and the recipient of several awards (see Chapter Four). Recreation was an 
important component of this project from the beginning.7 According to Frank Star, an 
outdoor recreation planner for the district, the involvement of the recreation staff in 
Rochester was typical of its participation in most civil works projects. First, Star related, 
the district had to determine whether recreational aspects were feasible. If so, it had to 
discover whether local entities were willing to share the costs of these developments. 
The City of Rochester expressed an early willingness to pay the fi fty percent cost 
requirement, meaning the district’s recreational staff worked closely with the city to 
determine just what features were desirable. “Once we had fi gured out what the project 
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was going to consist of, which was channel work in the city itself,” Star stated, “then 
we looked at what kind of recreational opportunities ... that afford[ed].” The two sides 
ultimately decided that the best utilization lay in bicycle and pedestrian trails and picnic 
areas along the Zumbro River where much of the Corps’ work was occurring.8
During the project’s construction in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many citizens in 
Rochester grew excited about the opportunities. As one newspaper report related, 
“Not only will the project protect the city from fl ooding, but it will provide outdoor 
enthusiasts with an array of new opportunities through a network of bike trails, a 
series of reservoirs and new parks and campgrounds.” These features, the newspaper 
concluded, showed that the Corps, as well as other entities involved in the project, 
was “work[ing] hard to combine fl ood protection and fun.”9 In essence, the recreation 
developments consisted of 6.5 miles of walkways and bicycle paths along the Zumbro 
in downtown Rochester, as well as pedestrian plazas, picnic shelters and better 
access points to the river. Even before the project was completed, the general public 
extensively used these features, and frequently commented favorably.10 One woman 
was grateful for the bike paths because her daughter could ride without worrying 
about automobiles and curbs. Another man, on an “after-dinner stroll,” expressed 
his pleasure with the trails, stating that the area was “much improved over what it 
was.”11 According to project manager Deborah Foley, the well-accepted recreation 
Recreation:  Swimmers at the Crosslake Recreation Area in Cross Lake, 
Minnesota.  (Photo by Shannon Bauer, courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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developments, funded in part by the city, were “key” reasons why the project received 
“top honors” in 1996.12
The South Fork Zumbro River Project was representative of the way the district 
developed recreational aspects on civil works projects. Although not all local parties 
were as willing to foot fi fty percent of the bill, other undertakings, including the St. 
Paul and the Grand Forks/East Grand Forks fl ood control projects, also had signifi cant 
recreation features. However, as with the Zumbro, once the Corps completed 
construction of these developments, it turned the recreation units over to the local 
sponsor for operation and maintenance. Thereafter, the Corps had little to do with 
the projects, aside from periodic inspections to ensure they were being operated and 
maintained correctly. Local assumption of responsibility commonly occurred in the 
last half of the twentieth century. According to Richard Otto, who began working with 
the St. Paul District’s recreation program in 1975, because most of these facilities were 
“small areas and parks ... used by local people,” common sense dictated that local 
governments operate them.13 
However, the Corps quickly learned that local governments sometimes caused 
problems in the management of recreation facilities. In 1980, for example, Vernon 
County, Wisconsin, which leased Blackhawk Park on the Mississippi River from the 
Corps, decided to terminate its operating lease and return the park to Corps’ control. 
The county also informed the St. Paul District it would no longer maintain the access 
road to the park, even though the street provided service to private residences and 
public utilities. In addition, the county refused to construct safety features on the road, 
including warnings at a railroad crossing. Because of the county’s unwillingness to take 
responsibility for the road and the safety concerns, the Corps closed Blackhawk Park for 
a couple of months in the spring of 1984. The loss of tourist 
revenue hurt the surrounding communities, leading 2,843 
people to sign a petition demanding the county assume 
responsibility for the road. The county fi nally accepted that 
duty in May, allowing the Corps to reopen in time for the 
Memorial Day weekend. Although the situation eventually 
resolved itself, it showed some of the diffi culties that could 
result from a local government’s lack of participation in 
recreation projects.14
Mississippi National River and Recreation Area
The Mississippi River was another site for recreational 
development in the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
although the Corps was at times dubious about pursuing 
recreation on the river. As part of the Great River 
Environmental Action Team’s (GREAT I) study of the 
Upper Mississippi River in the 1970s (see Chapter Three), a 
recreation work group, consisting of representatives from 
the Corps, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Heritage 
The Mississippi National 
River and Recreation 
Area extends from the 
mouth of the Crow River 
below Lock and Dam 
1 (shown here) through 
the Twin Cities to the 
mouth of the St. Croix 
River. (Photo courtesy of 
St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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Conservation and Recreation Service and the states of Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota, 
issued recommendations in 1979 for increasing recreation on the Mississippi. The work 
group suggested that:  
 The Corps should consider recreation enhancement when disposing of dredged   
 material on the river;  
 Congress should give the Corps authority to maintain recreational areas    
 on federal lands along the river in cooperation with other agencies without local   
 cost-sharing;
  The Corps should maintain backwater accesses; 
 Federal agencies should “provide a diversity of recreational opportunities” on   
 the river; and  
 Recreation should be included as a “project purpose” of the Nine-Foot    
 Navigation Project.15
When the St. Paul District issued its report on the 
implementation of GREAT I’s recommendations, it noted 
that its nine-foot navigation channel increased recreational 
boating opportunities on the river and recognized the 
popularity of islands in the Mississippi created by the 
disposal of dredged material. However, the district only 
promised to give “additional consideration” to recreation 
on the river, recognizing that other programs, such as 
environmental management, took priority.16 Accordingly, 
when the district later received authority for its Upper 
Mississippi Environmental Management Program in the 
1980s, the recreation component received no funding 
from Congress “due to a low” federal priority.17 As Frank 
Star explained, “The big problem is that the recreation 
community is not [as] well organized as some of the 
environmental community is ... There’s no big group of 
campers or hikers or somebody to raise the stakes.”18
Although GREAT I’s recommendations did not 
signifi cantly alter recreational opportunities on the 
Mississippi, it enabled Congress and environmental 
organizations to examine how recreation could be 
integrated more fully into river management plans. These 
dialogues eventually culminated in the introduction 
of legislation in the late 1980s by U.S. Representative 
Bruce F. Vento (D-Minnesota) for the establishment of a 
Mississippi National River and Recreation Area. It would 
encompass an 80-mile stretch of the river beginning near 
the Crow River in Minnesota and running through the 
Twin Cities to the confl uence of the Mississippi and the 
St. Croix rivers at the Wisconsin-Minnesota border. Vento 
Wildlife Refuge:  Don 
Powell served as 
project manager for 
the Fish and Wildlife 
Service’s Trempealeau 
Refuge Project as 
part of the Upper 
Mississippi Environmental 
Management Program. 
(Photo by Shannon Bauer, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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foresaw this area as falling under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service, with 
a coordinating committee aiding its governance. He believed the designation would 
“maximize the River’s potential and assure a fair balance between commercial and 
recreational interests.”19
The St. Paul District, however, was not enthusiastic about Vento’s plan, believing, in the 
words of District Engineer Colonel Briggs, that “another layer of coordination would 
unduly delay the essential time required to accomplish the things that we have to do,” 
such as navigation, fl ood control and environmental regulation. Vento disagreed with 
the Corps’ complaints, believing the real reason why Briggs opposed the project was 
because he did not want the National Park Service infringing on the district’s “turf,” a 
charge Briggs denied.20
Despite the Corps’ reservations about the new system, the bill had enough support 
to become law on November 18, 1988. Along with designating the 80-mile section of 
the river as a national river and recreation area under the jurisdiction of the National 
Park Service, the law also established a Mississippi River Coordinating Commission 
“to assist federal, state, and local authorities in the development and implementation 
of an integrated resource management plan.” Representatives from the National Park 
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the state of Minnesota and the Corps all had 
a seat on the commission. 21 This helped the St. Paul District work closely with the 
National Park Service to develop recreational activities on the Mississippi, including 
installing interactive kiosks at visitor centers and initiating the Mighty Mississippi 
Passport program, whereby children could earn a Mighty Mississippi Junior Ranger 
Badge and certifi cate by visiting a certain number of sites on the river. Although district 
offi cials were initially reluctant to support the designation of the river as a national 
recreation area, they eventually accepted it as a good way, in the words of Frank Star, to 
“encourage people to come down and look at the river and [our] stewardship.”22
Lower St. Anthony Falls Whitewater Park
Other possibilities for Mississippi River recreation also 
existed. In the late 1990s, the Corps began discussions with 
the Minnesota DNR about the creation of a whitewater park 
at Lower St. Anthony Falls in Minneapolis. The Mississippi 
Whitewater Park Development Corporation provided the 
impetus for the facility, forming specifi cally to outline plans 
for the park. The development corporation envisioned the 
establishment of a rapids channel adjacent to the Lower St. 
Anthony Falls Lock and Dam, along with a park and trail 
system on the east bank of the Mississippi. The channel 
would be 40 feet wide and 2,000 feet long and would utilize 
the dam’s vertical drop of 25 feet. Proponents believed that 
canoeists, kayakers and rafters would use the conduit, which 
would also provide fi shing opportunities. In addition, not 
only would the channel restore the whitewater rapids that 
Recreation Boating:  
Canoeists paddle 
through the Lower 
St. Anthony Falls 
Lock and Dam in 
Minneapolis during an 
annual Independence 
Day event. (Photo 
courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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existed on the river decades before, but the park itself would enhance the aesthetics of a 
desolate portion of the river. In 1999, Minnesota’s DNR completed a feasibility report on 
the park, and Congress authorized the project in the Water Resources Development Act 
of 2000. The Corps and the DNR entered into a cooperative agreement in 2002 to begin 
planning and design, but the outcome of the project was unclear after President George 
W. Bush omitted it from his fi scal year 2003 budget. Regardless, most supporters 
believed it was only a matter of time before the park would be constructed, and, when 
completed, it would, according to the Mississippi Whitewater Park Development 
Corporation, “expand the concept of a ‘user-friendly’ river, increasing environmental 
awareness, [and] giving Minnesotans the opportunity to make the Mighty Mississippi a 
part of their lives.”23
Maintaining Existing Facilities
Along with planning new recreational developments, the St. Paul District also 
maintained existing facilities under its control. Several of these were located at the 
headwaters of the Mississippi in northcentral Minnesota, including the Cross Lake, 
Pokegama Lake, Sandy Lake, Leech Lake, Gull Lake and Lake Winnibigoshish 
recreation areas. The Corps created these reservoirs between 1884 and 1912 by 
constructing several dams at the Mississippi Headwaters to store water for release 
during the summer to support navigation below St. Paul. After the Corps developed 
the nine-foot navigation channel on the Mississippi River in the 1930s, these reservoirs 
became less important for navigation but more signifi cant for wildlife habitat and 
recreation. In 1964, the fi rst offi cial recreation facilities were designated at the lakes 
with the completion of a recreational development master plan for the Pine River 
Reservoir, another name for Cross Lake. After that time, the Corps developed master 
plans for the other lakes as well.24 In addition to the headwaters, the St. Paul District 
supervised recreational facilities at several other locations, including Orwell Lake, Lake 
Traverse and Lac Qui Parle Dam in Minnesota; 
Homme Lake and Lake Ashtabula in North 
Dakota; and Eau Galle Lake and Blackhawk 
Park in Wisconsin. Finally, the Mississippi River 
itself provided numerous recreational resources, 
including beaches and islands made from 
dredged materials.25
One of the Corps’ essential responsibilities in 
managing these facilities was determining public 
needs and improving parks accordingly. Most of 
the sites, whether in Minnesota, North Dakota or 
Wisconsin, offered essentially the same water-
related activities: boating, swimming, camping, 
fi shing and picnicking. Some provided hiking, 
playground areas and visitor centers as well. 
With so many facilities scattered throughout 
the three states, district employees spent much 
Pine River Dam in Crosslake, 
Minnesota, received a 
facelift from 1999 to 2003. 
Improvements included an 
accessible fi shing pier. (Photo by 
Shannon Bauer, courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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time maintaining resources and ensuring the public’s satisfaction with the areas. In 
1985, for example, the Corps decided that changes were necessary at Leech Lake Dam. 
Traditionally an excellent spot for fi shing, the lake had experienced only nominal 
annual increases in visitation in the 1980s. The Corps determined that more appealing 
activities for families, retired couples and persons with disabilities might increase 
visitation, so it installed a game area with horseshoe pits, shuffl eboard, volleyball, 
badminton and basketball courts. The district also constructed landscaped stairways, 
ramps and walkway bridges to increase access. The improvements worked, and 
visitation increased by seventeen percent in 1986 and nine percent in 1987.26
The number of campers, coupled with a decreasing number of Corps’ employees at 
Leech Lake, compelled the district to instigate a volunteer campground host program. 
Under this plan, volunteers became the principal contact point for visitors to the area, 
handling questions and distributing information. According to the Corps, “hosts 
never enforce rules and regulations or become involved in any domestic disputes.” 
Instead, they performed “common daily duties, allowing rangers additional time to 
perform more professional duties.” Although the district never widely implemented 
the volunteer host program, it helped Leech Lake cope with a lack of personnel in the 
late 1980s.27
Funding and personnel issues were always problems for the St. Paul District and the 
Corps in general. Not only did recreation recommendations made by study groups 
such as GREAT I receive little money, but existing recreation areas, dependent on 
congressional appropriations, sometimes faced paltry funding as well. In 1989, for 
example, President Ronald Reagan’s fi scal year 1990 budget slashed the St. Paul 
District’s recreation operations and maintenance budget by nearly twenty-fi ve percent. 
This meant most sites had to cut back on activities.28 The St. Paul District was not alone; 
in 1989 the Bush Administration called for the closing of 654 Corps’ recreation areas 
nationwide. Fortunately for the Corps’ recreational employees and local economies 
depending on these sites, Congress rejected the plan. Because of these budget 
constraints, the Corps examined new ways to fund recreation projects in the early 1990s. 
As Frank Star said, funding was “always an issue” for recreation, in part because of 
its “non-essentiality.” Whereas transportation networks needed highway repairs, the 
maintenance of campgrounds was less important. This made recreation an “easy target” 
for budget cuts.29
User Fees
One of the ways the Corps attempted to bolster its funding was by charging user fees 
at its facilities. Congress fi rst authorized the Corps to impose recreation fees in the 
1965 Land and Water Conservation Fund Act. This law stated that federal agencies 
administering outdoor recreation sites could levy recreation use charges, mandating 
that such costs be “fair and equitable.” Other than campground fees, however, the 
Corps did not implement any charges at that time. With funding cuts for recreation 
in the 1990s, however, the agency decided user fees could rectify the situation. 
Accordingly, Congress included in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act a 
provision allowing the Corps to implement day-use charges at appropriate areas.30
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Subsequent Corps’ regulations claimed that the fees had fi ve major purposes: to recover 
some of the operation and maintenance costs of facilities, to reduce overcrowding, to 
provide quality recreational experiences which would support the national economy, 
to control vandalism and disruptive behavior and to foster a responsible user ethic 
among its guests. The resulting revenue went into a special Corps’ account in the U.S. 
Treasury and was ultimately returned as Special Recreation Use Funds to those projects 
producing the revenue.31 Although fees meant increased costs for the consumer, the 
public generally accepted the charges, in part because it knew the Corps used the 
revenue to offset operation and maintenance costs. As Star related, “If you can show 
them that the money is coming back and you’re actually making use of it to improve 
facilities, then [the public is] more accepting of it.”32 In addition, the fees were not 
burdensome. At the beginning of 2003, the public could purchase annual passes 
allowing yearlong day-use of Corps facilities for $30, while persons 62 years of age and 
older could buy a Golden Age Passport, which provided a fi fty percent discount on 
all recreation fees, for $10. Individual day-use charges ranged from $1-3 per person, 
depending on whether or not the individual accessed a boat ramp or a swimming area.33
National Recreation Reservation System
Another change the Corps implemented was the creation of the National Recreation 
Reservation System. In the late 1990s, the Corps joined with the Forest Service and 
the Bureau of Land Management, and later, the National Park Service, to establish a 
national reservation system for federal campgrounds. According to the Corps, this 
would “enhance customer service for users of our public lands by providing, with a 
single phone call, the ability to make reservations for fee-based, recreation facilities.” 
The organizations contracted with ReserveAmerica to provide this service, thereby 
facilitating the camping experience for those willing to make and pay for advance 
reservations. Although the Corps characterized this program as a “win-win-win 
service for our customers,” it did lead to some problems early on, mainly with the 
service provided by ReserveAmerica. Company representatives at times provided 
misinformation about the availability of campsites, while others placed non-disabled 
people on sites set aside for those with disabilities. The Corps also discovered the 
reservation system made it easier for individuals to skirt around policies such as the 
number of days a group could stay at a campsite. Frank Star expressed some frustration 
with the contractor, stating it was “not responsive at times to some of our complaints or 
problems,” but he still recognized the system was valuable at least for “reduc[ing] some 
of our workload.”34
Public Outreach and Safety Programs
The Corps faced other problems at its recreation sites. Some trouble arose because of 
the proximity of these areas to urban regions. The Corps prided itself on providing 
recreational opportunities to cities, but this same feature created diffi culties in the 
twenty-fi rst century. Alcohol had long been a source of concern at Corps’ facilities 
and forced the agency to conduct periodic assessments of its prevalence at larger sites, 
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but the appearance of methamphetamine labs at some Corps’ campgrounds was 
disturbing as well.35 So, too, was the danger that some Corps’ rangers faced. Because 
rangers did not have any law enforcement authority, working only to implement 
rules and regulations, they could not carry or use weapons, meaning they sometimes 
had little means of protecting themselves against assaults. The need to provide for 
ranger safety was emphasized in the 1970s when escapees from the Oklahoma State 
Prison abducted two park rangers in Arkansas, critically 
injuring one and killing the other. Such incidents caused 
concern, and, in 1995, the government appointed a task 
force to investigate ranger safety. This group issued a 
report and policy letter in 1996 addressing concerns and 
providing recommendations. One of the results of this 
study was the implementation in 1999 of a pilot program 
in the Fort Worth District allowing rangers to carry 
pepper spray. Based on the success of this experiment, 
the Corps issued a circular in April 2002 allowing 
all of its park rangers to carry and use the spray for 
self-defense. St. Paul District rangers welcomed this 
authorization, especially after discovering that in the 
summer of 2002 a highly dangerous sex offender was 
located not many miles from one of its camping sites 
in Minnesota. As Star related, “It’s getting a little more 
scary out there for our employees.”36
As visitation at Corps’ facilities expanded, littering 
problems increased as well. The St. Paul District, for 
example, had trouble with trash problems on the 
dredged material islands in the Mississippi River. 
Richard Otto, one of the district’s natural resources 
managers, explained there was little the district could do 
to ensure that visitors to these islands cleaned up their 
trash because “we don’t have any staff to patrol on the 
water.”37 Instead, the district sponsored annual volunteer 
cleanups at the islands, but littering continued. At other 
sites manned by the Corps, rangers regularly patrolled 
campgrounds and water areas both for safety reasons 
and for trash control, but as one district engineer related, 
“with limited resources, we cannot assign 24-hour ranger 
patrols to each recreation area.”38
In large part because of its staff and its outreach 
programs, the St. Paul District was able to provide a 
satisfying experience at its recreation facilities. The 
district received numerous letters from pleased visitors 
applauding Corps’ personnel and various recreation 
programs. One couple expressed their approval with 
the district’s Gull Lake campground. “It is nice to 
Water Safety:  Frank 
Star, wearing his ranger 
uniform, introduces the 
Corps’ Seamoor the Sea 
Dragon to children in La 
Crosse, Wis. Seamoor’s job 
is to teach water safety. 
(Photo by Shannon Bauer, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
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know that there is always such a great place to go for camping,” they commented, 
“and it is especially nice to know that we see the same familiar, friendly and helpful 
staff.”39 Neil R. Hunt, the president of a local Parent-Teacher Association, echoed these 
sentiments after a grade-school class toured the Cross Lake Recreation Area with two 
summer interns. “The kind of human level, service-oriented actions” exemplifi ed by 
the employees, he observed, did “more to improve the attitude of taxpayers than any 
program or brochure coming out of Washington.”40
Outreach programs provided an excellent means for the Corps to interact with the 
public, especially youth. School groups routinely visited recreation areas for tours, 
environmental workshops and fi shing lessons, while youth also attended summer 
fi shing clinics and contests. In 1978, for example, several recreation sites sponsored 
“Eco-Expoz,” where students participated in tours, games and exercises dealing 
with the environment. According to Richard Otto, the students enjoyed the different 
programs, convincing the district to continue them in future years.41 In a similar way, 
the St. Paul District participated in the Mississippi River 
Project in 1993, where different federal agencies coordinated 
a day of water quality awareness education for youth along 
the Mississippi from its headwaters to the Gulf of Mexico. 
As part of this program, students in the St. Paul District 
went to Lake Itasca, Harriet Island in St. Paul and Locks and 
Dams 3, 7 and 9 to help with water sampling and testing. 
At Lock and Dam 7, Otto and Corrine Hodapp, a park 
ranger at Blackhawk Park, discussed commercial navigation 
and water safety before the students conducted their 
experiments. As a district account of the event concluded, 
“By the end of the day, more than 300 future stewards of the 
Mississippi River had a better understanding of the river 
and its problems and promises.”42
Fishing activities were also popular. In June 1991, the staff 
at Sandy Lake Dam sponsored a clinic for campground 
visitors and a local 4-H club. Forty youth attended the event 
and learned how to identify different species of fi sh and 
how to tie various knots, while also gaining knowledge in 
artifi cial lures, casting, the uses of live bait and the proper 
way to release fi sh. At the conclusion of the workshop, the 
4-H group asked the Corps to hold such clinics every year.43 
Meanwhile, the Lake Ashtabula staff conducted an annual 
program entitled “Take A Kid Fishing Day,” held each June 
in conjunction with National Fishing Week. Rangers helped 
the children fi sh in the morning, and then talked to them 
about water safety and the “Mr. McGruff ” safety program in 
the afternoon. Upon leaving, each child received a bag with 
safety literature, coloring books, a National Fishing Week 
Educational Activity Book and various prizes donated by 
Valley City, North Dakota, businesses.44
Recreation:  Young 
fi shermen at Lake 
Ashtabula in North 
Dakota (Photo by Jeff 
Kapaun, courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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Safety Programs
As the Lake Ashtabula clinic showed, safety was an important feature of the Corps’ 
outreach programs. Because so many recreational opportunities revolved around 
water, the Corps was concerned about the public’s safety. The locks and dams on the 
Mississippi River constituted some of the most dangerous places because of the strong 
currents and powerful undertows close to the structures. To combat this problem, 
the Corps established restricted areas both above and below the locks and dams, 
but accidents still occurred.45 The safety hazards that water posed led lock operators 
and park rangers to gain training in rescue, CPR and fi rst aid, and this preparation 
was sometimes very useful. In May 1989, for example, park rangers at Leech Lake 
conducted two separate rescue operations within three days of each other. The fi rst 
involved a fi sherman who had become lost on the lake, while the second saved 
two couples stranded in a boat fi lled with water. Park Rangers Clint Fishel, Corrine 
Hodapp and Jeff Steere all participated in the rescues, leading one Corps’ publication 
to express its gratitude for the “training and expertise of the park rangers at our 
recreation areas.”46
In addition to ensuring its employees had proper rescue skills, the Corps conducted 
safety programs at its recreation sites. Lake Ashtabula, for example, presented “Kids 
in Boats” workshops to teach children about personal fl otation devices, hypothermia, 
rescue techniques and knot tying. Although students could attend the session at the 
lake, rangers also took the program to various locations in North Dakota in support 
of the North Dakota Game and Fish Department and the North Dakota Safety 
Council. According to one ranger, the workshops were so popular the staff could not 
fi ll every request. Likewise, personnel at the Cross Lake Recreation Area provided 
water safety presentations to grade school classes at the end of every school year in 
preparation for summer water activities.47 According to park ranger Kevin Berg, these 
programs helped “the public better understand the importance of thinking ‘safety’ 
while on the water.”48
Other forms of outreach included Corps’ participation in outdoor recreation 
conferences and professional societies. The St. Paul District often had booths at 
recreation and sports shows, where it explained its recreation operations. Frank Star 
claimed these shows enabled the Corps to “tell our story” to people unaware of “how 
big the Corps was and what it did.” Several district employees, some in leadership 
positions, were also active in professional societies, including the National Association 
of Interpreters, the National Recreation and Parks Association and the National Society 
for Park Resources. All of these efforts resulted in increased public exposure of the 
Corps’ recreation mission.49
Assisting in Natural Resources Management
Recreation employees also helped the Corps manage its natural resources. Part of 
this mission consisted of ensuring that recreation use on reservoirs and rivers did not 
harm the surrounding environment. One way the St. Paul District accomplished this 
was through environmental studies. As part of the Upper Mississippi River-Illinois 
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Waterway System Navigation Study in the 1990s, for example, the district undertook 
an examination of the effects of recreational boating traffi c on the Upper Mississippi 
River for the project’s EIS. The study related that recreational vessels caused “wake 
waves, propeller turbulence, noise in air and under water, release of petroleum and 
combustion products into air and water, and consumption of petroleum fuels.” In 
addition, they contributed to “shoreline erosion, sediment resuspension, and land 
use changes for marina facilities and boat landings.” Finally, although boating was an 
enjoyable activity, the plan stated, it produced “confl icts for lockage with commercial 
vessels, boating accidents, use of nonrenewable resources for leisure, and disturbance 
of other recreational users.” The study addressed how an expansion of navigation on 
the Mississippi River would affect these conditions but offered few solutions to the 
problems.50
This was not the fi rst time the district examined the diffi culties of recreational boating 
on the Mississippi. In 1977, the Corps held public workshops on locking delays faced 
by recreational boaters on the Mississippi River. Because commercial barges had 
priority at the locks, recreational vessels sometimes had to wait as long as two-and-a-
half hours for the availability of a lock. The Corps commissioned a study on the issue, 
and this report contained seven alternatives for relieving the congestion, including 
using signs to inform boaters of the length of the wait, providing special tie-up areas 
for recreational boaters, implementing designated lock times for recreational vessels 
and constructing separate recreation locks.51 In 1978, the Corps examined the feasibility 
of these alternatives, and the district eventually decided that the best ways to alleviate 
the congestion were to use signs and to establish better waiting areas. Unfortunately, 
these methods did not resolve the issue. In 2002, Frank Star still considered lock delays 
“a problem” for recreational boaters.52
Additional studies of the environmental effects of recreation on waterways also 
occurred. The Long Term Resource Monitoring Program of the Corps’ Environmental 
Management Program, conducted by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, studied the 
characteristics of waves from recreational watercraft in 1992 in order to determine 
their effects on the environment. The report recognized that waves from recreational 
vessels could exacerbate bank erosion and “cause resuspension of fi ne sediments and 
increased turbidity, which can then be carried to the side channels and backwater areas 
and may impair riverine ecosystems.”53 Meanwhile, in 1996 the River Resources Forum 
Recreation Work Group, an interagency organization chaired by Richard Otto, studied 
water-based recreational activities in Pools 7 and 8 of the Mississippi River in order to 
gather information useful “in determining future recreational uses of the river.” The 
group discovered that the most popular activities on the river were boat fi shing and 
recreational boating and that personal watercraft, such as jet skis, were becoming more 
prevalent. Such conditions led “a large number of boaters” to “avoid certain parts of the 
river because there are ‘too many other boats’ or ‘too many [boat] wakes.’”54 However, as 
with the Upper Mississippi Navigation Study, these reports did not offer many solutions.
But as a Minnesota DNR brochure explained, there were measures that could be taken. 
It was the boater’s responsibility to reduce his or her speed and wake size in order to 
mitigate shoreline erosion and other problems, the brochure claimed, but the Corps 
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could implement mandatory speed and wake restrictions. “If all boaters become aware 
of the wakes their boats create and take action to reduce them when necessary,” the 
brochure concluded, “the shoreline erosion can be reduced and conditions should 
improve.”55 The St. Paul District did not necessarily disagree. Richard Otto, for example, 
believed if the Corps did a better job of getting information to boaters, environmental 
effects could be lessened.56
In the meantime, district offi cials continued to serve on natural resource studies. In 
the fi rst years of the twenty-fi rst century, Frank Star participated in an examination 
of a system-wide operating plan for the headwaters of the Upper Mississippi. Called 
the Reservoir Operating Plan Evaluation Study, or ROPE study, it was conducted in 
partnership with the Forest Service, attempted, in the words of the St. Paul District, “to 
evaluate alternative plans and to recommend a new operating plan for the Mississippi 
Headwaters Reservoirs system with consideration given to tribal trust, fl ood control, 
environmental concerns, water quality, water supply, recreation, navigation, 
hydropower and more.”57 In essence, Star explained, the ROPE study would enable 
the Corps to operate the headwaters “more as a system.” Some of the alternatives the 
study examined were allowing more natural fl ow releases from the lakes in the spring 
and changing the levels of some of the lakes. It remained to be seen how extensively 
the study would change the Corps’ recreational practices at the headwaters, but the 
coordination of different purposes would at least provide better communication 
between agencies and groups responsible for the headwaters.58
Mississippi River Boathouses
One of the major controversies involving recreation and natural resources in the St. Paul 
District occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, but its beginnings stretched back into the 1920s. 
In 1924, Congress established the Upper Mississippi River Wildlife and Fish Refuge 
along a stretch of the river running from Wabasha, Minnesota, to Quincy, Illinois, and 
placed it under the jurisdiction of the Fish and Wildlife Service. In order to preserve 
habitat, the Fish and Wildlife Service purchased land along the Upper Mississippi. When 
Congress authorized the nine-foot channel navigation project in 1930, the Corps began 
buying land as well. This resulted in a checkerboard pattern of land ownership along 
the Upper Mississippi, in which the Corps owned some land and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service held other tracts. As people purchased property along the Mississippi River, the 
shoreline remained under the control of the two agencies. Against the wishes of the Fish 
and Wildlife Service, however, the Corps allowed individuals to place boathouses and 
docks on shorelines and did nothing to regulate this until 1960, even though some people 
moved amenities into the structures in order to have a place to stay on the weekends.59
In 1960, the Corps, concerned that these property owners were using public land for 
private purposes, developed Special Use Licenses for anyone wishing to place a structure 
on the shoreline, and these licenses specifi cally prohibited human habitation in the units. 
The Corps revised the license in 1973 to state that specifi c items, such as beds, stoves and 
heaters, were not allowed. Four years later, the St. Paul District, led by District Engineer 
Colonel Forrest T. Gay, strictly implemented these provisions and issued both public 
statements and private letters stating the Corps would remove units out of compliance. 
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It was unclear why Gay decided to take a stand at this time, but it is likely that he was 
partly motivated by pressure from the Fish and Wildlife Service, which considered the 
boathouses to be incompatible with the river’s wildlife refuge designation.60
Whatever Gay’s reasoning, a public outcry arose against enforcement. Minnesota 
State Representative Tom Stoa from Winona prepared a state resolution opposing the 
Corps’ licenses, arguing that “the vast majority of boathouses are neither a hazard to 
navigation nor detrimental to the river environment.” Stoa suggested the Corps target 
industrial pollutants, such as the Metro Waste Commission, “rather than harass the 
little guy who likes to spend the 
weekend at his boathouse.”61 
At the same time, the city of 
Brownsville, Minnesota, the site of 
numerous boathouses, supported 
the property owners; the city 
council declared that they saw 
“no harm with an overnight or 
weekend stay, to be able to relax, 
do a little fi shing or boating, 
providing [property owners] 
keep their area respectable and 
refrain from polluting.” Finally, 
citizens formed CARP (Concerned 
About River People), an 
organization which championed 
an owner’s right to stay in his 
or her boathouse on occasional 
weekends.62
The confl ict continued into the 1980s, when the St. Paul District announced it would 
begin on-site inspections of structures near Brownsville that it suspected were out of 
compliance with the regulations. On September 30, 1980, Ted Loukota and Joe Murphy 
of the district’s real estate section conducted the inspections. One newspaper reported 
that “there was no apparent animosity between the inspection team” and the boathouse 
owners, but citizens were still displeased. La Crosse County Supervisor William Ipsen 
wondered whether the crackdown would “push our kids back on the streets” because 
they would not want to go to the river “and sit in a bare room.” Loukota and Murphy 
expressed sympathy but argued that “if we allow the boathouses to be improved so 
they can be lived in we are granting exclusive rights to a few.”63
After these inspections, the issue remained dormant until 1982 when the Corps and the 
Fish and Wildlife Service began preparing a Land Use Allocation Plan for the Upper 
Mississippi. In a discussion of how to handle private use of the shoreline, the Fish and 
Wildlife Service declared that the boathouses, whether livable or not, were incompatible 
with the river’s designation as a wildlife refuge. The Fish and Wildlife Service claimed 
that lands purchased with tax dollars should be public land – they should not be leased 
Boathouse:  An individual fi shing from a 
boathouse on the Mississippi River. (Photo by 
Richard Otto, courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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out for private exclusive use. In a spirit of cooperation with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the Corps agreed as part of the Land Use Allocation Plan to refuse to issue any 
new licenses for boathouses on the river and to phase out all existing boathouses and 
docks by grandfathering them only for the life of the current owner. Once that owner 
died, the Corps would demolish the structure.64
The Land Use Allocation Plan and the Corps held public meetings in towns along the 
river throughout 1982 to announce this plan. But, in the words of Richard Otto, who 
operated as the district’s spokesman on the issue, “We got crucifi ed pretty badly.” 
Hundreds of people attended the meetings and were almost universally opposed to the 
plan. “They made a very strong point that they wanted their ... privileges to continue,” 
Otto related.65 In order to bolster their case against the Corps, CARP and other 
concerned citizens turned to the National Inholders Association, an organization whose 
mission was to fi ght bureaucracy on behalf of private property interests. The National 
Inholders Association pledged $35,000 annually to battle the Corps.66
Despite the National Inholders Association’s efforts, the Land Use Allocation Plan, as 
published, called for the elimination of the boathouses, stating that the grandfathering 
would occur in 1989. A Corps’ newsletter published that same year unequivocally 
stated the Corps’ reasons for instigating the plan: “Special private use of Federal land 
is becoming increasingly less appropriate and is not in the best public interest ... All 
available Federal land along the river will be needed to help meet future public use 
demands.” Although it seemed that boathouse owners had little recourse after this 
policy was issued, the National Inholders Association assured them there were several 
avenues still open. Even Otto admitted that “though the plan is in the very fi nal stage, 
there is a chance that the public could have it changed through legislation.” This was 
the exact approach that the National Inholders Association took.67
For the next few years, the National Inholders Association lobbied Congress to allow 
the boathouses to remain; and in 1986, its dedication paid off. In the Water Resources 
Development Act of 1986, Congress mandated that no existing structure could be 
phased out on Corps’ land. Because of this legislation, the Corps had to change its plan 
to say it would grandfather the structure instead of the owner, meaning that transfers of 
ownership could occur. As Otto explained, the boathouses thus “could be perpetuated 
way on into the future,” although the Corps still refused to grant permits for new 
units. This meant, essentially, that the number of structures was frozen. “If there’s 92 
structures,” Otto said, “there will never be 93.” This new plan went into effect in 1988 
and forced the Corps to use one full-time person to inspect the structures every year 
to ensure they were up to code. According to Otto, “habitation [was] still prohibited; it 
[was] just very diffi cult to enforce.”68 The presence of the Mississippi boathouses, then, 
represents a good example of the confl ict that arose between private property and the 
Corps’ mission to manage its waterways for the benefi t of the general public. It also 
showed that at least in some instances, public opinion could change Corps’ policy.
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Conclusion
Whether the St. Paul District was developing recreation opportunities at new projects, 
maintaining existing facilities, providing outreach programs or managing natural 
resources, its recreation staff interacted to a great extent with the public. Although at 
times the district, and the Corps in general, was reluctant to embrace its recreational 
mission fully, whether because of interagency confl icts, environmental concerns 
or the preeminence of other functions over recreation, the St. Paul District offered 
numerous services to the public. Indeed, recreation provided good exposure for the 
Corps, established good public relations and offered services many people appreciated. 
Because of this service function, recreation offi cials sometimes considered themselves 
to be public servants rather than just Corps’ employees. “I often tell people I don’t work 
for the Corps in the same sense that you work for General Motors,” Frank Star related. 
“I work for the public.”69 With this commitment, the St. Paul District’s recreation 
program effectively brought information about the Corps and its mission to the people, 
enhancing the Corps’ visibility in the process.
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Lake Winnibigoshish Reservoir at the 
center of controversy during the 
drought of 1988. (Photo courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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In the 1950s, Congress mandated the Corps of Engineers to provide 
relief to communities stricken by fl oods. Additional laws expanded the 
Corps’ responsibility, authorizing it to provide emergency operations in 
water-related disasters such as hurricanes and drought. In the regions 
served by the St. Paul District, the Corps’ emergency response was 
extremely important. The high water tables and severe winters of North 
Dakota, Minnesota and Wisconsin caused fl ooding almost every spring, as melting ice 
and snow poured into river basins in fi ve separate fl oodplains. In times of disaster, the 
district’s Readiness Branch provided logistical and technical support to incapacitated 
communities, building emergency levees and supplying equipment and manpower to 
fi ght fl oods. As it participated in these activities in the late twentieth century, the Corps 
earned accolades from those it aided, which improved its public image and boosted the 
morale of its employees. The Corps basked in this praise, frequently commenting on 
the worthwhile service it provided and the good feelings this engendered. As Robert 
F. Post, chief of the Engineering and Planning Division from 1987 to 1999, related after 
a 1997 fl ood on the Red River, “The professionalism and dedication displayed by the 
more than 200 men and women of the Corps’ Flood Emergency Response Team during 
this event was truly awesome.”1
The Corps’ emergency operations mission was a relatively new development. In June 
1955, Congress passed Public Law (PL) 84-99, which created a $15 million emergency 
fund to be used by the Corps “in fl ood emergency preparation; in fl ood fi ghting and 
rescue operations, or in the repair or restoration of any fl ood-control work threatened 
or destroyed by fl ood.”2 Subsequent amendments to the act expanded the Corps’ 
authority to deal with hurricane and shore protection, contaminated water and 
drought. In such instances, the Corps could engage in any action “which is essential 
for the preservation of life and property,” such as strengthening existing fl ood control 
8Emergency Operations and Recovery
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structures, constructing temporary levees, clearing channels and removing debris and 
wreckage once a fl ood had receded and providing clean water to regions in need.3
Supplementing PL 84-99 was the 1974 Disaster Relief Act, which empowered the 
president of the United States to provide federal assistance during major natural 
disasters of any kind upon a governor’s request. If the president determined a disaster 
exceeded the capabilities of a state, he would authorize federal emergency operations 
to begin.4 To provide a central coordinating agency for this federal response, President 
Jimmy Carter issued an executive order in 1979 that created the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.5 In 1988, Congress formalized FEMA’s role in the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.6 Under the provisions of 
this law, FEMA reviewed governors’ requests for federal assistance and then made 
recommendations to the president on whether or not aid was warranted. If the 
president decided assistance was required, he issued a disaster declaration and chose a 
federal coordinating offi cer who supervised FEMA’s direction of relief activities.7
In order to streamline emergency operations, FEMA developed a Federal Response 
Plan outlining the responsibilities of different agencies in times of disaster. Under the 
plan, the Corps became the operating agent for Emergency Support Function #3 (ESF-
3), entitled Public Works and Engineering. This made the Corps the lead agency in 
providing a variety of services, including: technical advice and evaluation, construction 
management and inspection, emergency repair of water and wastewater treatment 
facilities, emergency power, inspection of residential and commercial structures 
to determine damage and the stabilization or demolition of damaged structures or 
facilities deemed hazardous. In essence, the Federal Response Plan required the Corps 
to supply both logistical support and materiel in times of disaster.8
Whether the Corps acted on its own under the authority of PL 84-99 or under the 
direction of FEMA depended on the status of the disaster and whether or not it was 
water-related. If the Corps supplied fl ood assistance before a presidential disaster 
proclamation, it used its PL 84-99 authorization and funded the operation in a couple 
of ways. If the emergency called for strengthening fl ood control works operated by 
the Corps, money came from project funds. If local sponsors had responsibility for the 
fl ood control works, they paid up to twenty-fi ve percent of the cost. However, in cases 
where a presidential disaster declaration had been issued and in instances of non-water-
related emergencies, the Corps had to wait for FEMA to authorize its ESF-3 function 
before it could take any action. The Corps then funded these operations with money 
routed through FEMA.9 In all cases, Corps’ offi cials emphasized, emergency operations 
were supplements to local and state actions, not replacements. Local and state offi cials 
had to exert “maximum efforts” and offi cially request aid before the Corps could 
become involved. In addition, local governments had to “identify specifi c needs; obtain 
all necessary easements and rights of ways; provide a local source of borrow material; 
and coordinate with local landowners.”10
In the St. Paul District, disaster relief fell under the authority of the Readiness Branch in 
the Construction-Operations Division. The chief of the Readiness Branch served as the 
district’s point of contact for emergency situations and was responsible for the district’s 
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Emergency Operations Center, an administrative support offi ce within district 
headquarters that provided central logistical guidance.11 The chief, together with the 
district’s fl ood executive offi cer (who was the chief of the Engineering Division and 
who provided technical advice to the district engineer), ensured the district had a cadre 
of well-trained specialists that could be mobilized in times of emergency. Among these 
were the fl ood area engineers and operations managers who worked in the fi eld to 
coordinate fl ood control activities. In order to keep themselves ready for deployment, 
these employees participated both in annual fl ood scenario workshops and training in 
emergency operations and technology such as ENGLINK, an emergency operations 
software program. Other exercises included teaching people about contract negotiations 
for levee construction, practicing deployment of personnel to sites and establishing 
communication links between individuals in the fi eld and in the offi ce. Such simulations 
prepared the district for real emergency situations.12
Floods
Most of the St. Paul District’s disaster operations occurred in response to spring fl ooding 
in the fi ve fl oodplains under its jurisdiction. One of the major trouble spots was the Red 
River of the North Basin in North Dakota and Minnesota, a predominantly agricultural 
area. In geologic times, fi rst a continental glacier and then glacial Lake Agassiz covered 
the region, creating an immature, fl at and poorly drained valley through which runs 
the Red River, a waterway that begins in the vicinity of Breckenridge, Minnesota, and 
Wahpeton, North Dakota, and runs north into Canada. In the winter, frequent blizzards 
and below-zero temperatures cause large accumulations of snow. When spring arrives, 
snowmelt runoff, beginning fi rst in the southern headwaters, generates high fl ows in the 
river. As the water moves north, it collides with ice in the river’s still-frozen downstream 
reaches. These jams elevate fl ood stages and frequently push the waterway out of its 
banks. When that happens, water runs for miles in every direction because of the fl atness 
of the valley. Surrounding communities and farmland sustain heavy damage.13
In the spring of 1950, for example, the river ran 54,000 cubic feet per second, or cfs, at 
Grand Forks, North Dakota, instead of the usual 32,000 cfs, causing millions of dollars 
of damage. Despite several projects constructed to restrain the waterway, the river 
overfl owed again in the spring of 1969, this time inundating Fargo, North Dakota, with 
nearly three times its normal fl ow.14 The problems continued in 1978 when a greater than 
normal snowpack led the district to prepare for fl ooding. Thirty employees constructed 
temporary levees along the Red and its tributaries and gathered pumps, sandbags and 
polyethylene sheeting for the fi ght. The district also set up an offi ce to coordinate with 
local offi cials.15
When fl ooding began in late March and early April 1978, the river reached record water 
levels at Oslo, Minnesota, and approached records at Twin Valley and Hendrum, both 
Minnesota, and at Grand Forks. By the middle of April the water had formed a lake 22 
miles long and 5 miles wide over rural farmlands just north of Grand Forks. “The water 
has been coming up so fast, I don’t have any idea how many roads we’ve got fl ooded,” 
Norman County Sheriff Herman Lovas related. “It’s just running wild.”16 Fortunately, 
the river soon crested, easing the danger, but the damage had been done. U.S. Senator 
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Quentin Burdick (D-North Dakota) believed the devastation “thoroughly justifi e[d]” 
a presidential disaster declaration, and twenty-three counties subsequently received 
disaster assistance.17 Although many farms and ranches suffered from fl ooding, the 
district, using a complicated formula that compared peak fl ood stage/discharge 
data with existing stage/discharge damage curves, claimed that its emergency 
preparations and permanent levees prevented an estimated $40 million in additional 
damages, especially in urban areas. However, the fl ood highlighted the need for 
increased protection in several communities, including Grand Forks and West Fargo 
in North Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Crookston, Halstad, Hendrum and Roseau in 
Minnesota.18
Floodfi ghting
Grand Forks, North Dakota, during the Red River of the North fl ood of 1997. 
(Photos courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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Before the Corps could take any measures, the basin experienced its worst fl ood of 
the century. Initial forecasts in the spring of 1979 indicated that, although fl ooding 
was possible along the Red River and its tributaries, water levels would not approach 
those of 1978. In fact, the National Weather Service downgraded its forecast in April, 
indicating that, with normal precipitation patterns, only minor fl ooding would occur. 
The situation changed in mid-April when heavy rains fell and snow began melting 
rapidly. In preparation, the St. Paul District established emergency fi eld offi ces at Fargo 
and Grand Forks, constructed new emergency levees, and strengthened old ones. In 
some areas, the water rose too rapidly, and the communities of Warren and Stephen, 
Minnesota, and Grand Forks, Argusville, Bowesmont and Grafton, North Dakota, were 
inundated by the end of April. Water spread for 12 miles just north of Grand Forks, 
topping farmer-constructed dikes and submerging thousands of acres of farmland. By 
the time the water receded, it had reached heights unseen since 1897 – the worst fl ood 
on record – and had caused more than $90 million in damages.19
Ninety district employees labored to ease the disaster’s effects. The Corps estimated 
that workers spent 10,186 man hours fi ghting the fl ood, serving in one of four units: 
materials distribution, construction, reconnaissance and communication. The materials 
distribution group gathered the items necessary for the operation, such as sandbags and 
pumps, and coordinated the rental of other equipment. The construction unit planned 
and designed the required levees and negotiated the requisite construction contracts. 
The reconnaissance team collected fi eld stream gauging data and set high-water 
marks so that it could better record the peak discharges and stages along the river. The 
communications unit installed equipment, such as commercial telephone lines and 
radios, to ensure interaction between the fi eld offi ces and the emergency centers. These 
groups also coordinated efforts with other agencies, including the Minnesota and North 
Dakota National Guards, the Second Coast Guard District, the Air Force, the National 
Weather Service and the U.S. Geological Survey, among others.20
By the end of the fi ght, the district, in partnership with these entities, had assisted 
more than fi fty communities and constructed 33,470 feet of new emergency levee, 
while upgrading an additional 42,640 feet of existing levee. It additionally supplied 
affected areas with 462 rolls of polyethylene sheeting, 104 pumps and nearly 4 million 
sandbags. According to Corps’ calculations, these efforts prevented approximately $40 
million in damages, leading the district to claim that its role “was a key one carried out 
skillfully and tenaciously.” The Corps’ estimate of damage prevention failed to impress 
many residents in the Red River Valley who demanded more permanent fl ood control 
projects. “More than $300 million of damage has been done by fl oods in the last 10 
years,” U.S. Representative Arlan Stangeland (R-Minnesota) declared. “I am tired of 
facing this devastation every year.”21 The Corps acknowledged that some communities, 
such as East Grand Forks, required additional fl ood protection and promised to pursue 
these projects further, especially after Congress held hearings in the summer of 1979 on 
Red River fl ooding problems and solutions.22
Throughout the 1980s, however, the Corps had diffi culty fi nding projects in the area 
with favorable benefi t-cost ratios. When it did, local communities, such as East Grand
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Forks, sometimes balked at paying their share of the cost (see Chapter Four). Because 
there were no major fl oods for most of the decade, the public clamor for projects on 
the Red River subsided, highlighting the obvious connection between disasters and 
fl ood control projects. If fl ooding occurred several years in a row, the public and its 
congressional delegation pleaded for projects. If weather patterns produced no fl ooding 
for an extended period of time, it was diffi cult for the Corps to convince communities of 
potential danger, even if its fi gures showed a signifi cant fl ood potential.23
In the spring of 1989, the relative lull in the Red River Valley ended when ice jams once 
again caused the Red to fl ow out of its banks. The Corps began preparing in March 
after National Weather Service forecasts indicated that minor to moderate fl ooding 
would occur in the Red River Basin. In April, large slabs of ice clogged the river at 
Breckenridge, Minnesota, and Wahpeton, North Dakota, quickly elevating water 
levels to dangerous heights. Before the Corps or the cities could act, water fl owed into 
the streets, pouring into Breckenridge’s sewer system and fl ooding more than three 
hundred houses. “I’ve been here over 20 years and people just can’t believe it,” Butch 
Stollenwerk, a city worker for Breckenridge, related. “They haven’t seen anything like 
this before.” Craig Hinton, a St. Paul District engineer, agreed. “You look at the little 
old Red River during the summer and it’s just a little stream,” he explained. “Now it’s 
something else.”24 The water forced many citizens to evacuate their homes, leaving 
behind empty neighborhoods and mobile home parks. “It gives you a spooky feeling,” 
Gary Ferguson, a resident of Breckenridge, commented. “From what I can see, it’s 
pretty deserted.”25
Although little could be done for Breckenridge and Wahpeton, the St. Paul District 
quickly set up operations in communities downstream. From these bases, the Corps 
constructed emergency levees for Fargo and Grand Forks, as well as for East Grand 
Forks and Moorhead, Minnesota. At the same time, hydrologic teams inspected the 
Red and its tributaries to develop forecasts for the river’s maximum stages. According 
to the district’s After Action Report, sixty-fi ve members of the St. Paul District worked 
in the Red River Basin “during the peak of operations” in the fi rst two weeks of April. 
Fortunately, normal temperatures and little precipitation together diminished the fl ood 
threat, and many of these workers were able to return home after only a few days in 
the fi eld. The staff expended a total of 10,117 man hours, and, as with earlier fl oods, 
cooperated with several different agencies, including the Minnesota and North Dakota 
National Guards, the Second Coast Guard District and the Air Force. Breckenridge and 
Wahpeton experienced serious damage, but few other cities saw drastic fl ooding, and 
rural areas, overwhelmed in previous fl oods, escaped relatively unscathed. In its After 
Action Report, the district estimated its work prevented $25 million in damages to 
twenty communities.26
One reason for the district’s effectiveness was the availability of new technology that 
facilitated communications between emergency operation centers and fi eld workers. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, America experienced a technological boom, especially in 
computing and communications systems.27 By 1989, the Corps was reaping the 
benefi ts of these innovations. During the fl ood fi ght, the Corps used technology not 
available in the 1970s, such as laptop computers, which expedited contract negotiations 
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and reconnaissance reports; facsimile (FAX) machines, which quickly transported 
contracts, situation reports, correspondence and newspaper articles between offi ces; 
and portable radios and beepers.28 “The development of high technology in the last 
decade,” an article in the district’s newsletter explained, “made a signifi cant difference 
in communications and record keeping operations from the fl oods of ‘78 and ‘79.”29 
According to one report, this technology would only “expand in the future,” enabling 
the Corps to further “increase the speed and effi ciency of administrative control of 
emergency operations.”30
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For the next few years, the Corps enjoyed a reprieve from serious fl ooding; but in 
the late spring and early summer of 1993, major rainstorms inundated the Midwest, 
overfl owing numerous rivers. Although states such as Iowa bore the brunt of the 
storms, North Dakota and Minnesota also experienced problems. In May, the town of 
Marshall, Minnesota, fl ooded after receiving nearly 10 inches of rain in one day, and 
this was repeated in June. Meanwhile, Valley City, North Dakota, experienced a seven-
inch rainfall in three hours on July 15. In order to mitigate the resulting fl oods, St. Paul 
District offi cials made a risky but innovative decision: they closed the gates of the Lake 
Ashtabula reservoir a few miles upstream from Valley City, thereby shutting off its 
discharge. The closure meant that water overtopped the reservoir’s gates by six inches, 
exerting a signifi cant amount of pressure on the structure. Despite the risk of collapse, 
the overtopping was necessary because it reduced the amount of water fl owing into 
Valley City, preventing signifi cant damages. Had another large rainstorm passed 
through the region, the district would have had to release the water, causing even 
more fl ooding, but the gamble paid off and the city survived.31 “If we had . . . stayed 
within the absolute technical bands in which we were supposed to work,” District 
Engineer Colonel Richard W. Craig explained, “Valley City would be [completely] 
fl ooded right now.”32
As rainstorm after rainstorm pummeled the Midwest in the summer of 1993, the soil in 
the area became saturated, causing heavy runoff into the streams and rivers feeding the 
Mississippi River. This started a chain reaction of massive fl ooding on the Mississippi, 
especially from the Quad Cities of Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri.33 Throughout the 
summer of 1993, Corps’ personnel fought to keep the river in its banks. Working in 
concert with FEMA, the Coast Guard, National Guard units and the American Red 
Cross, the Corps constructed emergency levees and strengthened existing structures. 
It also used gage readings to develop numerical models of river stage forecasts – a 
diffi cult task because of the wide fl uctuations in water levels caused by levee breaks and 
overtoppings – and supplied sandbags and pumps to local governments. By August 
9, more than fi ve hundred Corps’ employees were involved in the fi ght, including a 
hundred and seventy-one from the St. Paul District. In the district itself, most of the 
damage occurred when the Minnesota River spilled into towns and farmland before 
reaching the Mississippi River. Although the Mississippi reached an all-time summer 
record of 19.2 feet at St. Paul, fl ood control structures in the Twin Cities prevented 
major destruction. Unfortunately, fl ood control structures in other regions, especially 
privately constructed agricultural levees, were not as strong and water broke through 
in numerous places outside of the St. Paul District’s jurisdiction. By the time the water 
receded throughout the whole Mississippi Valley, the Great Flood of 1993 had killed 
fi fty-two people, injured 2,300, left 56,000 homeless and caused more than $10 billion in 
property damage.34
Although the fl ooding sparked a national debate about the effects of the Corps’ levees 
on the Mississippi River (see Chapter Three), the major lessons learned by the St. Paul 
District focused more on its fl ood response efforts. An After Action Report explained 
that accessible basin maps and project locality maps would facilitate staff discussions 
of future operations. It also called for blackboards, fl ip charts or other ways to display 
current hydrological data, location of district personnel, summaries of pertinent events 
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and important telephone numbers. Fighting the fl ood had demonstrated that cellular 
telephones were an effective way of communicating during some emergency operations 
and district offi cials advocated their future use. Finally, the fl ood had convinced the 
district that if local governments would prepare emergency situation guidelines, 
including emergency notifi cation contacts, inventories of supplies and maps of the 
region, damage could be reduced.35
Map:  Red River of the North Basin in North Dakota and Minnesota. (Map courtesy 
of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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The lessons of the 1993 fl ood served the St. Paul District well four years later when the 
Red River of the North inundated Grand Forks, East Grand Forks and several other 
communities. During the winter of 1996 and 1997, six to eight feet of snow accumulated 
in the Red River basin, breaking records in several places. In February 1997, the 
huge snowpack caused the National Weather Service to issue a forecast of major 
fl ooding, and the Corps began to prepare for the fi ght. In March, the district initiated 
approximately twenty-two advance measures in several communities, spending $5 
million. When warm temperatures at the end of March hastened melting, swelling 
the river and its tributaries, District Engineer Colonel J. M. Wonsik authorized the 
beginning of emergency operations.36
During the fi rst week of April, the Corps established emergency operation centers in 
Fargo and East Grand Forks and worked from these locations throughout the month. 
Based on a fl ood stage forecast of 49 feet at Grand Forks, the district constructed 
emergency levees around the city to a stage of 52 feet and transported sandbags to the 
area. Then, on April 6, Blizzard Hannah, one of the worst snowstorms in fi fty years, hit 
the region, causing whiteout conditions, heavy wind gusts and wind chill temperatures 
of forty below zero. The storm dropped an additional 3.5 inches of precipitation on the  
already-saturated ground.37
After the blizzard ended, temperatures escalated 
again, producing vast quantities of meltwater. 
During the third week of April, the Red rose to 54 
feet, nearly 40 feet above its normal level. Water 
spilled over the emergency levees, pouring water 
into the downtown areas of both Grand Forks and 
East Grand Forks and forcing massive evacuations. 
Not long after, broken gas pipes ignited a fi re 
in downtown Grand Forks. Because the water 
prevented fi re fi ghters from reaching the blaze, 
eleven buildings burned. In the words of Lisa 
Hedin, project manager of the Grand Forks/East 
Grand Forks Flood Control Project, the situation 
“was like a bad Sunday night movie.” By the time 
the river crested at 54.2 feet, signifi cant damage 
had occurred. On April 22, President Bill Clinton 
visited the two communities, declaring them 
disaster areas and commented that the people of 
America “could never imagine facing a fl ood and 
a fi re and a blizzard all at the same time.”38 By the 
time the water receded, eight people died, tens 
of thousands had fl ed their homes and property 
destruction approached $2 billion.39
But Grand Forks and East Grand Forks were not 
the only communities waging battles in 1997. 
Breckenridge, Minnesota; Fargo, North Dakota; 
Cleanup:  Corps’ contractors 
cleanup the aftermath left in 
Grand Forks, North Dakota, by 
the devastating Red River of 
the North fl ooding in 1997. (Photo 
courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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and Ada, Minnesota, also experienced fl ooding, as did areas along the Minnesota 
River and the Mississippi River. More than a hundred district employees provided 
emergency services to more than forty communities in the spring of 1997, winning 
the fi ght in all but four of them – Grand Forks, East Grand Forks, Breckenridge and 
Ada. In total, the district estimated it spent $14.8 million and prevented an additional 
$100 million in damages by supplying state and local governments with 4.5 million 
sandbags and 235 pumps. “Every fl ood executive offi cer hopes that during their career 
they won’t have to deal with any fl ood, much less a fl ood of this magnitude,” Robert 
Post, chief of engineering, commented. “Thank God we were prepared and trained for 
this emergency.”40
Flood fi ghts continued in the twenty-fi rst century, when the Red River and the 
Minnesota River overfl owed again in 2001. Likewise, after heavy rainstorms in the 
summer of 2002, the district faced fl ooding from the Wild Rice River at Ada, Minnesota; 
the Roseau River at Roseau, Minnesota; and Lake of the Woods at Warroad, Minnesota. 
As with other fl oods, the district aided local communities with levee construction, water 
stage predictions and cleanup efforts. At Lake of the Woods, the district employed a 
new fl ood fi ghting device: geo-cells, which were plastic grid systems fi lled with dirt 
and stacked four feet-by-four-feet. The Corps worried about their cost, but because 
they were recyclable for up to six fl oods, offi cials hoped they would prove to be cost-
effective. Using such technology, the Corps protected streets, residences and businesses 
in the three communities. “The entire district supported the fl ood fi ght,” David 
Christenson, chief of the Readiness Branch, stated, “and they did it very effectively.” 
A note from a family in Roseau concurred with this assessment, expressing “a sincere 
thank you” to Corps Employees for “a job well done.”41
Drought
Although fl ooding was the major natural disaster the St. Paul District routinely faced, 
other emergencies occurred as well. In 1977, Congress amended Public Law 84-99 to 
mandate the Corps provide services in times of drought, such as offering emergency 
supplies of water and constructing wells in affected areas.42 To fulfi ll this mandate, 
the Corps developed several plans of action. If the National Weather Service issued a 
drought alert forecast in the vicinity of the Upper Mississippi River, for example, the 
Corps could use its locks and dams to conserve water in its reservoirs, and then release 
the stored fl ow at later dates. If the drought became severe, the Corps could restrict the 
number of lockages on the Mississippi in order to preserve pool elevations. It could 
also conduct emergency dredging operations if water levels became too low. When 
local, county and state resources became exhausted, the Corps could supply emergency 
drinking water assistance by providing water tank trucks, bottled water, temporary 
fi ltration, mobile purifi cation units, temporary pipelines and well-drilling equipment. 
In such instances, the Corps would cover the transportation costs while the community 
would pay for the water charges.43
The St. Paul District used these plans in 1976 when severe drought conditions affected 
the Midwest. When the Mississippi River’s water fl ow dipped to 532 cfs between 
Minneapolis and St. Paul, District Engineer Colonel Forrest Gay and Minnesota Governor  
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Wendell Anderson called an emergency news conference to ask Minnesotans to 
conserve as much water as possible. Within two weeks, residents of the Twin Cities 
had curtailed their water consumption by fi fty percent. The district also restricted the 
number of recreational lockages at St. Anthony Falls and Lock and Dam 1, thereby 
helping navigation interests on the river. Because of these actions, Minnesotans 
successfully outlasted the drought until rain fi nally fell.44
Another drought occurred in 1988 when water fl ows on the Mississippi again declined 
dramatically. During an unusually dry June, water levels at Anoka, Minnesota 
(upstream of the Twin Cities), dropped to 1,280 cfs, dramatically lower than the normal 
10,000 cfs average for June. Throughout the month, Ed Eaton, chief of the district’s 
water control unit, met with representatives from the Minnesota DNR in a series of 
technical drought meetings. At the same time, the district’s emergency management 
team prepared a situation report on the conditions in North Dakota, Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. When water levels continued to fall, the district advised recreational boaters 
that they could face either locking delays or restrictions on the Mississippi, and the state 
of Minnesota asked its residents to conserve water.45
Conditions worsened in July when no rain was forthcoming. The Minnesota DNR 
informed the Corps on July 6 that if water levels dipped below 1,000 cfs for three 
consecutive days, it would request the district release water from its headwaters 
reservoirs. During the last week of July, three consecutive days of sub-1,000 cfs fl ows 
occurred. In response, Governor Rudy Perpich asked the Corps to release 300 cfs of 
water from the Lake Winnibigoshish Reservoir. The Leech Lake Band of the Chippewa 
Indians protested the plan, concerned that a release of water at that time would have 
adverse impacts on its wild rice and fi shing operations later. At the same time, St. Paul 
District offi cials, including Colonel Roger Baldwin, who had only recently assumed 
the position of district engineer, did not believe the release would materially affect the 
low water levels. But because there was no conclusive data to support these claims, the 
district was reluctant to reject the request. While district offi cials considered the best 
course to follow, the river’s fl ow dropped to 842 cfs at Anoka on July 30. Fortunately, 
only three days later, rain began falling. Using the rainfall as justifi cation, Baldwin 
informed Perpich, the Leech Lake Band and Minnesota’s congressional delegation that 
he would not release water from Winnibigoshish. For the next two weeks, intermittent 
heavy rains soaked the area, and, by August 16, the Mississippi’s fl ow was at 2,690 cfs, 
convincing state offi cials to rescind water conservation requirements.46
Although the August rains meant that no emergency water supplies were necessary 
in Minnesota, other communities were not as fortunate. In North Dakota, two small 
towns, Pembina and Edmore, had inadequate supplies after the Pembina River’s fl ow 
dropped to nearly zero. In need of aid, the cities turned to the St. Paul District. In 
September, the district installed a 1,100-foot temporary pipeline connecting Pembina’s 
water treatment plant with the Red River of the North. In October, Assistant Secretary 
of the Army for Civil Works Robert Page declared Edmore drought distressed after the 
city’s main reservoir dried up. When Edmore offi cials found an old reservoir containing 
an estimated 4.5 million gallons of water, they called on the St. Paul District for help. 
The district installed a temporary pipeline and pump that drained the reservoir in 
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November. At the same time, district employees, in cooperation with the Omaha 
District, investigated more than ninety individual water supply requests from farmers 
in North Dakota and recommended that the North Central Division approve ten of 
them. The authorization was never given, but when autumn rains began falling, the 
worst of the drought was over.47
These episodes in 1988 taught the Corps several important lessons about drought in 
general. For one thing, conditions on the Mississippi River demonstrated the necessity 
of revising the district’s thirty-year-old low fl ow headwaters plan and drought 
contingency strategy. In the words of Gary Nelson, a Corps’ sociologist, “The drought 
told the staff we had severe information defi cits.”48 The St. Paul District immediately 
began working with state and federal agencies to correct these plans; and by 1991, 
according to Colonel Roger Baldwin, employees had a better understanding of “the 
physical nature of the basin” and “the physical nature of the water fl ows.” This enabled 
the Corps to produce a low fl ow headwaters plan that was “far superior” to the 
previous one.49 The drought also allowed the Corps to conduct water quality studies on 
the Mississippi River, thereby gaining information on how drought affected the river’s 
basic characteristics and how dam operations could improve water quality. The Corps’ 
Waterways Experiment Station, located in Vicksburg, Mississippi, assisted the St. Paul 
District with this study, taking samples from Pools 1 and 2 on the river and testing them 
for dissolved oxygen, pH, conductivity and temperature.50 Finally, the Corps developed 
a drought management team, similar to its fl ood management team, and studied Indian 
water rights. As Baldwin concluded, “a lot of education took place among all agencies 
and all players.”51
Lake Winnibigoshish 
Reservoir at 
the center of 
controversy during 
the drought of 1998. 
(Photo courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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Disasters Outside the St. Paul District
For the most part, the St. Paul District’s emergency operations focused on disasters 
within its own boundaries. However, in accordance with the Stafford Act of 1988, the 
district responded to emergencies in other regions as well. On October 17, 1989, for 
example, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake known as Loma Prieta rocked the San Francisco 
Bay area in California. The quake, which was the worst one in the United States since 
1906, killed sixty-two people, injured 3,775, left 12 thousand homeless, knocked out San 
Francisco’s power and caused $7.1 billion in damages. President George Bush declared 
San Francisco and other communities a major disaster area, and on October 20, FEMA 
requested Corps’ assistance in conducting residential inspections to determine whether 
people were eligible for FEMA’s individual assistance program. Normally, FEMA 
contracted out such inspection work, but because Hurricane Hugo, which had occurred 
the year before, had depleted the supply of available contractors, FEMA turned to the 
Corps for help, asking for three hundred people.52
On October 21, Corps’ headquarters in Washington, 
D.C., transmitted FEMA’s request, asking that 
divisions send only their best employees since they 
would be dealing directly with the public. Two days 
later, ten volunteers from the St. Paul District arrived 
in Sacramento, California, along with approximately 
three hundred other Corps’ personnel. Two of the 
district’s representatives were Clyde Giaquinto and 
Arne Thompson, who spent their time inspecting 
houses in Redwood City and Oakland, California. 
One of the problems they faced included people 
fraudulently claiming the earthquake had damaged 
structures actually destroyed by other means. At 
one address, for example, Giaquinto found “nothing 
more than a chain link fence in front of a vacant lot.” 
The applicant claimed the earthquake had destroyed 
his house, but after interviewing a neighbor and a 
postal worker, Giaquinto discovered the house had 
been torn down months before. Although damage 
claims investigations were not as glamorous as other 
engineering jobs, employees such as Thompson and 
Giaquinto understood that such work ensured that 
assistance only went to those truly in need. Thompson 
insisted he was glad to help in the situation, especially 
because the Corps’ efforts refuted general criticism 
levied against federal disaster relief in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Hugo. Unlike those efforts, the Loma 
Prieta earthquake response was, according to 
Thompson, “excellent.”53
Rebuilding:  The St. Paul 
District provides emergency 
operations support around 
the world. Here, Mark 
Koenig, and General 
Robert B. Flowers, Chief 
of Engineers, survey the 
area at Pol-E-Charkhi Army 
Base in Afghanistan, 2003.
(Photo by Captain Taylor Hwong, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps 
of Engineers)
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Other relief assignments allowed the Corps to focus more on engineering. At the 
end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, several members of the St. Paul District traveled 
to Kuwait to help the nation rebuild Kuwait City after its invasion and short-lived 
occupation by Iraq. The Corps had the responsibility of performing damage surveys, 
participating in emergency and long-term recovery efforts in public works, utilities, 
transportation and coordinating the reconstruction of key government and defense 
facilities. More than 2,000 Corps’ members volunteered for the response, including 
nineteen from the St. Paul District. James Ruyak, who served as chief of construction 
for the district from 1973 to 1979, worked as the resident engineer at the Ali Al-Salem 
Air Base. He surveyed damage, planned construction projects and mediated between 
the construction contractor and Kuwait’s Air Force. “The city’s entire infrastructure 
[was] pretty well destroyed,” Ruyak observed, but the Corps’ emergency response 
experience and its resources helped to restore much of Kuwait’s water, power and 
defense networks.54
In 1992, four representatives from the St. Paul District aided the city of Chicago in 
its recovery from the “Great Chicago Flood.” On April 13, 1992, a piling driven into 
the bottom of the Chicago River caused a small leak in a network of tunnels 50 feet 
underneath downtown Chicago. Water spread throughout the system, fl ooding 
basements in a number of businesses, causing power outages, closing subway routes 
and forcing thousands to evacuate. Initially, the Corps supplied only technical 
assistance to the city; but when the city could not stop the leak, FEMA authorized 
the Corps to assume command. Led by the Chicago District, the Corps set up three 
emergency operation centers around the city to coordinate repair and water removal. 
Lieutenant Colonel Mike Mahoney, deputy district engineer for the St. Paul District, 
supervised the effort to pump water from the tunnels, while Captain Mark Miller 
of the district’s Construction Branch served as chief of the Corps’ night shift team at 
the interagency command center. Dan Reinartz, from St. Paul’s hydraulics section, 
examined water conditions during the pumping operations, while Ken Gardner, chief of 
the district’s Public Affairs Offi ce, aided in media response.55
In August 1992, district employees were sent to southern Florida after Hurricane 
Andrew, a Category Four hurricane, caused $20 billion in property damage and left 
160,000 people homeless. To facilitate the cleanup effort, FEMA assigned two major  
tasks to the Corps: providing temporary roofi ng to residences and collecting storm 
debris. In response, more than 1,150 Corps’ personnel went to South Florida, including 
ten from the St. Paul District. Upon completion of its duties, the Corps had covered 
43 thousand damaged roofs and extracted 13 million cubic feet of storm debris. “It is 
amazing how the Corps of Engineers can organize,” Greg Porycky, an engineering 
technician from the district, remarked.56
The Corps also played a signifi cant role in disaster response after terrorists destroyed 
New York’s World Trade Center towers and part of the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001. At the time of the attacks, District Engineer Colonel Robert L. Ball and Deputy of 
Programs and Project Management Judith L. DesHarnais were conducting their annual 
congressional visit with U.S. Representative Ron Kind (D-Wisconsin). Although neither 
Ball nor DesHarnais were injured in the attack, the St. Paul District became involved in
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another way. Michelle M. Shafer of the St. Paul District’s Operations Branch, who was 
working at Corps’ headquarters in preparation for the upcoming hurricane season, 
was immediately mobilized along with two other employees as an Emergency Support 
Team for FEMA, and they spent the next nine days coordinating missions between 
FEMA and the Corps. The Emergency Support Team sent structural safety assessment 
teams, debris subject-matter experts and Emergency Support Function leaders to New 
York City and Washington, D.C., and also responded to telephone calls offering help. “I 
will never forget the numerous strangers, recognizing the Corps’ castle and emergency 
operations shirt I was wearing, that approached me just wanting to say thanks,” Shafer 
recounted. “It was probably one of my proudest experiences as a Corps’ employee.”57
Conclusion
Whether in the district or outside, St. Paul personnel assisted in emergency operations. 
Through the leadership and coordination of the Readiness Branch, the district 
responded to a variety of disasters, including fl oods, earthquakes and drought. This 
effort comprised several tasks. In some cases, the Corps provided technical assistance, 
equipment and coordination of operations; in other instances, the Corps helped in 
cleanup efforts and structure inspection. Each disaster gave the Corps an opportunity 
to refi ne its operations, making it more effi cient the next year. Ironically, the suffering 
of others gave the Corps some of its most positive publicity as it assisted those in need. 
As Colonel William Badger, district engineer from 1979 to 1982, stated, emergency 
operations gave the Corps “the highest marks, the highest visibility. That’s where we 
help people the most.”58 Colonel J. M. Wonsik, district engineer from 1995 to 1998, 
expressed it in a different way: natural disasters provided circumstances where the 
Corps “had no choice but to excel.” Because “each and every member of the district 
accepted that challenge personally,” the St. Paul District displayed its ability to combat 
emergencies effectively throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century.59
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Native American relations:  Swamp Creek fl ows just 
north of the formerly proposed Crandon Mine site 
into the Mole Lake Indian Reservation where the 
tribe harvests wild rice from Rice Lake. (Photo by Jon 
Ahlness, courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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During the past quarter century, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
maintained its traditional close relationship to Congress. At the same 
time, it developed stronger relationships to state, local and Indian 
tribal governments. The Corps also cultivated stronger partnerships 
with other federal agencies, such as when it responded to the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service on endangered species issues, or cooperated 
with the Environmental Protection Agency on regulatory matters or provided disaster 
relief under the auspices of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In step with 
the rest of the Corps’ organization, the St. Paul District devoted increasing effort to 
developing and sustaining myriad relationships with other federal agencies, state and 
local governments and nongovernment organizations. This development refl ected the 
growing complexity of the Corps’ mission in the environmental era as well as new 
realities associated with government reform.
Relationship with Congress
Congress traditionally took a close interest in the Corps of Engineers, particularly in 
the civil works program, which provided a prize opportunity for federal spending 
in each congressional member’s home state. In a practice known as “logrolling,” 
congressmen refrained from criticizing civil works projects in another member’s 
state in the expectation that the member would return the favor. In this way, the civil 
works program became a favorite arena for so-called “pork barrel politics” and the 
Corps became beholden to Congress. Beginning with President Carter and continuing 
through the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations, the chief executives sought to 
cut useless “pork” or undesirable projects out of the civil works program and to wean 
the Corps from its close relationship to Congress. This power struggle affected the 
Corps primarily at the headquarters level and above – especially in the Offi ce of the 
9External Relationships
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Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works). At the district level, the Corps continued 
to communicate frequently with members of Congress who represented the respective 
states. In the St. Paul District, the district engineer communicated primarily with 
senators and congressmen from Minnesota, Wisconsin and North Dakota. Although 
Congress’s relationship to the Corps in the last quarter century was highly contested at 
the national level, the relationship of local congressmen to the St. Paul District in this 
era might be better characterized as business as usual.
Local congressmen communicated directly 
with the district engineer. The local point of 
contact was crucial in times of disaster relief, 
such as during the Midwest fl oods of 1993. 
Congressmen also took the concerns of their 
constituents directly to the St. Paul District 
offi ce, as when a Section 404 permit application 
became controversial or a feasibility study hung 
in the balance. At no time was the relationship 
of Congress to the district offi ce more apparent 
than in the 1990s when the Corps’ reorganization 
plan called for elimination of the St. Paul District. 
Senators Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota) and 
Dave Durenberger (R-Minnesota) joined eighteen 
other senators in protesting the plan. Wellstone 
and Representative Bruce Vento (D-Minnesota) 
visited the St. Paul District offi ce and reassured 
Corps’ employees, saying that they were doing 
all they could to block the Administration’s 
reorganization plan or to develop an alternative 
plan. This meeting occurred in the cafeteria of 
the St. Paul Post Offi ce and was attended by 
most of the district offi ce’s 440 employees.1
Once each year, the district engineer visited 
members of Congress on Capitol Hill to inform 
them of the Corps’ various activities in their 
states and congressional districts. Typically the deputy for planning, program and 
project management or chief of planning accompanied the district engineer, and prior 
to making the rounds in the Capitol these two offi cials would meet with their superiors 
at Corps’ headquarters and the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil 
Works). Then, they proceeded to Capitol Hill, where they might get appointments 
with fi ve or six senators and a dozen or more representatives. Sometimes they met 
with a congressional staff assistant but more often they spoke directly with a senator 
or congressman. They highlighted what was of most interest to each member – civil 
works projects, feasibility studies, the environmental management program, the 
Section 404 program – and they left briefi ng papers. The St. Paul District accomplished 
these congressional visits on a yearly basis in order to keep senators and congressmen 
informed of new developments and to establish or renew personal relationships. Since 
Congressional Visits:  Deputy for 
Planning, Programs and Project 
Management Judy DesHarnais; 
Congressman Earl Pomeroy 
(D-North Dakota); District 
Engineer Colonel Robert L. Ball; 
and A.J. Wojciak, legislative 
assistant, on the steps of the 
Capital, in March 2003. (Photo 
by Marsha Mose, courtesy of St. Paul 
District, Corps of Engineers)
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the district engineers were on a three-year rotation (or two-year rotation from 1991 to 
2001) it was important for them to introduce themselves regularly.2
Interagency Cooperation
One of the most infl uential demands of the environmental movement was to force 
greater cooperation among government agencies. It was not enough to introduce 
interdisciplinary perspectives within a land-management agency such as the Army 
Corps. The holistic approach to environmental protection required interagency 
cooperation as well. Congress responded to this imperative by embedding innumerable 
requirements for interagency cooperation in environmental laws. The enthusiasm for 
establishing river basin commissions in the 1970s furthered the trend toward greater 
interagency cooperation.
In the St. Paul District, the focal point of interagency 
cooperation was the Mississippi River. Interagency 
cooperation began at the state level, as Minnesota, Wisconsin 
and Iowa shared concerns along the river where it formed 
state boundaries. It was institutionalized in the Upper 
Mississippi River Basin Commission established in 1972. The 
commission included the three states together with fi ve federal 
agencies: the Army Corps of Engineers, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the Soil Conservation Service (now Natural Resources 
Conservation Service), the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the Department of Transportation. The Corps worked 
particularly closely with the Fish and Wildlife Service, for 
the Corps was responsible for dredging the navigation 
channel, while the Fish and Wildlife Service was responsible 
for managing fi sh and wildlife habitat. Indeed, much of the 
area was designated as wildlife refuges and came under the 
jurisdiction of the Fish and Wildlife Service. The placement 
of dredged material on manmade and natural islands and in back channels, sloughs and 
wetlands posed both a threat and an opportunity for habitat management. 3 This was a 
classic example of the need for interagency cooperation.
Environmental groups were vigilant in demanding interagency cooperation in order to 
make one federal agency serve as a watchdog over another federal agency. The Corps 
had a long-standing arrangement of transferring funds to the Fish and Wildlife Service to 
help the latter agency study and recommend ways to modify civil works projects so as to 
enhance fi sh and wildlife habitat. The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act authorized the 
transfer of funds. When the Army threatened to eliminate the transfers in the early 1980s, 
a prominent Washington-based environmental group, the Wildlife Management Institute, 
protested. The departments of natural resources of Wisconsin and Minnesota also stood 
to lose both funding and input regarding Corps’ actions if the Army decision held.4
Congress responded to these concerns by mandating more intensive cooperation 
between the Corps and the Fish and Wildlife Service on the Upper Mississippi. 
Interagency 
cooperation:  District 
personnel consult with 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service staff, 1982. 
(Photo by Lyle Nicklay, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, 
Corps of Engineers)
Ex
te
rn
al
 R
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
9 224
Congress designated the Upper Mississippi River System a nationally signifi cant 
ecosystem. It funded a series of “habitat projects” along the river under the Corps’ 
new Environmental Management Program.5 The habitat projects were a combination 
of dredge-and-fi ll operations and bank stabilization efforts, each designed with a view 
to enhancing fi sh and wildlife habitat while preserving the navigable waterway. These 
projects involved the Fish and Wildlife Service in project design and environmental 
monitoring. The states participated under cost-sharing agreements.6
After Congress authorized the Mississippi National River and Recreation Area 
in 1988, the Corps coordinated with the National Park Service on navigation and 
recreation issues. The protected area extended for 80 miles along the river from Dayton, 
Minnesota, to Hastings, Minnesota, and the St. Paul District commander served as 
commissioner on an advisory board. The Corps already consulted with the National 
Park Service on matters involving historic properties and other cultural resources 
under the Corps’ jurisdiction, as required by the National Historic Preservation Act of 
1966 and NEPA. The historic properties included the system of locks and dams on the 
Mississippi River. The Corps additionally coordinated with the National Park Service 
on issues involving the Rainy River drainage in Voyageurs National Park, located on 
Minnesota’s international border with Ontario. Interagency cooperation became yet 
more structured in the Upper Mississippi River System Environmental Management 
Program established by Congress. Although the Environmental Management 
Program was fundamentally a partnership, Congress invested the Corps with overall 
responsibility for federal management of the program. The Corps actively coordinated 
with the U.S. Department of the Interior, the Upper Mississippi River Basin Association 
and the fi ve states of Minnesota – Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa and Missouri. The Corps’ 
North Central Division managed the program, while three districts – St. Paul, Rock 
Island and St. Louis – managed the habitat projects within their boundaries. The 
Environmental Management Program recognized the river’s importance both as a 
system of major national wildlife refuges and a commercial waterway for navigation.7
International Cooperation
The International Joint Commission, or IJC, is a permanent body established by the 
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. Its purpose is to deal impartially with problems 
of mutual concern wherever waters extend along or fl ow across the international 
boundary. Historically, the IJC was concerned primarily with obstruction or diversion 
of water, particularly where it affected navigability. In the latter part of the twentieth 
century, it became increasingly involved with water quality, especially in the Great 
Lakes. As the St. Paul District is bounded on the north by the international border 
with Canada, the district is one of a handful of Corps’ districts involved with the IJC. 
After the St. Paul District boundaries were realigned in 1979, the district was no longer 
concerned with Great Lakes matters. In its present confi guration the St. Paul District 
encompasses three rivers that fl ow along or across the international border: the Rainy, 
Red and Souris rivers.
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The IJC consists of six commissioners: three Canadians and three Americans. One 
member from each nation serves full-time as a cochairman, while the other two 
commissioners from each nation serve part-time. The commissioners act as a unitary 
body and are supposed to make decisions which will best serve both nations. While 
the IJC itself maintains only a small technical staff, it is empowered to establish boards, 
composed of engineers and other technical experts from both nations, to oversee 
particular issues. The boards may meet regularly or conduct studies, and they make 
recommendations to the IJC.8
In 1980, the St. Paul District district engineer served on seven different boards under the 
IJC. These were the International Lake of the Woods Control Board (established 1925), 
International Rainy Lake Board of Control (1940), International Prairie Portage River 
Board of Control (1939), International Souris-Red Rivers Engineering Board (1948), 
International Pembina River Engineering Board (1962), International Roseau River 
Engineering Board (1971) and International Garrison Diversion Study Board (1975). The 
number of boards proliferated as the IJC became more involved with pollution issues. 
In 2001, the district engineer served on four international boards: the International 
Lake of the Woods Control Board, International Rainy Lake Board of Control, 
International Souris-Red Rivers Engineering Board, and International Red River Board 
of Control.9 Each board comprised a small number of public offi cials from each nation. 
The International Souris-Red Rivers Engineering Board, for example, included three 
U.S. offi cials from the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers and the Geological 
Survey together with two Canadian offi cials from the departments of Agriculture and 
Environment.10
As has been discussed in Chapter Four, the Souris and Red rivers present diffi cult 
problems for fl ood control. Both rivers fl ow north. Spring thaw generally occurs 
upstream (in the United States) before it occurs downstream (in Canada), causing 
fl oodwaters to back up and overfl ow the riverbanks. Moreover, the two river valleys are 
exceptionally fl at and the fl oodplains cover large expanses containing both urban and 
The Souris River 
at Minot, North 
Dakota, with levee 
and channel work 
performed by the 
Corps of Engineers. 
(Photo courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of 
Engineers)
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agricultural development. The Corps of Engineers operates a number of fl ood control 
dams and reservoirs on these rivers and their tributaries in North Dakota and on the 
Minnesota-North Dakota state line.
Relations with Indian Tribes
At the end of the twentieth century the Corps was no newcomer to political 
controversies involving Indian tribes and resources. Numerous dam projects had 
involved the Corps with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal representatives since 
the 1930s.11 For most of this period, however, the federal government treated tribes as 
dependent wards, with the government in the role of trustee and guardian. This began 
to change in the 1970s, when the Nixon Administration adopted a national policy of 
Indian self-determination aimed at promoting tribal self-government. Congress enacted 
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, which initiated 
a broad program of federal support for greater tribal autonomy in the management of 
tribal resources. With federal assistance, tribes took control of programs formerly under 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal governments increased their power through the 
formation of intertribal political organizations. As one example of this trend, tribes in 
Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota formed The Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife 
Commission, which pressed for the protection of treaty rights through legal action. 
Environmental legislation in the 1970s required federal agencies to consult with tribal 
governments on actions that could affect tribal resources or treaty rights. The National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the River and Harbor and Flood Control Act of 1970 
and the Water Resources Development Act of 1974 provided new requirements for the 
Corps to deal with Indian tribes. In 1978, these requirements were strengthened by the 
Council on Environmental Quality, which published “Regulations for Implementing the 
Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.” Under these 
regulations, the Corps needed to consult with tribes concerning project development 
and project de-authorization, real estate acquisition and disposal, water resources 
planning, wildlife mitigation and other environmental management programs, cultural 
resources management and regulatory functions. Importantly, these consultation 
requirements were not limited to actions involving Indian lands but extended to other 
Indian resources such as cultural sites and off-reservation hunting and fi shing grounds 
associated with treaty rights.12
President Jimmy Carter sought to increase coordination between the Corps and tribes 
on water development projects. In a memorandum concerning federal and Indian 
reserved water rights dated July 12, 1978, Carter outlined procedures for federal 
agencies to evaluate Indian water development projects and to increase Indian 
water development in conjunction with quantifi cation of water rights. Secretary of 
the Interior Cecil D. Andrus established a federal task force, which held a series of 
meetings with Indian representatives and made recommendations in a report. It 
specifi cally recommended the Corps establish procedures for coordinating with tribes 
on water development projects and for consulting with tribes on permit applications 
that might affect tribal resources. While the Corps initially responded favorably to the 
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recommendations, the initiative died with the advent of the Reagan Administration 
in 1981.13
Federal environmental legislation and Indian policy were not the only factors that 
encouraged tribes to assert tribal sovereignty during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. As the courts and the Indian Claims Commission entered judgments awarding 
money to tribes for past actions by the United States (mainly involving inadequate 
compensation for land takings), tribes often employed these funds so as to assert 
themselves in economic planning and development. Moreover, various court rulings 
in this era reaffi rmed tribal sovereignty in matters ranging from the power to tax and 
create corporations and administer justice for tribal members, to environmental matters 
such as the authority to regulate water quality on the reservation. In the mid-1980s, the 
Environmental Protection Agency initiated government-to-government agreements 
with tribes concerning the setting of water quality standards. Courts subsequently 
upheld the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to treat Indian tribes as states 
under the Clean Water Act.
The move toward government-to-government relations signifi cantly advanced when 
President Bill Clinton signed a memorandum dated April 29, 1994, directing the head 
of each executive department and agency to improve federal cooperation with tribal 
governments. Clinton specifi cally called for a government-to-government framework 
for dealing with federally-recognized tribes. In response to Clinton’s initiative, the 
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, John H. Zirschky, directed the 
Corps to hold interest-group workshops and gather data aimed at improving the Corps’ 
working relationships with tribal governments. The Corps assigned this responsibility 
to a Native American Intergovernmental Relations Task Force under the auspices of the 
Institute for Water Resources.14
Between February and June 1995, fi eld personnel met with tribal representatives 
of 186 tribes. Each district offi ce prepared an after action report on the workshops 
and supplied the data to the task force. The task force found a nationwide pattern of 
“confl ict ... between the Corps multistage execution of its water resource missions 
and its obligation, as a federal agency, to honor the commitments made to Federally 
Recognized Tribes in treaties, statutes, administrative orders, and court cases.” It stated 
the Corps had an obligation “to reconcile these confl icts as they arise.”15
The St. Paul District participated in two workshops, the fi rst drawing representatives of 
ten tribes in Minnesota and North Dakota, and the second, held jointly with the Detroit 
District, drawing representatives of all nine federally-recognized tribes in Wisconsin.16 
The general format of the workshops was a series of presentations on Corps’ programs 
followed by round-table discussions of tribal concerns. Many of the tribes’ comments 
were directed at the regulatory program. For example, the tribes wanted assurance that 
the Corps would enforce clean water standards where the tribes adopted more stringent 
standards than the states, and they wanted the Corps to “lobby” against weakening 
of the Clean Water Act. (On the latter point, Corps’ offi cials stated the Corps does not 
lobby for or against its programs, and that tribes must take this initiative.) Another 
theme in the discussions concerned the defi nition of tribal trust resources. The Corps 
wanted the tribes to identify their trust resources, and it offered to assist the tribes with 
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wetland mapping, aerial and ground surveys and other means. The tribes stated they 
lacked money and manpower to do this, and they believed the Corps defi ned trust 
resources too narrowly. In particular, they disagreed with the St. Paul District counsel’s 
view that a tribal trust resource must be specifi cally mentioned in a federal legal 
document such as a treaty or executive order. The tribes noted that many tribal trust 
resources related to cultural heritage or spiritual values and could not be described in 
“Euro-Asian terms” for the Corps.17
Part of the workshops’ emphasis on the Corps’ regulatory responsibilities stemmed 
from the controversy surrounding the Crandon Mine proposal, which threatened 
to impact no fewer than eight federally-recognized tribes. Three tribes occupied 
reservations in the vicinity of the mine: the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe, the 
Menominee Indian Tribe and the Sokaogon Chippewa Community (Mole Lake Band). 
Five other tribes reaffi rmed in court their rights to hunt, fi sh and gather in the area 
around the mine. These tribes were the Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, 
the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa, the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa and the 
St. Croix Band of Lake Superior Chippewa. Additional tribes potentially had trust 
resources at stake, having ceded lands in the area.18
When the workshops 
convened, the three tribes 
whose reservations were 
near the Crandon Mine had 
recently produced a study, 
“The Potential Cultural Impact 
of the Development of the 
Crandon Mine on the Indian 
Communities of Northeastern 
Wisconsin.” This contracted 
report by two anthropologists 
and a biologist described 
the history of resource use 
by the affected tribes and 
the potential environmental 
impacts of mining operations. 
The report warned of sulfuric 
acid pollution in Rice Lake and the Wolf River – vital 
resources to the Mole Lake Band and the Menominee 
Tribe respectively – not only as a consequence of 
mining, but also in anticipation of mine abandonment 
many years in the future.19 Tribal representatives 
raised these concerns in the workshop three months 
later when they admonished the Corps to evaluate 
projects on a longer time frame. Although the Corps 
normally considered project lives of fi fty to a hundred 
years, one tribal representative stated, tribal policy 
Native American relations:  
Swamp Creek fl ows just 
north of the formerly 
proposed Crandon Mine site 
into the Mole Lake Indian 
Reservation where the tribe 
harvest wild rice from Rice 
Lake. (Photo by Jon Ahness, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps 
of Engineers)
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was to consider effects on the next seven generations. Therefore, the Corps was urged 
to weigh the benefi ts of a mine that might create an economic boom for twenty to forty 
years against the costs of “decades of restoration work.”20
Each of the three tribes in the vicinity of the Crandon Mine had unique concerns. The 
Mole Lake Band occupied a reservation only two miles from the mine site, and the 
reservation encompassed Rice Lake, from which they harvested wild rice. According 
to early versions of the mining proposal, wastewater from the mine would enter 
Swamp Creek and fl ow into Rice Lake, threatening the wild rice crop. The Potawatomi 
were located on lands northeast of the mine site and their primary concern pertained 
to air quality. They did not want airborne pollutants descending on the area and 
contaminating the plants and animals that formed a substantial part of their diet. 
The Menominee Reservation, meanwhile, was located south of the mine site and was 
traversed by the Wolf River. The portion of the river fl owing through the reservation is 
a national wild and scenic river. The tribe was concerned about the water quality of the 
river, particularly as several tribal chiefs were buried along its banks.21
Tribal demands that the Corps defi ne its trust responsibilities toward Indian tribes 
intensifi ed in 1997, when the Corps handed the Crandon Mining Company a seeming 
victory in its long effort to develop the mine. Faced with formidable problems in 
protecting the water quality in the vicinity of the mine, the Crandon Mining Company 
altered its proposal and requested state approval to pump 600 gallons per minute 
of treated wastewater some 38 miles to the Wisconsin River. The Corps determined 
the transfer of water from the Great Lakes basin to the Mississippi River watershed 
would not be illegal because the federal diversion law applied only to surface waters.22 
Although the Corps’ ruling was soon superseded by other developments, it served as 
a catalyst for an exchange of issue papers between the Corps and the tribes about the 
Corps’ trust responsibilities.
Tribal attorneys accused the Corps of failing to consider its trust responsibilities 
adequately. In answer to these charges, the St. Paul District developed an issue paper 
about the Corps’ trust responsibilities toward Indian tribes in the regulatory permitting 
process. Prepared by District Counsel Edwin C. Bankston, the issue paper was reviewed 
by attorneys in Corps’ headquarters, who concurred in its analysis.23 On September 29, 
1997, District Engineer Colonel J. M. Wonsik transmitted the issue paper to the tribes, 
proposing the Corps meet with tribal representatives sixty days later for consultation.24 
This meeting never took place.25
Bankston’s eleven-page paper addressed a number of issues, citing federal case law. 
Fundamentally, the Corps had a responsibility, explicitly recognized in Northwest Sea 
Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1996) to protect Indian treaty rights. In 
other words, the Corps could not issue a Section 404 or Section 10 permit that would 
cause a treaty right to be impinged or abrogated.26 This much was unambiguous.
Most Indian treaties in Minnesota and Wisconsin conditionally secured “usufructuary 
rights” to hunt, fi sh and gather wild foods on lands off the reservation. These rights 
were limited to “ceded lands,” or demarcated areas that each tribe had once occupied 
and ceded to the United States during the nineteenth century. Bankston held that the 
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Indians’ usufructuary rights to resources such as game and fi sh invested the federal 
government with a trust responsibility toward those same resources; thus, the Corps 
had to consider Indian treaty rights both on and off reservations. However, Bankston 
noted, the usufructuary rights were extinguished when the land passed into private 
ownership. In contrast, Indian treaties in the Pacifi c Northwest made usufructuary 
rights perpetual. Bankston argued the difference was signifi cant, that it affected the 
federal government’s obligation to determine some form of mitigation when treaty 
rights were involved. The Corps, he wrote, should apply the same criteria to permit 
applications for activities on or off reservations; however, it was “very likely” that an 
activity located off reservation would have a lesser impact on tribal resources.27
Since the Corps’ regulatory program required that it conduct a public interest review 
for all individual permit applications, Bankston asked: did the Corps’ tribal trust 
responsibilities take precedence over public interests? Bankston argued that tribal 
resources should be “considered in the public interest review just as any other similarly 
sized community would be.” But, he added, adverse impacts to natural resources could 
have a greater effect on Indians than on non-Indians, since the “individual Indian may 
be more closely tied to the defi ned land area than his non-Indian counterpart.”28
One-and-a-half years later, 
the Great Lakes Indian Fish 
and Wildlife Commission, 
representing several tribes 
in Minnesota, Wisconsin 
and Michigan; the Sokaogon 
Chippewa Community; and the 
Menominee Indian Nation jointly 
prepared a detailed response 
to the Bankston’s issue paper 
entitled “Tribal Rights and Trust 
Responsibility.”29 The nineteen 
page paper explained the legal 
basis for tribal rights in natural 
resources for each of the affected 
tribes, and then it opined on 
federal trust responsibilities. M. 
Catherine Condon, an attorney representing the 
Indian groups, transmitted the paper to the St. 
Paul District on April 15, 1999.30
Tribal representatives and Corps’ offi cials 
met in St. Paul on April 23, 1999, to discuss 
the two papers. Although the papers were 
close on many points, two critical differences 
emerged. First, the tribes held that the federal 
government’s trust responsibility required the 
Corps choose the regulatory alternative that 
Native American relations:  A 
consultation between District 
Engineer Colonel Robert L. Ball 
(right) and the Menominee 
Tribe was conducted at the 
Menominee Indian Reservation. 
Ken Fish, Menominee Treaty Rights 
Offi ce, a representative from the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, is on the 
left. (Photo by Jon Ahness, courtesy of St. 
Paul District, Corps of Engineers)
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would be in the best interests of the tribes; the Corps, on the other hand, insisted that 
it need only consider tribal interests alongside others. The second difference was a 
procedural issue that followed from the fi rst point: the tribes believed that the Corps’ 
consideration of trust resources must be decoupled from the public interest review 
process; the Corps maintained that the two could be handled at once.31
Tribal representatives and the Corps had two follow-up meetings in an attempt to 
resolve differences raised by the issue papers – the fi rst on May 26 in St. Paul, and 
the second on June 23 in Keshena, Wisconsin. The tribes continued to argue that trust 
responsibilities required separate consideration. Indeed, representatives of the Mole 
Lake Band refused to participate in meetings with representatives of the Crandon 
Mining Company. When the Corps allowed company representatives to attend one 
of these meetings – because the company was concerned as well about whether tribal 
interests would be separated out of the public interest review – the Mole Lake Band 
walked out of the meeting. Henceforth, the Corps initiated dual monthly telephone 
conference calls: one with the company and one with the tribes.32 Government-to-
government meetings continued between the district engineer and tribal chairpersons 
in 2001 and 2002.33
There was no clear resolution of the question: do trust responsibilities take precedence 
over public interest review? In terms of process, the tribes appeared to have won their 
point: the Corps initiated its own EIS rather than team with the state Department of 
Natural Resources on this mammoth study owing to the federal government’s trust 
responsibilities to the tribes, and its consultation with the tribes took the form of 
government-to-government talks. But in terms of product, the Corps would not allow 
its hands to be tied. As the massive environmental impact study neared completion, it 
remained unclear how trust resources would be defi ned and what level of protection 
they would be afforded.
Ultimately, the Forest County Potawatomi and Mole Lake Band concluded the federal 
government’s trust responsibility would not necessarily preclude development of the 
mine. To assure the mine would not be developed, the two tribes decided to purchase 
the property with tribal funds. On October 28, 2003, the tribes acquired 5,770 acres in 
Forest County and 169 acres in Shawano and Oconto counties for $1.6 million. A few 
days later, the tribes withdrew the application to open the mine, ending twenty-fi ve 
years of controversy over impending environmental impacts. The Mole Lake Band’s 
chairwoman, Sandra Rachal, stated, “We made this decision to protect our people 
and our resources.” Whether the Corps would have denied a Section 404 permit for 
the Crandon Mine in the fi nal analysis anyway would never be known, but certainly 
the controversy forced the St. Paul District to explore facets of the Corps’ federal trust 
responsibility to Indian tribes as no other district had. The district’s government-to-
government relations with these Indian tribes established a positive foundation for 
further engagement with tribal governments in the future.
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Conclusion
Regional planning and interagency cooperation have become increasingly vital 
concerns to the Corps in the last quarter century. As land managers seek to balance 
competing interests and to accomplish tasks with fi nite resources, they must ensure 
that one agency’s actions do not confl ict with another’s, and that resources are shared 
whenever possible. For the St. Paul District, managing the Upper Mississippi River is 
the most complicated interagency effort it has ever undertaken. Yet, other demands 
on the district highlighted the trend toward greater government-to-government 
consultation as well as interagency cooperation. Situated on the boundary with Canada, 
the Corps consulted with land managers across the border. And, it dealt with the 
unique relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, consulting with 
tribal governments on issues affecting Indian trust resources.
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Flooding on Sheppard Road in St. Paul, Minn., 
at the end of the twentieth century.
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In the last quarter century, few public agencies could match the 
record of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for reinvention as it 
transformed itself from the nation’s leading dam builder to the 
nation’s leading water resources steward. Some observers admired 
the agency’s commitment and fi nesse, while others maintained that 
despite the Corps’ best effort to adapt to the environmental era, it still 
had outlived its usefulness. Regardless, the St. Paul District proved to be one of the 
Corps’ most forward looking districts in its approach to civil works design, protection 
of wetlands and other Corps’ missions. In addition, mirroring the experience of 
other administrative units of the Corps, the St. Paul District underwent signifi cant 
organizational change and adopted new ways of doing business in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century.
In its civil works program, the district worked energetically with commissions such 
as the Great River Environmental Action Team and the Upper Mississippi River 
Basin Commission to improve management of the Upper Mississippi River. The 
Corps demonstrated sensitivity to the environment, albeit with prodding from 
environmental groups, in its implementation of the Upper Mississippi River System 
Environmental Management Program, as well as its efforts to preserve the Higgins’ 
eye mussel. Even as the district pointed to these accomplishments, however, the 
Corps as a whole faced new questions about its commitment to environmental values 
following the Inspector General’s investigation of the Corps’ Upper Mississippi River-
Illinois Waterway Navigation Study.
Outside of the Upper Mississippi River Environmental Management Program, the 
St. Paul District faced a decline in workload for civil works as large dam projects 
were curtailed – indeed, interrupted in mid-construction in the case of the La Farge 
Dam – due to environmental concerns. The district adjusted to the environmental 
era by developing a workload that involved smaller, more numerous, and less 
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environmentally destructive projects. Communities continued to look to the Corps for 
assistance in fl ood control, but the district responded with measures that were more 
modest in scale. It also touted nonstructural solutions such as moving buildings out 
of the fl ood plain and modifying land uses so that communities were less exposed 
to fl ood damages. In the case of the La Farge Dam, the St. Paul District mothballed a 
project that had already cost $18 million and was forty percent complete. After several 
years of litigation, the Corps fi nally offi cially abandoned the project and mitigated 
its effects by assisting the State of Wisconsin and the Ho-Chunk Indian Nation in the 
development of a nature reserve on that section of the Kickapoo River.
Although the St. Paul District no longer proposed large dam and reservoir projects for 
fl ood control, it continued to respond to communities’ requests for fl ood protection. 
Adapting to new cost-sharing approaches mandated by WRDA-86, the district worked 
successfully with cities such as Rochester, Minnesota, and Grand Forks/East Grand 
Forks on the North Dakota-Minnesota state line to construct fl ood control projects 
under elaborate cooperative agreements. Indeed, new federal guidelines required local 
communities to take greater initiative, and the district’s protracted negotiations with 
the neighboring communities of Grand Forks/East Grand Forks demonstrated the 
increased level of public review and political coalition building that the Corps had to 
undertake in order to secure large civil works projects in this new era.
The environmental era posed new opportunities for the Corps, as well as challenges 
to its traditional mission of waterway improvements for navigation and fl ood control. 
The St. Paul District implemented new Corps’ responsibilities with zeal, in part to 
take the place of civil works projects. After the Corps received the duty of regulating 
the nation’s wetlands, for example, the St. Paul District pioneered a major innovation 
in the Section 404 program by revising regulatory boundaries to conform to state 
lines. This enabled the Corps to work in close cooperation with the Wisconsin and 
Minnesota DNRs on wetlands protection. With the aid of the states, the district 
improved public compliance with the regulatory program.
But the public did not readily associate the Corps with the protection of wetlands. 
Section 404 permitting was somewhat of a thankless task, for it incurred the irritation 
of many landowners and developers who saw excessive government red tape in the 
Corps’ handling of tens of thousands of permits annually. Given the large number 
of wetlands under its jurisdiction and the strong inclination of farming communities 
to accept agricultural practices that harmed wetlands, the St. Paul District had an 
exceptional responsibility for environmental protection. Increasingly, the St. Paul 
District had to mediate differences between urban dwellers who valued biodiversity 
in the surrounding countryside and rural residents who wanted farmers to prosper 
even at the cost of destroying wetlands. The St. Paul District sought to balance these 
competing interests, or in Colonel Badger’s telling phrase, to “swim in the middle 
of the river.” In that way, the St. Paul District gained the public’s respect, which 
ultimately helped the Corps win the public’s support of a more regulatory environment.
Under the mandate of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the St. 
Paul District vigorously implemented a cultural resources program and worked 
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assiduously to maintain the district’s own history. Using visitor centers, oral history 
programs and public outreach, the St. Paul District preserved its past and shared 
it with others. Even as the Corps struggled with the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation over Section 106 compliance on regulatory projects, the St. Paul District 
maintained a positive relationship with the Minnesota State Historic Preservation 
Offi ce. At the same time, district archeologists effectively implemented the Section 
106 program on civil works projects and worked with Native American groups to 
preserve their history and cultural resources.
Recreational use of reservoirs and other waterways 
under the Corps’ management increased signifi cantly 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Water 
sports gained popularity, boosting demand for 
public access to these areas even beyond the 
increases in recreational use that stemmed from 
population growth and rising affl uence. Managing 
civil works projects for recreational use was not 
new to the St. Paul District, but it acquired more 
emphasis in the period since 1975. The recreation 
program was distinctive because it involved so 
much interaction with the general public. It entailed 
issues of public access and visitor safety, as well as 
outreach programs aimed at encouraging public 
enjoyment of Corps-built facilities. Public recreation 
was not as central to the Corps’ mission as it was 
to an agency such as the National Park Service; 
yet with the amount of water resources under its 
control, the Corps had to respond to growing public 
demand for recreational opportunities. The St. Paul 
District maintained a number of parks connected 
with dams and reservoirs, and it cooperated with the 
National Park Service in the management of public 
recreational use in the Mississippi National River and 
Recreation Area.
The region covered by the St. Paul District is  susceptible to drought and fl ood, 
and the Corps participated in numerous disaster response actions. Notable fl ood 
fi ghts included efforts to protect communities along the Red River in 1978, 1979, 
1989 and 1997, and the response to the epic Midwest fl ood of 1993. St. Paul District 
personnel participated in disaster relief operations outside the district as well, notably 
in connection with war-stricken areas in the Middle East and in New York City, 
following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. During the past three decades, 
federal disaster relief efforts as a whole grew more costly and complex, raising issues 
about the role of the federal government in prevention and response. The Midwest 
fl oods in particular led to reevaluation of fl oodplain management.
Navigation:  Kevin Reesie 
and James Marquardt test 
the ice thickness on the 
Mississippi River at Lake 
Pepin. (Photo by Mark Edlund, 
courtesy of St. Paul District, Corps 
of Engineers)
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Like other districts, the St. Paul District reorganized itself and adopted new 
methods of operations, both internally and in its relations with other entities, in 
order to improve effi ciency. Cost-sharing and project management were two salient 
programs. The uncertainty and confusion surrounding the reorganization of the 
Corps took a human toll, but it also produced bursts of creativity – as evidenced 
by several award-winning designs produced by the St. Paul District staff – and a 
stronger organization. In the area of human resources, a noteworthy accomplishment 
of the district was the number of women who had attained senior staff positions at 
the end of the twentieth century.
This recent history of the St. Paul District has emphasized two themes: the relative 
success of the Corps of Engineers in responding to environmentalism and the 
pressure on the Corps to adopt new business practices as part of a wider effort to 
reform federal government. Looking ahead, it appears likely that both the public 
concern for the environment and the search for effi ciencies in government will 
continue to dominate Corps’ administration in the next few decades of the twenty-
fi rst century. The Corps will be involved with two key environmental concerns in the 
future: climate change resulting from global warming and pressures on land use from 
continuing population growth. Long-range projections of the national debt suggest 
there will be a continuing struggle over the federal budget. The St. Paul District will 
no doubt face challenges, but these are challenges that it has capably handled during 
the past twenty-fi ve years.
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BRAC    Base Realignment and Closure
CARP    Concerned About River People
DNR     Department of Natural Resources
EIS     Environmental Impact Statement
EMP     Upper Mississippi River System Environmental Management Program
FEMA    Federal Emergency Management Administration
FTE     Full-time Equivalent
GREAT    Great River Environmental Action Team
HQUSACE   Headquarters Division, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
IJC     International Joint Commission
NEPA    National Environmental Policy Act
ROPE    Reservoir Operating Plan Evaluation
SHPO    Minnesota State Historic Preservation Offi ce
TCPs    Traditional Cultural Properties
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District Commanders
1976 - 2007
NAME      YEARS OF COMMAND
Colonel Michael J. Price    2010 -  
Colonel Jon L. Christensen    2007 - 2010
Colonel Michael F. Pfenning    2004 - 2007
Lt. Colonel Thomas E. O’Hara    2004
Colonel Robert L. Ball     2001 - 2004
Colonel Kenneth S. Kasprisin    1998 - 2001
Lt. Colonel William J. Breyfogle    1998
Colonel J. M. Wonsik     1995 - 1998
Colonel James T. Scott     1993 - 1995
Colonel Richard W. Craig     1991 - 1993
Colonel Roger L. Baldwin     1988 - 1991
Colonel Joseph Briggs     1985 - 1988
Colonel Edward G. Rapp     1982 - 1985
Colonel William W. Badger    1979 - 1982
Colonel Forrest T. Gay III     1976 - 1979
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